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We have seen many world events, and recent years have 
been filled with any number of violent ones, from wars to 
genocides. But until September 11, we have had no 
symbolic event on a world scale that marked a setback 
for globalization itself. . .In dealing all the cards to itself 
the system forced the Other to change the rules of the 
game. And the new rules are ferocious, because the game 
is ferocious .. . 
- Baudrillard, 2002: 1 
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I Synopsis 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, have changed America forever. In a 
horrific manner the vuInerability of the highly developed states was demonstrated 
and exposed in world politics. The event is ushering a new political era where far-
reaching shifts in international relations are under way. 
In the post Cold-War international world it appears that the ideological 
conflict between capitalism and socialism has been replaced by a new world order. 
One that has retained the binary conflict structure of the Cold War, except that this 
binary is now presented by political Islam and consumerist's capitalism (Martin, 
2000:155). Indeed, in the previous bipolar world order, the acute distinction between 
capitalism and communism served to attenuate the discord in and between 
religions. This complex blurring of distinctions has been systematically heightened 
since the end of the Cold War, as it has allowed Western governments to maintain 
controlling interests outside of their dominions (Gupta, 2002:6) . This struggle has 
since been conceived in a variety of different, but related ways: A 'Clash of 
Civilizations' (Huntington 1996), or as an inescapable dialectic typical of the process 
of globalization itself (Barber, 1996:245). 
In the case of Huntington's (1996:19-20) genealogical narrative, he refers to global 
politics and the way in which the future will be reconfigured according to cultural 
identities. The division along these cultural lines, will furthermore "shape" the 
patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the Post-Cold War world" 
(Huntington, 1996:20). Huntington's thesis is rather overriding in explaining the 
clash between the supposedly 'West' vs. 'Rest', whose interaction is historically 
determined. Yet, the genealogical narrative is not sufficient in taking into account the 
dynamics of globalization. Benjamin Barber's structural narrative, on the other hand, 
goes to great lengths to illustrate the paradoxical relationship between Jihad and 
McWorld, and how both forces tend to survive in a world that they inevitably create. 
By' acknowledging the relevance of both binaries (East/West), it is hoped to 
transcend them by presenting a structural-genealogical grand narrative, which will 
essentially allow one to understand Jihad as being a structural moment of the 
genealogical narrative. Given this general strategy, it will become perceptible that 
Jihad is one form of anti-globalization as the structural narratives become part of the 
genealogical and the genealogical part of the structural. 
In essence, then, this thesis is attempting to come to grips with the 
phenomenon of September 11, from a political-philosophical perspective. More 
specifically, this study will firstly be looking at two different, but related narratives 
that have emerged post-September 11, to make sense of tlle event. Given the 
structural-genealogical approach, the central concern in this study is consequently to 
look at two separate but related interests. The one pertains to history and the other 
to historiography. 
*** 
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I Synopsis (in Dutch) 
De aanvallen van September 11, 2001, hebben Amerika voor altijd veranderd. 
Op zeer geweldadige wijze hebben zij aangetoond en tevens blootgelegd hoe 
kwetsbaar de overontwikkelde landen eigenlijk zijn in politiek perspectief. Deze 
gebeurtenis heeft een tijdperk van nieuwe politiek tot stand gebracht, waarbij 
verstrekkende verschuivingen, op het gebied van internationale relaties, in 
ontwikkeling zijn. 
Op internationaal niveau blijkt het, dat na de Koude Oorlog, het ideologische 
conflict tussen kapitalisme en socialisme, vervangen is door een nieuwe wereldorde. 
Deze wereldorde heeft weliswaar het tweezijdige conflictstructuur van de Koude 
Oorlog behouden, behalve dat deze tweezijdigheid nu gepresenteerd wordt als een 
conflict tussen politiek Islam en het consumenten kapitalisme (Martin, 2000:155). 
Ongetwijfeld heeft het overduidelijke onderscheid tussen comrnunisme en 
kapitalisme, in de vorige tweepolige wereldorde gediend, om de onenigheid, onder 
en tussen geloofsovertuigingen, te sussen. Deze complexe vertroebeling van 
verscheidenheid, heeft op systematische wijze gestalte gekregen sinds het einde van 
de Koude Oorlog, en heeft het de Westerse regeringen toegelaten, om uitvoerende 
macht te behouden over belangen buiten hun grenzen om. (Gupta, 2002:26). Deze 
strijd is sindsdien op verschillende, maar verwante manieren geinterpreteerd: een 
'Clash of Civilizations' (Huntington 1996), of als een onontkoombare vervormde 
kenmerk van het globalisatie proces alszodanig (Barber, 1996:240). In de 
genealogische beschrijving van Huntington (1996:19-20), verwijst hij naar globale 
politiek, en de wijze waarop de toekomst geherstructureerd zal worden wat betreft 
culturele identiteiten. De verdeeldheid, wat deze culturele aspecten aangaat, zal 
bovendien de samenhangende patronen van disintegratie, en het conflict in de 
wereld van na Koude Oorlog gestalte geven, (Huntington, 1996:20). De thesis van 
Huntington minimaliseert de tegenstrijdigheid tussen de veronderstelde, "West" 
versus "Rest" wiens interactie in wezen al historisch bepaald is. Desalniettemin is 
deze genealogische beschrijving niet voldoende om de dynamiek van globalisatie te 
onderkennen. 
De structurele beschrijving van Benjamin Barber (1996) daarentegen, getroost 
grote moeite, om de paradoxale relatie tussen Jihad en McWorld te beschrijven, en 
hoe beide krachten blijken te overleven in een wereld die zij onvermijdelijk zelf 
gecreerd hebben. Door de betrekkelijkheid van beide tegenpolen, OostjWest, te 
onderkennen, hoopt het hen te vervormen door een grote structurele en 
genealogische beschrijving aan te bieden, waardoor men zal begrijpen, hoe de Jihad 
een structureel moment is van genealogische uitleg. Gezien deze algemene strategie, 
zal het duidelijk worden dat de Jihad een vorm is van antiglobalisatie, aangezien de 
structurele uitleg deel wordt van het beleg van zekere voorgaande data en 
evenementen. Gezien deze structurele- en genealogische benadering, is het algemene 
belang in deze studie dientengevolge, om twee afzonderlijke, echter verwante 
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belangen, in aanmerking te nemen. Het ene behoort aan geschiedenis toe, en het 
andere aan geschiedkunde. 
*** 
IX 
Isishwankathelo (in Xhosa) 
Uhlaselo langomhIa weshumi elinanye kwinyanga yomsintsi ngonyaka 
wamawaka amabini ananye (September 11, 2002) lure lwanyijika iMelika 
ngonaphakade. Kwangokunjalo lubonakaIise ukoyikeka kwendlela 
obungakhuselekanga ngayo ubuchwephesha obuphakamileyo baluyaphondo 
kwezo Politiko. Esi sehIo sizise uhlelo olutsha kwezopolitiko, apho utshintsho 
iwamazwe ngamazwe ngokuhIobana belikade lijongeka rnfiliba kwaye 
lungafikeleleki. Ngoku lutsho lwabonakalisa inqubela. 
Kwirnfazwe erhubuluzayo yamazwe ngamanzwe, ingqo yenkolo 
ebinempikiswano iye yabonakala ukugcina iitlantlo mbini zengquzulwano 
kwimfazwe erhubuluzayo zitsho zinyamezelane, ngaphandle nje kokuba ngoku 
ezintlantlo mbini zibonakaliswa kwipolitika zama Isilamu kunye nezabafunxi 
abangama kepitali (Martin, 2001:155). Ngo kunjalo ngaphambili leyantlukwano 
intlantlo mbini yehIabathi yamandulo yokwenza izinto ngokwemigathango ethile 
ithatha eyona ngqalelo kumahluko ophakathi kobu komansi nobu kepi tali, isebenza 
ekunciphiseni iingxwabangxwaba nokungevani okuphakathi kwezinkolo. 
Obubuxhakaxhaka burnfiliba bokwahlula izinto buye banyuka ngokunyuka emva 
kophelo lwernfazwe erhubuluzayo njengoko ithe yavumela orhulumente bamazwe 
aseNtshona ukuba baphathe belawulu imidla neemfuno ezingaphandle kwemida 
yabo (Gupta, 20002:6). Olukruthakruthano lungentla luye lwakhulelwa 
ngokhulelwa ngeendlela ezahlukeneyo kodwa ezinxulumeneyo. Ngokwencwadi: 
'Clash of Civilizations' ka (Huntington, 1996). Okanye njengengafunkiyo inkqubo 
yehIabathi entlantlo mbini (Barber, 1996:245). 
Kwimvo ka Huntington (Huntington, 1996:19-290). Kwimbali yakhe 
kwezobungzali uyibonakalisa imeko yehlabathi kwezopolitiko njengobuthathaka 
bezityalo nezilwanyana ezisakhulayo kwanje ngendlela eliya kuthi ikamva 
lihlengiswe ubume balo ngokwezithethe ezaziwa ngazo. Iyantlukwano 
kwezizithethe iyakuba nakho ukulungisa imigaqo yobanbane; iyantlukwano 
kwakunye nengxwabangxwaba zemfazwe erhubuluzayo yehlabathi yamandulo 
(Huntington, 1996:20). Ubhalo lwernfundo ephakamileyo luka Huntington nook 
oluyithatheli ngqalelo ibanzi ingcacisco efunekayo imbambano oluxhomekeke 
ekuhIuzweni zezembali, kanti ngokunjalo lembali olunentshukumo olwenzekayo 
jikelele ehIabathmi. 
!bali lemilo lika Benjamin Barber kwelinye icala lingena nzulu 
ekubonakaliseni ukuhlabana kwenthetho eziphikisanyao zinobunyani phakathi kwe 
jihad ne McWorld, nendlela oluxinezelwano lomficiselwano lwezindlela zimbini zithi 
ziphumelele ukuqhubekeka kwelihIabathi. Ngokwamkela ubukho bezintlu-mbini 
(MpumajNtshona), kukho ithemba lokwazi ngokugqithisileyo ekubonakaliseweni 
nakwinkcazelo echaseni nozwelonkenjengoko nemo yembali isiba yindowo yengcali 
zohlobo olubuthatllaka buyindawo yobume. 
Okubalulekileyo ke ngoko yinto yokuba olubhalo lubalulekileyo oluzame 
ukubonakalisa ngokupheleleyo enzinye zezinto eziqinisekisa ekukhokeleni 
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kwisehlo sange nyanga yomsintsi umhIa weshumi elinanye xa lemeko iweleIa 
kwicala Iezopolitiko - nophando Iwazi Ngakumbi nangakumbi Iemfundiso 
isakugala ijonge iimbali ezimbini ezahlukeneyo kodwa zinxuIumene ezithe zaveIa 
qwnge enzigqondweni ngesi sehlo. EyokuqaIa yileyo inokhuIo oIubuthathaka ethe 
yabona kaliswa ngu Huntington kwicandelo Iobhalo Iweziju nge ezide kwimfundo 
esemagqabini, eyesibini yimo ethe yavikivwa yi Jihad ka Barber ekunye no McWorld 
(1996). Zombini ezimbalo zizakuphononongwa ngrnjongo yokufunana inyaniso 
apho ifihlakeIeIe khona emileyo eyakuba yimbali ngesehIo senyamga yo Msintsi 
umhla weshumi elinanye, Ie mbali iyakubangela ukuba wonke ubani abe nalo 
ithuba lekuziphonononga zonke iintshukumo ezathi zasetyenziswa lihlabathi 
jikelele, ziguquguqulwe kwanye zlOnglslwe zonke izigigaba nezehlo 
ngokuIandelelana kwanzo nokubaluleka kwazo, ngokwemihla ezathi zehla ngayo. 
Ngokunikezelwa kwalenkcazelo yobume engezobungcali kukhulo 
olubuthathaka eyona nqontsonqa ekufuneka iyimfundiso kukuqaphela 
ngokweziphumo iimfuno ezimbini ezahlukileyo zibe zalamene ngaxeshanye. Enye 
yazo ingembali enye ingobhalo nocwangciso lwembali. 
*** 
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Statement by the President of the United States in His Address to the Nation 
8:30 P.M. EDT 
September 11 , 2001 
The President: Good evening. Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very 
freedom, came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The victims 
were in airplanes, or in their offices; secretaries, businessmen and women, military and 
federal workers; moms and dads, friends and neighbours. Thousands of lives were 
suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror. 
The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, 
have filled us with disbelief tenible sadness, and a quiet unyielding anger. These acts of 
mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have 
failed; our country is strong. 
A great people have been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the 
foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. 
These acts shattered steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. 
America was targeted for an attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and 
opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining. 
Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we responded with the 
very best of America - with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for 
strangers and neighbours who came to give blood and help in any way that they could. 
Immediately after the first attack, I implemented our government's emergency response 
plans. Our militanj is powerful, and it's prepared. Our emergency teams are working in 
New York City and Washington D.C. to help with local rescue efforts. 
Our first priority is to get help to those that have been injured, and to take every 
precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks. 
The functions of our government continue without interruption. Federal agencies in 
Washington which have to be evacuated today are reopening for essential personnel 
tonight, and will open for business tomorrow. Our financial institutions remain strong, 
and the American economy will open for business, as well. 
The search is underway for those who are behind those evil acts. I've directed the full 
resources behind our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those 
responsible and bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists 
who committed these acts and those who harbour them. 
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I appreciate so very much the members of Congress wlw have joined me in strongly 
condemning these attacks. And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world 
leaders who have called to offer their condolences and assistance. 
America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and securitJj in the 
world, and so we stand together to win the war against terrorism. Tonight, I ask for your 
prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been shattered, for all 
those whose sense of safety and securitJj has been threatened. And I pray that they will be 
comforted by a power greater than any of us, spoken through the ages of the Psalm 23: 
"Even though I walk through the valley of death, I fear no evil, for You are with 
me," 
This is the day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice 
and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and will do so this time. Yet, we go 
fonvard to defend the freedom and all that is good and just in our world. 
Thank you. Good night, and God bless America. 
-Edwards & DeRose, 2001:1 
*** 
Bin-Laden Thanks Allah for 9/11 
Here is America struck by God Almighty in one of its vital organs, so that its greatest 
buildings are destroyed. Grace and gratitude to God. America has been filled with horror 
from north to south and from east to west, and thanks be to God that what America is 
tasting now is only a copy of what we have tasted. 
Our Islamic nation has been tasting the same for more than 80 years, of humiliation and 
disgrace, its sons killed and their blood spilled, its sanctities desecrated. 
God has blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the forefront of Islam, to destroy America. 
May God bless them and allow them a supreme place in heaven, for He is the only one 
capable and entitled to do so. When those have stood in defence of their weak children, 
their brothers and sisters in Palestine and other Muslim nations, the whole world went 
into uproar, the infidels followed by the hypocrites. 
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A million innocent children are dying at this time as we speak, killed in Iraq without any 
guilt. We hear no denunciation, we hear no edict from the hereditan} rulers. In these 
days, Israeli tanks rampage across Palestine, in Ramallah, Rafah and Beit Jala and many 
other parts of the land of Islam, and we do not hear anyone raising his voice or reacting. 
But when the sword fell upon America after 80 years, hypocrisy raised its head up high 
bemoaning those killers who toyed with the blood, honour and sanctities of Muslims. 
The least that can be said about those hypocrites is that they are apostates who followed 
the wrong path. They backed the butcher against the victim, the oppressor against the 
innocent child. I seek refuge in God against them and ask Him to let us see them and 
what they deserve. 
I say that the matter is ven} clear. Every Muslim after this event, after the senior official 
in the United States in America, starting with the head of international infidels, Bush 
and his staff who went on a display of vanity with their men and horses, those who 
turned even the countries that believe in Islam against us - the group that resorted to 
God, the Almighty, the group that refuses to be subdued in its religion. 
They have been telling the world falsehoods that they are fighting terrorism. In a nation 
at the end of the world, Japan, hundreds of thousands, of young and old, were killed and 
this is not a world crime. To them it is not a clear issue. A million children in Iraq, to 
them this is not a clear issue. 
But when a few more than ten were killed in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Afghanistan 
and Iraq were bombed and hypocrisy stood behind the head of the international infidels, 
the modern world's symbol of paganism, America, and its allies. 
I tell them that these events have divided the world into two camps, the camp of the 
faithful and the camp of infidels. May God shield us and you from them. 
Even} Muslim must rise to defend his religion . The wind of faith is blowing and the wind 
of change is blowing to remove evil from the Peninsula of Mohammad, peace be upon 
him. 
As to America, I say to it and its people a few words: I swear to God that America will 
not live in peace before peace reigns Palestine, and before all the army of infidels depart 
the land of Mohammad, peace be upon him. 
God is the Greatest and glory be to Islam. 
-Parfrey, 2001:304-305 
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I Introduction 
Even) grown-up hates Americans, Jews, and Christians. It is 
part of our belief and our religion. Since [ was abO!) [ have been 
at war with and harbouring hatred of Americans. 
- Osama bin Laden, cited in Corbin, 2002:3 
On the morning of September 11, 2001 (9/ 11), an airport security camera 
captured Mohammad Atta entering the departure area for a flight from Portland, 
Maine, to Boston, where he connected with American Flight 11 (Bergen, 2001:38). 
Precisely one hour after takeoff, Atta directed Flight 11 into the North tower of 
the World Trade Center. Perhaps an exaggeration, but nonetheless assorted 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies worldwide believe that the former 
student of urban preservation had now grown to be "the architect of the most 
spectacular act of urban demolition in history" by using four planes as al-
Qaeda's 1 ultimate modus opemndi (Bergen, 2001:38-39). 
Like most people, I was glued to my television screen watching the terror 
that struck America. At first I did not believe any of it, it seemed too incredible. It 
was the kind of morning when everything seemed 'right' with the world 
(Bergen, 2001:24). It was the perfect day to stop for a cup of coffee on your way to 
work, or simply to take the dog for a walk. It was also the ideal morning for 
flying (ibid). It is strange to think about it now, or perhaps not so strange 
considering I am a student in an academic field that is meant to analyze and 
understand all political facets of humans in society, but the first thing I thought 
1 ' Al-Qaeda' means 'The Base' in Arabic. 
1 
of - in addition to the tremendous shock and fear - was: oh no, now the United 
States will have free reign to respond to any opposition however it likes. 
Prior to September 11, Americans and Westerners, generally considered 
themselves safe from foreign attack. Until that grim morning, the average 
American was statistically less likely to be killed by an act of terrorism than a 
bolt of lightning. But, as we are all too familiar, everything had now changed. In 
little more than an hour, the illusion had been shattered with the most 
catastrophic act of terrorism in the history of the United States. Seared into the 
world's consciousness are those terrible images: New York's tallest tower in 
flames, black smoke billowing from a yawning hole where a passenger plane had 
hit the building, while a second jetliner speeds, unbelievably, full throttle into the 
tower and explodes into a giant fireball (Mylorie, 2001:xiii). As a stunned nation 
watches, the Pentagon is hit as well (ibid). This then is our new reality: a century 
where it seems that issues of security and terrorism are back on the political 
agenda. 
For me as a citizen of the global village, this thesis is essentially aiming at 
making sense of the events of September 11 by placing them or contextualizing 
them historically and structurally. The story that will be told here is not a pleasant 
one. It is in many ways the story of the roles that the United States plays around 
the world. It is a story about the consequences of interaction in an interconnected 
globe which experiences great disparities of power, wealth, freedom, poverty, 
and opportunity (Sardar & Davies, 2002:6). 
* * * 
2 
I 1. General Discussion of Chapters 
In chapter one, an attempt is made to raise the question how or why Islam 
has come to function increasingly as the necessary protagonist through which the 
United States defines and articulates its superpower status after the 'death' of 
communism. Western fears of militant Islam were confirmed by a prominent 
member of the Western academic establishment, Samuel Huntington, when he 
published his article The Clash of Civilizations in the Foreign Affairs issue of 1994. 
The debate over the 'Clash of Civilizations' has received widespread attention -
especially in the Muslim world - where many saw the publication as yet more 
evidence of the West's true attitudes towards Muslims and Arabs (Esposito, 
1992:viii). Continued criticism has been voiced towards the Western 
governments by many Muslims for their double standard in promoting 
democracy with fervor in the West but very selectively in the Muslim world 
(Esposito, 1992:viii-ix). 
In an October 2002 broadcast, bin Laden stated: U As we speak, a million 
children are dying, killed in Iraq ... Today, Israeli tanks are ransacking Palestine" 
(Kepel, 2002:14). It is clear that one requires examination of the problems that 
existed before September 11 in order to have a better understanding of the 
historical conflict that eventually culminated in the attacks. For Islamic 
fundamentalists, then, history holds the key to understanding n ot only the past, 
but the present and the future as well. The answer to the question that is so often 
asked by Americans: 'Why do they hate us?' becomes increasingly clearer as one 
dredges up the historical prejudices that Western countries have against Muslims 
and the injustices committed against their people. After all, Osama bin Laden did 
not wake up one day and spontaneously decide to bomb the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon. To define the idea of America as the future, everyone else's 
future, is a rather conceited denial of the freedom of others, and the possibility of 
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the present to fashion alternative futures in a world consisting of a multiplicity of 
cultures (Sardar & Davies, 2002:10). 
As far as one can judge, the attack on the United States took place at a 
moment when anti-American feeling in the Arab world had grown virulent. 
America's belief in the superiority of its institutions and its values (democracy, 
individual rights, rule of law and prosperity), combines with its despotic way of 
running global affairs, provoked the attacks (Fukuyama, cited in Booth & Dunne, 
2002:28). Most Americans are simply oblivious or in denial of their government's 
policies towards the rest of the world. More significantly, a vast majority plainly 
do not believe that America has done, or can do, anything wrong. Yet bombs 
dropped on Muslims speak louder than press releases and speeches - the 
statements of U.s. officials that 'we are not against Islam' notwithstanding. 
What this chapter suggests is that the modern prejudice against Islam 
derives from a long legacy of Orientalism which makes it difficult to dismiss the 
influence of Western fear and ignorance of Islam from current U.S. foreign-policy 
making. The long march of prejudice of the West against Islam can be traced 
back as far as The Crusades. From these perspectives, then, September 11 is 
perhaps no more than a contemporary culmination of a very old conflict. 
In contrast with Huntington's (1996) and Said's (1978) historical narratives 
that tell the story of the long emerging 'Clash of Civilizations' and 'Orientalism', 
chapter two assesses Benjamin Barber's (1996) structural 2 approach to illustrate 
that as we become more modern, we are also apt to become a product of 
globalization while using the commodities of the modern world in our own 
2 lt is important here to distinguish that this thesis deals with two meanings of the word 
'structural.' In this case, structural refers to Benjamin Barber's usage of the term, which looks at 
the phenomenon of globalization and how its interconnected nature has itself caused it to reflect 
chaos. Take, for example, the al-Qaeda network and how, according to John Gray (2000:2), it is 
seen as a product of modernity and globalization, one which certainly will not be the last groups 
to use the products of the modern world in its own horrific ways. The second definition of 
structuralism is in agreement with the work of Michael Foucault who conventionally was labeled 
as a structuralist but who consistently denied this claim. Structuralism in this sense takes its 
starting point from language (Petit, 1975:2). "It derives from linguistics a framework of concepts 
which it seeks to extend from language to other areas of interests" (ibid). 
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monstrous ways. All forms of Jihad, including September 11, can be interpreted 
as a fragmentation of the structural moment of globalization. It is not simply 
generated against globalization but generated structurally and dialectically by 
globalization. The struggles of Jihad against" an integrative modernization and 
aggressive cultural imperialism" are in fact diametrically opposed but strangely 
intertwined forces (Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne,2002:245). Many of the 
technological innovations, including the free movement of capital across borders, 
enabled international terrorists to coordinate events culminating in September 
11. The global natw:e of al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups is as much a response 
to globalization as a creation of it and in that sense forms part of a greater 
resistance against globalization - all of which Barber considers under the generic 
term Jihad. Hence, Barber (cited in Booth & Dunne, 2003:249) makes a somewhat 
harsh, but rather interesting statement when he says that, "Bin Laden without 
the modern media would have been an unknown desert rat." 
It seems, then, that there are two ways of reading September 11, one 
historical and one structural. Taken on its own, however, the genealogy of the 
clash between Islam, and the Christian, Capitalist West, does not take into 
consideration the complexities of globalization. However, too much emphasis on 
these complexities tends to result in the genealogy of the conflict being ignored. 
Thus, by taking into account historical and contemporary (i.e. structural) 
elements of the conflict, the aim of chapter three is to syntheSize the strengths 
and weaknesses of these genealogical and structural narratives, so that it will be 
possible to make sense of September 11 by means of a structural-genealogical 
grand narrative. By transcending the binary through a structural-genealogical 
reading, it is hoped that the underlying meaning of September 11 acts as a 
catalyst to outline the necessary parameters of the new world (dis)order. In other 
words, by making the connection how the attacks on September 11 ironically 
employed the language and methods on which modernity rests, it almost seems 
as if we have come full circle and as if tllere is a genealogical continuity between 
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the Crusades and September 11. Making sense of 9/11 through a structural-
genealogical account offers a way out of the global war between modernity and its 
critics, as the war waged against Jihad will not succeed, unless McWorld is also 
addressed (Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:247). The promise of a new 
world order will reveal that the paradox of the dialectical interdependence 
between these two forces has become noticeable as a result of the attacks on New 
York and Washington - exposing the contortions present within the system. 
*** 
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2. Methodological Framework: Discourse Analysis 
To follaw the complex course of descent is to identify the 
accidents, the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty 
calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist 
and have value for us; it is to discover that the truth or being do 
not lie at the root of wha t we knaw and what we are, but the 
exteriority of accidents. 
- Foucault, cited in Fillingham, 1993:102 
This study adopts a post-structural approach. It uses what Fairclough 
(1995:97) calls 'critical discourse analysis' or 'deconstructive analysis' to critique 
and contribute to the literature on September 11. Fairclough (1995) uses the 
notion of critical in the sense that it makes visible, through analysis and critiques, 
connections between properties of texts and social practices and relations which 
are generally not' obvious' to people who interpret the texts. Discourse analysis 
can be defined as the act of demonstrating how within specific texts discourses 
have particular effects in terms of their dish'ibution of social power (Terre 
Blanche & Durrheim, 1999:154). In this case, the connection between language 
and power or discourse and power is of utmost importance, as it intends to 
illuminate how the conflict between the United States and Islam, or the forces of 
globalization, have been and still are, discursively constructed. 
In Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings (1972-1977), a 
collection of interviews, an essay, and a pair of lectures, Michael Foucault tries to 
work out new ways to talk about power. He seeks to articulate a new conception 
of how power and knowledge interact in the modern world (Terre Blanche & 
Durrheim, 1999:162). Most of us are aware that there are people who know 
certain things that others do not. We also know that there are organizations that 
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rule other people (people are respected and suppressed without even knowing it 
- each willingly or unwillingly doing their bit). In this way discourse analysis 
demonstrates ways in which subjects are positioned in relation to each other, and 
who is empowered or disempowered in a particular context. In any discourse, 
therefore, knowledge, social relations, and social identities, are being constructed 
in historically specific ways. Thus, discourses construct who we can become and 
how we can project others and ourselves. 
Edward Said sets this out convincingly in Orientalism (1978). He shows the 
effect of the scientific societies and the journals of the past three hundred years 
and how an institutionalized notion of "objective truth" was used for the 
proliferation of the authority of the truth. This operation allowed the West's 
'Other' to be invented. As Said states (1978:1-2): 
... Ih e Orienl has helped 10 defin e Europe (or Ihe Wesl) as its 
contrasting image, idea, personality, experience ... Orientalism 
expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as 
a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, 
scholarships. imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and 
colonial sty les. 
Just as Orientalism has been used by a mass of writers to dominate, 
restructure, and have authority over the Orient, so too have I found that it is 
useful to employ Foucault's notion of discourse, as described by him in 
Arachaeology of Knowledge (1972) and in Discipline and Punish (1977), to 
understand the enormously systematic way in which European culture uses the 
Orient as a vision to make their own history a reality. Therefore as much as we 
want to assume that the Orient is an inner act of nature, we must rather 
acknowledge that the vocabulary that has brought it to life has been done in and 
for the West (Said, 1978:5). Once again, the way Foucault conceives of the 
relationship between the power and domination is reflected in the way certain 
cultural representation gain predominance over others. Through the justification 
and institutionalization of dominating representations, ideas gain acceptance as 
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'truthful' representations of reality and through this acceptance, acquire" serious, 
tangible social consequences" (Praeg, 2000:76). 
The a priori rules that govern the historical dimension of discursively 
invented identities are therefore essential to this study. As they give us a glimpse 
of the contours of the invention of the Orient. The focus of a Foucaultian 
archaeology centers on speech acts or statements which are seen as 
performances. According to Foucault, any performance is a production of 
meaning (Praeg, 2000:74). By engaging in detailed readings of pieces of texts it is 
important to be sensitized to the context. Context is crucial as texts do not 
operate in isolation, but rather through being rooted in contexts (Terre Blanche & 
Durrheim, 1999: 163). This point shall be dealt with in greater detail below, but 
for now it is imperative to note that statements, by contributing to discursive 
formations, can be interpreted through" a logically prior understanding of what 
it is that they are doing" (Praeg, 2000:74). For, as Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983:45) 
put is: a statement is " relative and oscillates according to the use that is made of 
the statement and the way in which it is handled." Consequently, what the 
archaeologist does is to: 
.. . situate the statement neither in relation to its deep and 
unspoken or hidden meanings nor in relation to histon) vis-a-vis 
an origin that will clarify its meaning. Instead the statement is 
accepted at face-value. 
- Praeg, 2000:77 
2.1 Foucault's Histon{ o(the Present 
The work of Michael Foucault, conventionally considered as structuralist 
but denied by him to be as such, is unusually difficult to deal with in any short 
account. This is not only because this oeuvre is so extensive, but also because it is 
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hard at times to specify Foucault's own ideological position (White, cited in 
Sturrock, 1978:81). In Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1982), Dreyfus and 
Rabinow adopt the phrase 'interpretive analytics' or 'history of the present' to 
describe the specific methodological approach to discourse analysis as used by 
Foucault ( See also Tamboukou, 1999:201-217). It is worth spending a little time 
at this juncture indicating the type of historical analysis that Foucault is 
attempting to fashion (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1983:118). 
Within the field of modern philosophy there are two distinct camps that 
can be identified, according to Foucault. On the one hand are those philosophers 
who are dedicated to the' analytics of truth' (the Pyrrhonian skeptics - those who 
seek to find essential rationality of the Enlightenment preserve) (Kendall & 
Wickham, 1999:29) On the other hand are those who see themselves to be part of 
Foucault's camp, namely the group concerned with 'an ontology of ourselves' 
(ibid). These philosophers explore the "contemporary limits of the necessary" 
(Foucault, 1984:47). What we take from the quote is that 'interpretive analytics' is 
all about the capacity of self-invention. A true Foucaultian is not so much 
concerned to find a parallel meaning in the past, but rather to trace the 
components of a specific time and what they have come to mean today. In this 
process of analYZing, the ultimate authority remains the actor as he! she will only 
become authentic, if it is acknowledged by the author that the truth is established 
out of deep interpretation (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:124). 
It is in line with the recognition of the limits of our endeavour that one 
needs to return to the more mundane methodological distinction between 
genealogy and archaeology. As an archaeologist, Foucault sought to unearth the 
hidden structure of knowledge that pertains to a particular historical period 
(Strathern, 2000:19). By excavating the hidden structures of knowledge - the 
epistemological a priori - Foucault felt that he ultimately would be able to 
determine the ways in which we experience and perceive our roles in society 
(Kwant, 1978:136). Consequently, in the 'archaeological' phase of his work, 
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Foucault sought to excavate meaning in a quasi-Saussurian fashion by 
suggesting that speech acts or statements should not be understood as something 
exterior to the rule-governed system, but rather as a priori imposed order that 
exerts regularity (Praeg, 2000:77). As Dreyfus and Rabinow remarked (1983:55) 
about the epistemic a priori, "the rules governing the system of statements are 
nothing but the ways the statement are actually related." This implies that the 
world does not contain any transcendent meaning, since we filter as we go along: 
The SlJs tem of language is a vast structure that is always 
changing. Before men, linguistics focused on h= language 
changes over time, but that doesn't give you any glimpse of 
language as a whole. We need to take a snapshot of the rules that 
hold it together. 
- de Saussure, cited in Fillingham, 1993:94 
In his Madness and Civilization (1965), for instance, Foucault illustrates how 
madness does not exist objectively, but is a condition that has been given 
meaning by the very discourse on madness (White, cited in Sturrock, 1979:90-91). 
In this view of the history of madness, Foucault sees a split at different point by 
sharp changes and breaks in the way people experienced and treated the mad. 
One such break occurred in the middle of the seventeenth century when large 
numbers of citizens (madmen and others) were confined in detention centers 
such as the Hospital General de Paris. Foucault locates another break in the 
history of madness at the end of the eighteenth century around the time of the 
French Revolution. This break illustrates a new way of experiencing madness 
that corresponds to 'mental illness' as we know it today. For one thing, when 
Foucault speaks of the 'experience' of madness, he does not mean that people of 
the age were aware of certain intrinsic characteristics of madness that other ages 
did not notice. Rather, the overall strategy that Foucault tries to illustrate here is 
that the present Classical experience of madness dominates the nineteenth and 
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twentieth centuries had their own set of assumptions, prejudices and mindsets 
about the mentally ill at the time, which structures the limited thought of that 
particular age (code of knowledge), or its episteme (Cousins & Hussain, 1984:7). 
An episteme is characterized by a certain discourse, a certain way of talking. It 
represents an accumulation of concepts, beliefs, and statements, which are 
produced by a particular discourse (Gutting, 1989:140). 
The weakness of the early Foucault's archaeological method, however, 
was its failure to incorporate a theory of power into its analysis of discourse. In 
1971, Foucault took his first major step towards a more satisfactory and self-
consciously complex analysis of power in an essay entitled "Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History" to support and complement his theory of archaeology with 
that of genealogy (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982:xxi). His shift away from discourse 
(preserving his archaeological theory and complementing it with genealogy) 
shows dearly how the issue of power had not been thematized: 
What was missing in my work was the problem of 'discursive 
regime', the effects of power proper on the enunciative play. I 
confused it too much with systematicity, the theoretical form, or 
something like a paradigm. 
- Foucault, cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982:104). 
In Discipline and Punish (1977) and the History of Sexuality (1976), Foucault 
identifies the rituals of power that take place by referring to the Panopticon of 
Bentham and the confessional. By using these examples he illustrated how power 
works, what it does and when it does it (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982:7-80. History 
is thus not seen as progress or universal reason, but rather as the play of rituals 
in which power and humanity are advancing from one domination to the other. 
"Rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized: they are impersonal 
and can be bent to any purpose" (Foucault, cited in Dreyfus & Rabinow, 
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1982:110). What the genealogist derives from this is that particular groups will 
seize these empty rules and impose a particular interpretation on them. The 
more one interprets, the more one finds that the interpretation becomes a never-
ending task as they have been imposed and created by other people and not by 
the nature of things. 
What we see on the genealogical side appears to be the conclusion that 
everything is meaningless and lacks seriousness. As the "successor" of 
archaeology, genealogy concerns itself with" disputable origins and unpalatable 
functions" (Rose, cited in Kendall & Wickham, 1999:29). It is, in other words, a 
methodological devise with the same effects as a precocious child at a dinner 
party: Genealogy makes the older guests at the table of intellectual analysis feel 
decidedly uncomfortable by pointing out the things of the origins and the 
functions that they would rather remain hidden. A genealogist would therefore 
ask: "What is happening now? How did we get there and how is the 'now' within which 
we all find ourselves constructed?" (Tamboukou, 1999:202). Thus, below the surface 
of events, history has its hidden structural a priori. The past is therefore alive in 
the present and the past will be able to show us how we can understand what is 
happening now. 
By using Foucault's energetically embraced 'multidisciplinary' 
framework, the present will not only do away with the archaeological method 
completely, but 'backtrack' the influence of structuralism to combine this with 
the return of an interpretive, critical dimension. This combination of 
archaeological and genealogical insight will allow me to situate myself in the 
current situation so that I have a way of articulating the complex meaning of the 
subject as a function of their tradition. As Foucault himself has noted: 
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[ never stopped doing archaeology, [ never stopped doing 
genealogy. Genealogy defines the target and the finality of the 
work and archaeology indicates the field within which I deal to 
make the genealogy. 
- in Tamboukou, 1992:12 
2.2. A Structural-Historical Reading of September 11 
What is interesting about Foucault's archaeology and his subsequent shift 
to genealogy is that it provides a very useful way of conceiving of the challenges 
of this study - a study that seeks to take seriously the genealogical as well as the 
structural moments of the contemporary global political economy. Such an 
approach has already been advocated and applied by Modelski (1996) and 
Thompson (2000) in their analysis of the emergence of the global political 
economy. Paramount to this approach is a deconstruction of September 11 - an 
event that has acquired the status of a radical epistemic shift. From a structural 
perspective, the issues surrounding the attacks of September 11 would involve 
questioning what is typical or unexceptional about the way that it came about. 
What such questioning assumes is that there is a logic to the way in which global 
political economies rise and fall - something typical that has always a function of 
the relation between economics, politics, political leadership and global war 
(Modelski, 1996: 1). 
What Thompson (2000) offers is a structural-genealogical reading of the 
current global political order. Such a reading emphasizes structural similarities but 
also historical differences, continuities and change. It suggests that, although the 
rise and fall of the global political economies is always structurally similar. Each 
rise and fall is also historically different from the others in important ways. Thus, 
what the structural-genealogical methodology enables us to ask, in addition to 
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the above structural question, is the complementary genealogical question 
regarding where the roots of the current/ future global economic system lies. 
Is history continuous or discontinuous? Is change long-term, gradual and 
continuous or are changes abrupt? Foucault qua archaeologist maintained the 
latter when he suggested that history of Western civilization is marked by 
epistemic shifts that cause the end of one order of things and the beginning of 
another - changes that are sudden, all-embraCing and structural. Can we 
attribute to September 11 the status of an episternic shift in political order, and if 
so, how can we complement such a structural insight with the additional 
understanding of the genealogy of the conflict that has made the shift possible? 
In order to understand the implications of September 11, it is necessary to 
make clear that the attacks are a product of a complex interplay of factors, at 
once historical and cultural, referring to a historical conflict and the structural 
complexities of globalization. So far, I have not only tried to delimit a certain 
investigative domain through a very brief discussion of central notions in 
Foucault's archaeology, but have also attempted to illustrate how a structuraI-
historical approach can provide a methodological framework for the kind of 
synthesis aimed at here. True to a Foucaultian genealogy the focus on discourse 
as composed of statements will place my analysis in between hermeneutics as a 
reading (in which meaning is taken seriously) as well as structuralism, (in which 
meaning is abandoned all together) (Praeg, 2000:73). Such then is my brief 
Foucaultian interpretation of understanding September 11 and it is hoped that 
this approach will establish, in outlines, the necessary parameter to circumscribe 
essential features of a new world (dis)order. 
*** 
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Chapter One 
September 11: A Genealogy of 
Resistance 
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new 
world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economical. The 
great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of 
conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful 
actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will 
occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash 
of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between 
civilizations will be the battle of the future ... 
- Huntington, 1993:1 
1. Introduction 
'The present', as the Hungarian Marxist critic Gyorgy Lukacs once 
observed, is 'a problem of history' (Sardar, 2002:1). To understand September 11, 
we have to realise that current political dynamics have been evolving over a long 
period of time. One cannot understand the meaning of the September 11 crisis in 
a vacuum. "Without an understanding of what the past has been about, it is 
extremely difficult to make sense of the present" (Thompson, 2000:22). This 
chapter offers a genealogical reading of the events leading up to September 11 in 
order to answer the question: how did an event like this become possible and how did 
we make sense of it? 
The Foucaultian analysis of Edward Said in Orientalism (1978), based on 
a theory of discourse as strategies of power and subjection, inclusion and 
exclusion, puts forward the kind of approach that is adopted here. Influenced 
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by Nietzsche's account of the body, Foucault asserts that the body and, by 
extension any identity, can be interpreted in many different ways -depending 
on the culture that interprets it. The issue raised here is of fundamental 
importance, since it shows how bodies and the identities they are associated 
with have become an essential component for the operation of power relations 
in modern society. It is this potent combination of knowledge and power, 
localized on the body that we are interested in as it is this internal relation of 
power and knowledge that will be used as a point of departure to interrogate 
the historical dimensions of a deep-rooted ideological difference between the 
'West' and the predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East, the so-
called "Orient." Such an overview of the genealogy of Muslim-Christian 
relations seems crucial, as this kind of interrogation is a condition for any 
meaningful, that is, constructive or critical engagement with the current world 
system. 
To an extent, such a genealogical reading embraces the assumptions 
implicit in Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilization' thesis, which was 
published in the Foreign Affairs issue of 1993. In this article, Huntington 
commits himself to 'truths' or 'facts' in order to illustrate how the future of 
world politics will be dominated by a clash between civilizations. This study, 
however, does not commit itself to such an account of truths or facts solely 
(Huntington), but rather seeks to illustrate how discourses have historically 
produced facts (Foucault) in order to construct those identities that Huntington 
takes as his point of departure. The intention of this chapter is therefore, not to 
omit the historical facts to which Huntington attaches such great significance, 
but rather to establish a link with these facts in order to illuminate how 
knowledge structures take shape and produce the identities we take for 
granted. In other words, genealogy stresses the connection between talking and 
doing by illustrating how knowledge can be seen to structure those power 
relations in society that dictate how we act. This does not mean that there are 
no historical facts. The series of attacks known collectively as the Crusades 
were such historical facts; but what they mean in the narrative of conflict 
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between the West and the Middle East and how they may have contributed to 
the conflict that culminated in the attacks of September 11 is another question. 
Let us start, therefore, by reminding ourselves of the historical facts that 
substantiate Huntington's argument that there is indeed a 'Clash of 
Civilizations' taking place and which has been born out of an encounter dating 
back hundreds of years. 
* * * 
18 
2. Muslims and Christians: The Genealogy of the 
Myth of the 'Other' 
2.1 The Crusades and the Ottoman Empire 
As world religions, both Christianity and Islam accommodate a high 
degree of religious and cultural heterogeneity as well as a spectrum of 
theological views. The interrelationship between Christianity and Islam is of 
particular interest to this study, as both religions are missionary by nature and 
have the inclination to declare a universal mission; each has a transnational 
community based upon common belief and vocation to be an exemplar to the 
nations of the world (with the understanding that one faith is better than the 
other) (Zebiri, 2002:37). This, ironically, only made them focus on their 
reinforced differences and has polarized rather than united these two great 
monotheistic traditions. Even the common ground that they shared as 
participants in the Abrahamic monotheistic tradition has frequently been a 
cause of discord rather than harmony. There are, according to Norman Daniel, 
(cited in Zebiri, 2002:13) "irreducible differences between non-negotiable 
doctrines ... The Christian creeds and the Qur' an are simply incompatible and 
there is no possibility of reconciling the content of the two faiths, each of which 
is exclusive." The relationship between Islam and the West has thus often been 
marked by mutual ignorance, contempt, stereotyping and conflict. Because 
both these monotheistic religions had universalizing ambitions and because 
they were steeped in defining themselves culturally, as Christian West and 
Muslim Middle East, these religions began to construct the necessary 'Other' in 
their process of self-identification. 
As a result, Byzantine Christian writings on Islam already represented 
Muslims as a military threat. Some of the themes of Byzantine polemic were 
later carried on into Western Christian views of Islam. Muhammad was 
sometimes seen as a figure that was inspired by Satan or among other things, it 
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was maintained that he inspired sexual promiscuity and suffered from 
epileptic fits (Zebiri, 2002:25). It was also commonly believed (roughly from 
about d.AH 428 to 1073) that the Qur'an was a jumbled collection of materials 
from biblical and non-biblical sources (ibid). Ignorance, sometimes wilful, 
continued to be common for centuries to come. In a similar manner, Muslim 
authors were also under the impression that the actual text of the Bible was not 
just an interpretation, but that it was in fact corrupted in the process of its 
compilation (Zebiri, 2000:50). From the broad spectrum of opinion, which is 
represented in Eastern scholarship, it is often the extreme representations of the 
'Other' that are chosen; in this way authors can usually find what they set out 
to look for. Several Muslim authors even draw a contrast between 
Muhammad's success and Jesus' relative failure. Niazi (cited in Zebiri, 2002:64) 
comments that Jesus' miracles failed to have the desired effect, since "no one 
believed him except his twelve disciples, and even one of those betrayed him." 
In the absence of accurate information Western images of Islam and Islamic 
images of the West during the period leading up to the Crusades, were highly 
imaginative - containing elements of pure invention. 
The latter illustrates only how cultures and civilizations try to speak with 
one voice in the quest of dominating the field of interpretation through 
manipulating the possible meanings of an event. For, as Foucault (cited in 
Gates, 1990:186) puts it, 'civilizations' will always try and exercise 
the power of culture by virtue of its elevated or superior 
position to authorize, to dominate, to legitimate, demote, 
interdict, and validate: in short, the power of culture to be 
an agent of, and perhaps the main agenClJ for, powerful 
differentiation within its domain and beyond it too. 
One can presume that such representations about the 'Other' appealed 
because they satisfied certain needs on the part of those who adhered to them. 
Negative and stereotypical images of Islam provided the antithesis to 
European's own self-image, external threat. On a more popular level, they 
satisfied the demand for imaginative stimulation (Zebiri, 2002:26). This was 
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highly needed at a time when there was a lot of uncertainty in the institutions 
and ideas of society that were undergoing rapid change. It also prompted the 
search for alien elements within and outside to serve as targets to ideological 
and physical aggression (Murphy, 1976:28). 
Feeding off the theological speculation and the need to relieve internal 
tensions and problems of their own societies, the Crusades, which obtain their 
name from "cross" (or Crux in Latin) gained momentum and culminated in a 
series of military expeditions which took place from the eleventh to the 
thirteenth centuries (Generi et al., 2000:90). 1 Initiated by Alexius's plea, Pope 
Urban II preached at Clermont in France and called for Holy War against the 
infidels on 27 November 1095 (Sardar & Davies, 2000:147). From Urban II's 
sermon in Clermont to the end of the Crusades three hundred years down the 
line, the Crusaders were constantly driven at least in part by a strong sense of 
idealism, a belief that the sacrifices they made, the hardships that they endured, 
were for a cause more important than their lives (Murphy, 1979:ix). The 
historians of the Age of the Enlightenment by and large summed up the 
driving motives of the Crusades as "Religion, greed and restlessness" 
(Brundage, 1964:viii). Twentieth century historians are of the belief that the 
relationship of the West with the Islamic world marked a turning point, when 
the West, emerging from the Dark Ages, began to mount a counterattack when 
it saw that the Islamic world had gained political and religious force. When the 
Byzantine Emperor Alexius I feared that the Muslim armies would also capture 
Asia and the imperial Capital of Constantinople, he turned to Christian rulers 
to turn back the tide by undertaking a 'pilgrimage' to unshackle Jerusalem 
from Muslim rule (Esposito, 1992:40). In Pope Urban's opinion, it was the right 
of the Europeans to attack the pagans and the infidels as the enemy was 
supposedly throwing them off their lands, destroying Christian altars and 
appropriating churches for their own religion. Those who decided to take part 
1 There is no consensus on how many attacks constituted the Crusades. It is believed that the 
journey to the Holy Land consisted of eight to eleven Crusades which inspired many stories of 
bravery and honour (Ganeri et al ., 2000:91). 
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by taking the cross became Crusaders and were believed to be set on the road 
to paradise (Sardar & Davies, 2000:147). 
Ill-conceived and feebly orchestrated, the Christian success was short-
lived (Zebiri, 2002:24). The Crusaders became an annoyance rather than a grave 
danger to the Islamic world and in 1187 the tide had once again turned when 
Jerusalem was reconquered by the Muslims under the leadership of Saladin 
(Esposito, 1992:42). Militarily speaking, the Crusades represented only a 
minimal threat to Muslims, for whom they seemed like yet another barbarian 
invasion on the borders of the Islamic world, with no exacting religious 
importance. The response of Western Christendom was, with few exceptions, 
defensive and belligerent. "Islam was a danger to be reckoned with" (Esposito, 
1992:38). As Maxime Rodinson (cited in Esposito, 1992:37) has observed, "The 
Muslims were a threat to Western Christendom long before they became a 
problem." Few events have therefore had a more devastating and long-term 
effect on Muslim-Christian relations than the Crusades (Zebiri, 2000:15). 
Psychologically, the Crusades left a deep scar on the Western, Christian psyche 
that revealed itself over and over for the duration of the colonial era. The 
Crusades were therefore not just a chapter in the history of the anxiety between 
the Christian West and the Muslim East. Instead, the Crusades represent a 
perpetual desire on the part of the Christian West to preside over Islam and to 
demonstrate that religion as inferior (Youssef, 1984:ix). To many Muslims, the 
Crusades were the clearest example of militant Christianity, an earlier 
predecessor of the antagonism and imperialism of the Christian West. The 
recollection of the Crusades lives on as a dramatic aide memoire of Christianity's 
early hostility towards Islam. On further scrutiny of the larger historical 
context, it not only puts in proper perspective the motivation of the Crusaders 
but also helps one realize more the Islamic resurgence in the post-colonial, or 
the neo-colonial era. 
Today, Middle Easterners, chiefly active Islamic groups, believe that the 
Crusades are not over. The United States and European countries are seldom 
referred to as the 'West' or even Christendom; in its place they refer to them as 
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kafirun (infidels) (Zebri, 1997:28). Therefore, in Muslim-Christian relations it is 
less a case of what in fact happened in the Crusades than how they are 
remembered. What is certain is that the Crusades constitute a chronicle of 
events that are of fundamental importance to the history of West-Islam 
relations. The meaning will be revisited every time the conflict emerges or 
needs to be fuelled. The last chapter looks at the way in which the United States 
did exactly this, namely to reinvent Jihad in military terms in order to capture 
the spirit of the Crusades. 
No sooner had the Crusades passed than European forces had to 
confront the might embodied in the Ottoman Empire (Esposito, 1992:42). 
Creating a world Empire, the Ottomans became the great warriors of Islam and 
soon incorporated major Muslim centres. Some eight hundred years after the 
first Arab threat to Europe, Islam was back, but this time in the hands of the 
Turks. Yet, in 1571 at the defeat of Lepanto, the Ottoman Empire once again fell 
and subsequently saw the power shift to a revitalized and now self-confident 
Europe (Esposito, 1992:44). 
Although we should not indulge ourselves too much in the outcome of 
the Crusades and the impact that the Ottomans had on European rule all 
together, understanding these events is significant as a backdrop to any 
attempt at theorising the current rivalry between the 'East' and the 'West' 
genealogically. Many people who admire and have learned from Foucault, 
including myself, come to find that a good way to illustrate how discourses 
take shape, is to remember that it is not so much what is said but who narrates 
the ideals of the particular discourse in question. A view of the world is more 
than politics and law; it finds expression in all cultural products of a 
civilization. The Crusades were not merely foreign military expeditions 
external to Europe - they were ideas which claimed that the Muslim East posed 
a threat to the Christian West and were subsequently internalized as an outlook 
to the world (Sardar & Davies, 2000:148). Jews together with Muslims were 
soon discriminated against and persecuted for their 'Otherness.' The invincibly 
ignorant were those 'Others' who had never encountered the message of 
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Christianity. In other words, the Jews and the Muslims were the necessary 
'Others' in the construction of a sense of the Western or European self. 
European Images of Islam and Islamic views of Europe can therefore be 
attributed to the negative fallout from events in Christian-Muslim history that 
has emerged from the literature over the years. The stereotypes which were left 
behind by the Crusaders and the conquests made by the Ottomans went into 
constructing the 'Other' as the enemy. This furthermore dissuaded scholars 
that more exists underneath the layers of stereotypes that needed to be taken 
seriously. As Albert Hourani has noted, (cited in Esposito, 1992:45), "fear and 
disdain, coupled with European ethnocentrism, produced distorted images of 
Islam and Muslims and dissuaded scholars from serious study of Islam's 
contributions to Western thought." 
This ignorance has certainly led to the main thrust behind Samuel 
Huntington's 'Clash of Civilization' thesis. As his point of departure, 
Huntington uses cultural identities and their universalizing ambitions to define 
and defend themselves in the new international order. In the post-Cold War 
world, Huntington's thesis has often been used by foreign policy analysts to 
substantiate the rivalry between the Muslim East and the Christian West. 
Again, as is argued at a later stage in this chapter, because of the universalizing 
ambitions of Christianity and Islam, both religions define themselves culturally 
by constructing the 'Other' if so necessary. By creating a simplified picture of 
the post-Cold war politics shaped by two civilizations that rival each other, the 
central axis of the post-Cold war world politics is thus the interaction of 
Western power and culture with the power and culture of non-Western 
civilizations (Huntington, 1996:29). This necessary simplification rooted in a 
Cold War image of superpower competition that is now supposedly taking 
place between the United States and countries pertaining to the' axis of evil' 
(Iran, Iraq and North Korea), highlights the importance of paradigms ill 
international relations. As John Gaddis (cited in Huntington, 1996:30) so 
prudently observed, 
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Finding one's way through unfamiliar terrain generally 
requires a map of some sort. Cartography, like cognition 
itself is a necessanj simplification that allows us to see 
where we are, and where we might be going. 
In short, worldviews and causal theories are a necessary in world 
politics as they portray 'reality' and simplify reality in a way that best serves 
our purposes (Huntington, 1996:31). While it is always expected that a one-
world unity will be created at the end of conflicts, the tendency to think into 
two worlds recurs throughout history as the cultural bifurcation of the world is 
still too useful to be discarded as yet (ibid). Even though no paradigm is good 
forever, Huntington's civilizational paradigm is relevant at this point of 
departure as it allows one to conceptualise how a civilizational approach could 
justify the creation of the 'Other' in the attempt of acknowledging one's own 
self-identity. 
Having said that, it is now time to move on to the next leg of the 
genealogy of resistance, namely the impact that colonial rule and missionary 
discourse had in constructing stereotypes that perpetuated the myth of the 
'Other.' 
2.2 Colonial Rule and Missionan/ Discourse 
The technological progress of Western Europe in development and 
management was a visible foundation of the strong sense of cultural 
supremacy that marked the period between the 17th and the 19th century 
(Youssef, 1984:53). The systematic approach that the European invaders 
utilized to absorb land in Africa and the Middle East has contributed greatly to 
the disunity and dysfunction of indigenous peoples; coups take place in Africa 
and the Middle East not because Africans and Middle Easterners are not able to 
govern themselves, but because their leaders have inherited a colonial legacy 
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that tends to place African against African and Middle Easterners against each 
other. 
The Europeans travelled the world accumulating as many means and as 
much power as they possibly could, fought their colonial wars and established 
imperial governments, in order to generate, the best conditions for their 
economies (Youssef, 1984:53). For the most part, each colony took on the 
cultural milieu of its colonizer. Each colonial power pursued a cultural policy 
that it believed would give it effective results, and a policy that was in tune 
with the philosophy of the colonial administration. Thus the rise of the 
colonialism/ imperialism ideology was based on the belief that colonies were 
an essential attribute of any great nation. 
With the ascendance and growth of Western industrial capitalism 
during the nineteenth century, the majority of the regions brought under 
Western domination 2 experienced confrontation among the local population. 
In the early stages, the colonized organized itself in politico-religious 
movements, that began to fight the foreign rulers under the banner of Jihad 
(Peters, 1979:39). 
In subjecting the Muslim world to imperial rule the moral condescension 
of the Europeans is clearly discerned as it manifests in three aspects of the 
European outlook: 
1. Historic hostilihj between Christianihj and Islam 
2. The disapproval of Muslim polygamy, apparent sensualihj, and the inferior 
position of Muslim women with the attendant "evil social consequences" 
3. The tradition of treating Islamic things as exo tic, a tradition which maintained 
a symbiotic relationship with imperialism. 
- Youssef, 1984:54 
2 In order for colonial domination to survive by the end of the nineteenth century, it was 
pivotal that colonies in Northern Africa (Algeria, conquered by the French in 1830, followed by 
Tunisia in 1881 and Morocco in 1912), the entire East Indian Archipelago, Central Asia and the 
Middle East (in 1882 Britain gained control over the Suez canal and then in 1899, the Sudan was 
taken), was secured for social, economic and ideological purposes (Peters, 1979: 1-2). Later, one 
of Europe's latecomers, Italy, also took full advantage in the 'imperialist scramble for land' by 
occupying Libya from 1912 onwards (Peters, 1979:1). It was only later when World War II came 
to an end that France gained control of the former Ottoman Empire of the Arab Provinces 
(Peters, 1979:2). 
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This kind of thinking still lays the foundation for ethnic (tribal) disputes 
in Africa and the Middle East, or at least contributes to the problem. It is 
therefore quite apparent that the effect of colonialism (was) is immensely 
detrimental. Take for example, the systematic, indiscriminate partition of Africa 
(' scramble') that came about as a result of the Berlin Conference (1884-1885), 
which brought different cultural tribes under one or more colonial power. This 
situation disrupted the political development of the social groups as ethnic 
groups were fragmented. The artificial boundaries created by colonial rulers as 
they ruled and finally left Africa had the effect of combining many different 
ethnic peoples within a nation that did not reflect, nor have (in such a short 
period of time) the ability to accommodate or provide for, the cultural and 
ethnic diversity (Barber, 1996:11).3 As a consequence of this ethnic 
fragmentation, groups such as the Hausas and Fulanis exist in British Nigeria, 
German, later French/British Cameroon, French Niger and Chad. European 
colonial administrators effectively set out to invent African traditions for Africa 
by creating their notion of tribalism. These were the dangerous foundations 
upon which the colonialists imposed a new political geography. However, once 
in motion, the Africans themselves enthusiastically reinforced the process. 
Tribes became the object of passionate African imagination and conflict. 
In the light of this apparent partitioning and humiliation under the 
colonial powers it is intelligible that the forces of nationalist movements have 
directed their revulsion and anger toward the West. Psychologically, Muslim 
nationalists have never recovered from their mistrust of Western powers. 
Muslim discourse on Christian missions and colonialism, therefore, almost 
consistently refers to the historical association with imperialism, which is felt to 
be ongoing. Although actual Western political hegemony may have declined, 
missionaries are charged with being agents of secularization and with 
3 It is noteworthy that a country such as Canada, which has been trying for hundreds of years 
with mixed success to accommodate only two linguistic groups - English and French - already 
had major problems in finding a common ground. This gives one an idea of what it must have 
been like for African states with much larger cultural and linguistic divisions (Robbins, 
2002:302). 
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continuing to serve the interests of Western governments (Youssef, 1984:56). 
Indeed, Christian missionary activity is frequently characterized in Muslim 
discourse in precisely the same way as colonialism: as oppressive, exploitative, 
and unscrupulous as to methodology, ruthless, arrogant, immoral, and 
destructive to indigenous cultures. 
Missionaries are one of tll£ Western institutions used for 
intellectual invasion of tll£ Muslim world. They tried to 
get the Muslims out of Islam by weakening the faith in 
their hearts and accepting the Western way of lifo. 
Outwardly they call for adopting tll£ faith of Jesus, but in 
realih; t/l£y In; and facilitate the Western intellectual 
invasion of the Islamic countries. 
- MEMRI, 2003:4 
As with the Crusades, the interrelationship between colonialism and 
Christian missions has become deeply rooted in the consciousness of most 
Muslims, and has turned out to be part of the anti-Western language (Youssef, 
1984:2). By and large, missionaries not only acquiesced in the imperialist 
endeavour but saw it as a good thing, both because it would be the benefit of 
the colonized, and because of the providentiaI opportunity which it afforded to 
bring the gospel to the 'unreached.' The exporting of the Western culture and 
patterns of commerce could therefore be seen as complementary, if ultimately 
subordinate, to the diffusion of the Christian message. One of the controversial 
areas of discussion is the impact of missions on indigenous cultures. 
Missionaries like traders, travellers and colonizers, were agents of cultural 
change. For Muslims, however, the page is not easily turned, and the memory 
of the past subjugation is constantly renewed by the manifestations of neo-
colonialism in the present. 
With these historical 'facts' in mind (The Crusades, the rise and fall of 
the Ottoman Empire, the implications of Colonialism and the missionary 
'invasion') we can now consider the genealogr; of resistance in more Foucaultian 
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or Said ian terms. After all, the genealogical point that will be made during the 
next section is how stereotypes from the past can be established as knowledge 
structures and how these can be used to influence the power relations between 
people. It is the broader cultural context that has to be taken into consideration, 
as well as how historical facts are used for the invention and the reinvention of 
the' Other.' 
2.3 Creating the Enemy: The Reinvention ofthe 'Other' 
Edward Said, the Palestinian thinker who died in September 2003, 
showed throughout his academic career how distorted stereotypes such as 
'Orientalism' and 'militant Islam' were especially used by the United States to 
justify its periodic wars waged in the developing world (Internet 25) . The most 
penetrating of his work is his now famous 1978 critique of Western studies of 
the Orient in which he shows how the West's misunderstanding of Islamic 
culture stemmed directly from the scholars, novelists, journalists and agencies 
of the state. By portraying Europe as an area of superior culture and the 
'Orient', when compared with it, as an area of patently inferior culture, they 
proceeded to divide the world into the 'civilized us' and the 'uncivilized them' 
categories (Said, 1978:7). It would be difficult to find a clearer example of the 
Foucaultian concept of discourse as power or as "a violence that we do to 
things" (Foucault, cited in Gates, 1990:195). 
What Western discourse on the Orient constructed was not a value-
neutral knowledge, but an imperialist discourse - Orientalism - that 
represented the Orient as "a theatrical stage affixed to Europe" (Said, 1978:63). 
Reproduced over and over, this accumulating Euro-centric, imperialist 
knowledge passed into the West's collective memory banks, from where it not 
only proceeded to colour and condition Western perceptions of Islam on a 
continuous and unchanging basis, but also to influence the way developments 
infusing Muslim societies were and still are interpreted (Internet 6). In a sense, 
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then, Orientalism was a kind of library or archive of intellectual power that was 
man-made and whose vocabulary had given a history and tradition in and for 
the West (Said, 1978:5). These values explained the behaviour of the Orientals 
and supplied them with certain characteristics, with a mentality, a genealogy. It 
deepened and hardened the distinction between Easterners and Westerners. 
Categories like Oriental and Western are both the starting and end point of 
analysis - resulting in the polarization of the distinction. "The Oriental becomes 
more Oriental and the Westerner becomes more Western" -limiting the human 
encounter between the two cultures (Said, 1978:46). Because this tendency is 
found right at the centre of Orientalist theory, this sense of power over the 
Orient is institutionalized and established as scientific 'truth.' 
With this 'truthful' belief that one culture is superior to the other, 
Western countries, in particular official America, began to develop this habit of 
not taking responsibility for their own actions. Questions such as why do they 
hate us? in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, become increasingly 
explicable in a world in which these ancient oppositions between 'us' and 
'them' is now reflected in a parallel distinction, namely between the powerful 
and the powerless, the rich and the poor and so on. It is therefore predictable 
that the sense of infuriation that has manifested itself in many countries in the 
Middle East which have lent themselves to some suicide missions against 
Western buildings and Western personnel whose presence is perceived as a 
symbol of Western imperialism. 
The following are but a few post-colonial case studies that explain the 
hatred Middle Easterners have towards the United States. They also illustrate 
how contemporary political strategies legitimize themselves with reference to a 
history of stereotypes rooted in historical conflicts that date as far back as the 
crusades, colonialism and imperialism. 
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2.4 Post-Colonial Imperialism 
i. Iran 
A combination of ignorance and stereotyping, history and experience 
often blind even the best-intentioned when dealing with the Arab world. The 
point is that the European representation of the Muslim, of the Ottoman or 
Arab was always a way of controlling the redoubtable Orient - making them 
less fearsome to the West. For decades, international relations has seen how 
fear is used by superpowers in the demonization of an enemy or threat. 
The Iranian Revolution (1978-1979) startled even those who were 
exceptionally knowledgeable about Iranian events. The Revolution perplexed 
political analysts and sent shock waves through the oil-dependent world. 
Questions were feverishly asked about the meaning of the social upheaval in 
the Middle East. The Revolution was a grand upheaval for Islamist forces at 
large. It provided them with a strong sense of inspiration and encouragement 
and demonstrated that an Islamic Revolution or 'resurgence' was indeed a 
realistic objective. From being the centre of Westernization and secularism, Iran 
had overnight become a centre of Islamist policies and agitation. Many asked 
whether the government of Reza Pahlevi, would be the last pro-Western 
government in the area to fall. To be sure, the easy path was to view Iran and 
Islamic revivalism as a threat - to pose a global Pan-Islamic threat, monolithic 
in nature, an historic enemy whose faith and agenda dramatically opposed that 
of the West. If one wishes to indulge into polemics, almost each allegation has a 
counter-accusation (Zebiri, 2000:230). As mentioned earlier, both Christianity 
and Islam have this universalist ambition to be the role model of the nations of 
the world, as this will enable them to impose their discursive boundaries? In 
the case of the Christian West, the revolution was interpreted in terms of an 
7 Discursive boundaries are "rules governing what can and cannot be said within the 
boundaries of a particular discourse" (Williams & Chrisman, 1993:5). 
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Islamic resurgence - a myth which afforded the British a lens through which 
they could control the vast oilfields of Iran. In this way the British produced 
and codified knowledge about Iranian culture under colonial domination, 
enabling them to generalize the construction of 'man and his others' as objects 
of knowledge within this overall period (Williams & Chrisman, 1993:7). 
After World War II the British choice of ruler, Raza Shah was deposed 
by the Iranian parliament and Mohammad Mossedegh was elected as Premier. 
He set about nationalizing Iran's oil fields, upsetting the British, who along 
with the U.S. ousted him in 1953. Raza Shah was returned to power where he 
ruled in true dictatorship fashion, funded by the U.S. His regime was corrupt 
and brutal, with little of the vast wealth amassed from sales of oil going to the 
Iranian people. Eventually he was forced to abdicate because of the unrest of 
the country. This left a vacuum into which the radical Islamist Ayatollah 
Khomeini stepped to take up the reins of power. Khomeini's aims were to instil 
a new confidence in Muslims in seeing their civilization as superior to that of 
the West. Alarmed at the emergence of the fundamentalist revolution 8 in Iran, 
the U.S. backed and armed to fight Ayatollah Khomeini leading to the Iran-Iraq 
war, which left one million people dead. 
Because of the success that the Iranian Revolution exerted, the United 
States has reacted to political Islam with distrust. This point of view gained 
credence not only in the United States, but also in Europe. Some of the Western 
powers believe that, if the various Islamic fundamentalist movements come to 
power, they might well work to the disadvantage of the strategic and economic 
security in the Middle East (Davidson, 1998:15). It is preCisely when these 
interests are at stake that the West suddenly comes up with inherent problems 
with the practices of the Islamic fundamentalist phenomenon. For as long as 
the assumptions of Orientalism go unchallenged, the endpoint will always be 
8 Here it is understood that which constitutes something as 'fundamentalist' can be defined 
according to two things: One, when it is uncompromising and two, when it consciously 
positions itself in a history of conflict and 'othering' - a positioning which would signal that the 
difference is so irresolvable, even metaphysical. 
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the same; the only difference being that a different justification for the actions 
of the West will be invented (Williams & Chrisman, 1993:14). 
ii. Iraq 
During the course of the Iran-Iraq war, the u.s. supplied more than five 
billion dollars worth of military equipment. Inevitably an imbalance of power 
developed in the region and Iraq began to see more expansionist possibilities. 
To this end, Iraq occupied Kuwait, another country rich in oil, in 1990. There 
followed the Gulf War, wherein the Iraqis were not only forced to withdraw 
from Kuwait, but much civilian infrastructure in Iraq was targeted by the U.S. 
Once sanctions and an embargo on the oil trade had been imposed, thousands 
of Iraqis lost their lives from malnutrition and preventable diseases after the 
war, at least, in part because of the harsh sanctions and occasional bombing to 
reinforce them. What is also vivid in one's mind is when the U.N. weapons 
inspectors were withdrawn and these same inspectors later admitted collecting 
intelligence to help undermine the Iraqi regime (that is spying to Jan and me). 
Under those circumstances it is not inconceivable why Iraq did not want to 
readmit inspectors, simply because of fears that the United States would resort 
to spying again. So the Iraqis detest the United States because even though they 
have readmitted those spying inspectors to Iraq, they were correct in asserting 
that this would not be enough to avoid an attack. 
Increasingly, voices proclaim for the general public in America and 
Europe that Islam is news of a particularly unpleasant sort. Today, a state of 
panic exists in the Western world, especially after September 11. The media, 
especially in the United States, have intentionally succeeded in portraying 
Islam as the antagonist of the West. Negative images of Islam are much more 
prevalent than any others. Such images correspond not with what Islam 'is' but 
to what prominent sectors of a particular society would like it to correspond to. 
The Bush administration invested a lot of capital in the war with Iraq, 
and the removal and ultimate incarceration of Saddam Hussein. Saddam has 
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been so demonized in the American media so that Bush could get away with 
making audiences believe that he had to go to war with Iraq to ensure 
Saddam's immediate removal (Ritter & Pitt, 2002:3). With the exception of 
Britain, the states with veto power in the Security Council (French, Chinese, 
and the Russians) were not persuaded to satisfy Bush's passion to go to war, as 
soon as possible, as they looked to containment as a solution (Mailer, 2003:40). 
The major weakness of Powell's presentation of the evidence to go to war with 
Iraq, however, was the evidential link of Iraq and al-Qaeda. It is certain, at 
least, that the Bushites, in assuming that such a link exists, had to have 
assumed the legitimizing myth of a monolithic Muslim culture, one in which 
'all Muslims are the same.' The belief to throw all Muslims into one pot and to 
annihilate the distinctions between them is so powerful for camp Bush, that it 
even overpowers and nullifies the sovereignty of one Muslim state. Any 
dissent or difference between them is not perceptible in the Western mind, bent 
as it is on Orientalist thinking. As with the involvement of the United States in 
Iran, stereotypes seem indomitable when nothing is at stake and negotiable 
when not. 
It was claimed by the United States government that Saddam retained 
nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction which he was prepared to 
surrender to the al-Qaeda network. This idea is laughable, as any weapons that 
would be given to al-Qaeda would first and foremost be used on Saddam 
himself, as he was a secular leader who worked for years to crush 
fundamentalist activities (Ritter & Pitt, 2002:4) . There are not even facts to back 
up claimed cormections between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Iraq therefore, does not 
have a history of dealing with terrorists of this nature. 
From Saddam's point of view, bin Laden was the most 
troublesome kind of man, a religious zealot, that is to say a 
loose cannon, a warrior who could not be controlled. To 
bin Laden, Saddam was an irreligious brute, an 
unbalanced fool whose boldest ventures invariably crashed. 
- Mailer, 2002:35 
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There are lots of 'stubborn facts' that have surrounded the war with 
Iraq, and the long history that has been shared with this nation. Based on the 
facts at hand, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein is a monster - he killed 
millions of his own people by using chemical weapons. But there is a phrase 
missing: "with the aid and support of Daddy Bush", who considered that that 
was just fine (Chomsky, cited in Junkerman & Masakazu, 2003:130). Bush I 
umelentingly provided aid and support to Saddam, and so did Britain. Yet, 
Saddam for all his crimes against humanity did not have a hand in September 
11 (Mailer, 2003:55) . But still Americans yearned to go to war with Iraq - or any 
country that could be a potential culprit (ibid). The unfortunate thing for the 
Iraqis was that when the war in Afghanistan failed to capture the leading 
protagonists, the White House now decided that "the real pea was under 
another shell. Not al-Qaeda but Iraq" (Mailer, 2003:36). By using the American 
flag and words such as 'evil' many times in every speech, Bush's aim is beyond 
doubt to strive for American dominance in global affairs . In his January 29, 
2002 State of the Union speech, President Bush singled out Iran, Iraq and North 
Korea as an 'axis of evil' (Internet 13).9 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an 
axis of evil, anning to threaten the peace of the world. By 
seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a 
grave and growing danger. T1ley could provide these arms 
to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. 
T1ley could attack their allies or attempt to black mail the 
United States. 
- Disinfopedia, 2004:1 
9 Iraq, Iran and North Korea are seen as 'bad' actors for the following reasons: Iraq is 
suspected of wanting to pursue programmes to develop nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons and missiles. Iran is equally depicted as an 'axis of evil' as it is listed by the United 
States as sponsoring state terrorism. It is claimed by the U.S. that Teheran plans to develop 
weapons of mass destruction. North Korea has been the main concern of the U.s. because of 
the manufacturing of missiles and the willingness to export sensitive technology (Internet 13). 
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Even though there is a real solidarity in the United States to take on 
terror, the actions and the words of Mr. Bush's State of the Union address seem 
to have "consequences that are very dangerous ... when there is very little 
margin for error left" (Senator Hagel, cited in Internet 13). Bush also met 
increasing attack from the international community - even the closest ally of 
the United States, Britain, thought that it was hard to agree with Bush's 
remarks as his theory attempts to use the anti-war terror as a justification to 
continue invading 'evil' states at will (People's Daily Online, 2004:2; emphasis 
mine). 
By entering Iraq, the U.s. has once again portrayed itself as the colonial 
or imperial power and enemy of Islam (Nye, 2002:3). By being perceived as an 
imperialist power in the region, the U.s. is already encountering an anti-
imperial reaction that has led to attacks on its ground troops in which 
hundreds of soldiers have died. According to John Esposito, director of the 
centre for Muslim-Christian Understanding (CMCU) at Georgetown 
University, the U.s. administration risks a backlash in the Muslim world thanks 
to its inconsistent treatment of Muslim sensibilities. Esposito says that "many 
people in the Muslim world see the United States as a hegemon", a kind of neo-
colonialist power, not a state engaged in a morally unimpeachable war on 
terror" (Esposito, cited in Internet 1). 
iii. Afghanistan 
The war in Afghanistan was one of the most brutal wars of our violent 
era. Indeed, if any conflict should be called a just Jihad, the war against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan surely was (Bergen, 2002:52). Unprovoked, a super 
power invaded a largely peasant nation and inflicted devastation on it. It was 
one of the most significant conflicts since World War II, but paradoxically it 
was one of the most underreported wars of the past decades (ibid). 
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The victory against the Communists in Afghanistan not only moved 
men like Osama bin Laden spiritually, but certainly was an invigorating moral 
victory, since a superpower had been overpowered in the name of Allah. "It 
was an important lesson for the Afghan Arabs and for bin Laden himself, who 
applied it to his next holy war - against the United States" (Bergen, 2002:78). In 
Afghanistan, the United States encouraged, financed and armed Mujaheddin10 
fighters, many of them from Pakistan and other neighbouring countries, in a 
fight against the former U.S.5.R. Drawing on nearly unlimited flows of 
weapons from Saudi Arabia as well as the U.S. funds, the Mujaheddin were able 
to wear down the Soviet occupation forces. Then, in 1989, once the Cold War 
was over, not only did the Soviet Union withdraw its forces, but the United 
States also abandoned the Afghanis - leaving a battleground of ethnically and 
religiously divided Islamic militias fighting for control of the country. 
Afghanistan plunged into a brutal civil war with warlords across the country 
fighting for supremacy. When the Taliban finally took control, the Afghanis 
thought that they might see the end of the horror that they had endured for the 
past twenty years. They were to be disappointed, as history has shown. Under 
the Taliban, Afghanistan thus became not merely a new national state, but a 
home for an international movement aiming to reinstate Muslim power by 
overturning secular governments and Western control all over the world. 
Because the Islamic movement had been exposed to the arsenal of lethal 
weaponry and tactics of stealth over the course with its battle against the 
Soviets, once the Taliban was in control, it was able to become the site of 
sophisticated training operations and communications for a network of Islamic 
warriors with international aims and ambitions (Goldstone, cited in Calhoun et 
al.,2002:146). 
In the case of Afghanistan, America is hated because the United States 
used Afghanis to tempt the U.S.5.R into a long and destructive war from which 
10 The Afghan Mujaheddin were approximately 35,000 Muslim radicals that came from as far as 
Central Asia, the Far East, Middle East, and North and East Africa to Afghanistan between 1982 
and 1992 where they were trained in the madrasses (training camps that became like virtual 
universities for future Islamic radicalism where radicals studied, trained and fought together) 
(Rashid,2000:130). 
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Afghanistan has never recovered. A familiar pattern re-emerges with regards to 
the Mujaheddin and the al-Qaeda network, as these two modern political 
projects have been invented by the United States - indirectly trained, equipped, 
and financed by the CIA - to put into service the global American campaign 
against the 'Evil Empire' (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:56-57). 
One cannot but notice how sinister this is. The United States, who uses the 
historical conflict between Islam and the West to justify its wars on Muslim 
nations, now abuses this history and exploits the currency of this war of the 
stereotypes to fight another war that has nothing to do with Islam.ll Clearly 
then, what is at the heart of what is being explored here, is how America 
perceives others and how others perceive America. Each culture has its own 
founding myths and narratives of the 'Other' which evidently have come to 
shape a culture's way of acting. In the case of the United States, America's 'war 
on terror' has designated three poor and unconnected states (Iraq, Iran and 
North Korea) as an 'axis of evil', that are considered hostile to America and 
need to be eradicated, together with any other nations suspected of terror and 
terrorist activities. This reflection of a "moralist sensitivity to good and evil" 
has furthermore pointed out that the real axis of political evil running so 
strongly through the United States in fact underpins the Bush regime (Harmon, 
2000:1). This axis, according to Harman (2001:1), includes the oil industry, 
military-industrial complex (MIC), and other transnationals. These players use 
Bush's 'war on terrorism' to carry out foreign and domestic policies. Apart 
from Bush himself, Cheney, Rumsfeld, O'Neill and Ashcroft are all important 
contributors to Bush's electoral triumph - each of whom have a high level of 
representation in the administration of the United States. The "Washington 
Axis" certainly plays its part in accelerating all the ugly trends, wrapping 
themselves, for example, in the flag to persuade the public to revel in the game 
of war in order to beat up yet an another small opponent (Herman, 2001 :2). 
This form of grand absolutism is a recipe for disaster as it dehumanises 
and demonizes relations with the rest of the world that is growing even more 
II This dynamic is looked at more closely in chapters two and three. 
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interconnected as a result of globalization. It reinforces America's belief that its 
way is always the right way, while painting the enemy as some embodiment of 
evil who hates the U.s. (Sardar & Davies, 2000:87) . As the historical analysis has 
shown in the first section of the proposed genealogy of resistance, the theological 
conflicts between Christianity and Islam which stretch as far back as the 
Crusades, have been used by Western governments, particularly American and 
British ones, to define Muslims according to stereotypical fabrications which 
have been incorporated into present knowledge structures when referring to 
Islam (a common belief is that all Muslims are fundamentalist-loving people). 
By undertaking such a stance, Western culture has been capable of illustrating 
that their values and beliefs are by far more advanced and 'peace-loving' than 
those of Muslims, or terrorists, if you will. In that sense, if the enemy is a bunch 
of freedom-hating and progress-hating fundamentalists, then it is easier to hate 
them back. 
iv. Saudi Arabia 
The House of Saud, controlled by Crown Prince Abdullah, rules Saudi 
Arabia. Moderate and reformist voices do exist among the Saudi princes, but 
those voices have little power, because Crown Prince Abdullah is protected by 
u.s. troops stationed within Saudi Arabia and by weapons provided to his own 
army by the U.S. Interestingly enough, the Saudis, together with the United 
States, have had a primary accountability for the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism world-wide, especially during the long and disorderly years 
of the Cold War. In the environment of the Cold War, Saudi Arabia and the 
United States equally worried about their interests in the Middle East, 
especially during the heyday of Arab nationalism under Jamal Abdul Nasser, 
who hoped to cause the downfall of the Saudi government in the 1950's and 
1960's (simultaneously with other pro-western governments) (Abukhalil, 
2002:58). While the United States was concerned with the threat of communism 
externally, the Saudis were resolved to maintain political control within the 
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country. The United States, during the1980's, however, no longer had a raison 
d'etre to encourage the growth of radical Islamic fundamentalism, especially 
since the events surrounding the trial of assassins of Anwar Sadat in 1981, and 
more importantly, since the movement had increasingly turned against the 
United States. The waning importance of the Saudi alliance was also coupled 
with two noteworthy developments: first, that the Russians and Venezuelans 
are competing to supplant Saudi Arabia as the leading exporters of oil, and 
second, that the majority of Middle Eastern country are siding the United States 
in the 'war against terror' (Bergen, 2002:237). Even countries that were 
sympathetic to Saddam Hussein throughout the Gulf War (such as Yemen and 
Jordan) are implacably opposed to al-Qaeda and its affiliates. 
As a consequence of these developments, there has been a dramatic 
decline in the friendly relations between the United States and the House of 
Saud. Broad questioning of the United States' support for the House of Saud 
has also been implemented because Osama bin Laden comes from a prominent 
Saudi family and because the majority of the nineteen hijackers were Saudi 
nationals. In order to distance itself from former relations with Saudi Arabia, 
the United States began to resurrect older stereotypes of 'the Arab' and Islam in 
terms of Bedouin, desert, camel, polygamy, harem, and rich oil sheikhs. There 
was, therefore, no doubt when the world watched in horror on the morning of 
September 11 that the identity of the people responsible for the attacks had to 
"be Muslims/ Arabs/ extremists/ fundamentalists, it was unquestionably 
'Them'" (Sardar & Davies, 2002:45). The conclusion came before the 
investigation had even gone ahead or before the evidence was collected. In the 
broader context, it once again reveals how the history of ideas gets established 
as 'knowledge' and how these 'facts' subsequently become a common cultural 
convention. As a hall of mirrors, Orientalism distorts images as not merely 
being known as popular stereotypes, but as cultural knowledge (Sardar & Davies, 
2002:53). 
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v. Palestine 
The Palestinian people were promised a state of their own in the 1947 
partition plan, which split the region, then under British control, into Palestine 
and Israel. However, Israel invaded Syria, Jordan and Iraq in 1967 and won a 
war, which resulted in their seizing a lot more territory from the Palestinians. 
Since then Israel has continued to occupy Palestinian territory, and refused 
Palestinian refugees the right to return to which they had been entitled to in the 
first place under international law. U.s. relations with Israel are but one of the 
many aspects of u.s. foreign policy that are the major source of irritation and 
resentment in the Middle East. Viewing Israeli-Palestinian developments from 
the perspective of the Muslim world, Arjomand (cited in Hershberg & Moore, 
2002:162) claims "the inability of the American superpower to stop the 
expansion of Jewish settlements in Palestinian territory even during the period 
of the peace accord is incomprehensible." Such incomprehension has even led 
to the spread of the conspiratorial rumour, widely current in the Arab Middle 
East that the Jews were behind the World Trade Center attacks as opposed to 
al-Qaeda. As a matter a fact, more than two years ago, a prophetic document 
about the U.s. threat posed by terrorism, was only recently released in which it 
is claimed that "some catastrophic and catalyzing event like Pearl Harbour" 
was needed that could present "the opportunity of ages" for the United States 
in following 'The Project of the New American Century' (Internet 17). A series 
of articles that had been published in the Washington Post, repeatedly reveals 
that the Bush Administration manipulated September 11 as an "opportunity" 
to go to war with the terrorists (ibid). According to a classified document which 
was made in preparation for Rumsfeld, known as the 'Proactive Pre-emptive 
Operations Group' (P20G), terrorist attacks are provoked which will 
eventually call for "counter attack" by the United States on countries that 
harbour these terrorists. In other words, innocent people might have been 
killed by the United States on September 11. 
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Certainly, then, when turning back to the success of the Israelis in the 
Middle Eastern conflict, their dominant demeanour in Middle Eastern affairs 
could not have been made possible, if it were not for the support of the United 
States. Since May 2001, it has been impossible to miss the conspicuous use of 
American weapons that have been used to destroy Palestinian civilians 
throughout the Middle East. Under cover of propaganda in which the United 
States claims to combat Yasser Arafat and his terrorist inclinations, the truly 
dangerous men, such as Rumsfeld and Cheney, are well aware that Sharon, 
after all, has a firm hold on the U.S. administration (Mailer, 2003:55). With the 
Mossad, Sharon has one of the best intelligence services in the Middle East, if 
not in the world. The CIA, prominent by now for its small members of Arab 
spies in the Muslim world, cannot do without Sharon's services (ibid). The 
Israelis, in turn, can count on the United States using their veto in the U.N. 
Security Council to stop most Resolutions against Israeli actions. So the 
Palestinians hate the United States because they support the Israeli policy of 
slowly taking over more and more Palestinian land, bulldozing houses and 
shooting children on their way. 
The mutual implication of Foucault's power-knowledge nexus can once 
again be applied to this post-colonial case study. In the context of Orientalism, 
Western power (in this case that of the United States and particularly the power 
to enter or examine other countries at will) enables the production of a range of 
knowledge about other cultures (Williams & Chrisman, 1993:8). Such 
knowledge in turn enables (legitimates, underwrites) the deployment of U.s 
power in the feud between the Israelis and Palestinians. Consequently, we can 
also begin to understand Said's point that Orientalism is a cultural and political 
fact which follows a "distinct and intellectually knowable line" (Williams & 
Chrisman, 1993:138). With this in mind, it begins to be more apparent that the 
Israeli-Palestinian example is part of the genealogy of the conflict. As 
Orientalism was such a system of truths, in Nietzsche's sense of the word, the 
system of representations regarding the religion of Islam began to be framed by 
a whole set of forces that brought the Orient into Western awareness (Williams 
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& Chrisman, 1993:142). At this stage I do not want to press all this any further 
on general theoretical grounds: it seems to me that the value and credibility of 
my case can be demonstrated by referring to these case studies to illustrate the 
ways in which the 'subaltern' native subject is constructed in the discourses 
(Williams & Chrisman, 1993:16). This reasoning has been carried down from 
one generation to the next and has led Bush and his handlers determine 
authoritatively who are the terrorists, who harbours them, and who can build 
weapons. Israel is of course let off from this regulation and has been given carte 
blanche to smash the Palestinian civil society (Herman, 2002:2). 
This then, has been the briefest of summaries of the U.s. activities in the 
Middle East, yet it highlights more than enough reasons for the countries and 
people of this region to have an extreme dislike for the U.s. and, given the 
historical backdrop of West-Orient relations, to articulate this dislike in terms 
of the historical conflict between them. The developments in Afghanistan, 
Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and Iran gave renewed life to the Islamist movements 
that had been able to overcome authorities and establish themselves in such 
Muslim secular states such as Egypt, Syria, or Pakistan (Goldstone, cited in 
Hershberg & Moore, 2002:146). The Afghan revolution drew Islamist 
supporters together, gave them a mission, combat experience, and 
sophisticated weaponry and training ground; under the Taliban, they gained a 
territorial base. These supporters all had the common desire to destroy the 
dominance of the Western power and culture in the world, and to undermine 
that power and prestige that the Western allies had in the world. With repeated 
wars against the Arab nations by the Western allies, these Islamic warriors felt 
that the events from the 1970's through to 2001 created a formidable basis for 
an international Islamic movement that is prepared to use terror in order to 
advance its goals. 
In their book entitled Why Do People Hate America? Ziauddin Sardar and 
Merryl Wyn Davies (2002), take the question of hostility towards Americans 
even further. By turning their attention to the background and context of 
September 11 and the problems that would have existed irrespective of such a 
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crime, they give an exposition of the problem of relations between America and 
the rest of the world (as illustrated in the above- mentioned examples). Their 
inquiry is extremely relevant to this study, for unless the background of the 
attacks is revealed and made part of the debate, there is little hope of 
understanding the genealogy of resistance that led to 9/11. 
*** 
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I 3. Why Do People Hate Americans?' 
As a 'hyper power', America affects the lives of people all around the 
world. Yet, many Americans are not even aware of the actual consequences of 
U.S. engagement with the rest of the world (Sardar & Davies, 2000:11). Many 
Americans are held back from achieving a better understanding of how their 
government is perceived by knowing so little about their own history, and even 
less about the history of other peoples. This is one of the central problems that 
Sardar and Davies (2002) try to illuminate when they answer the question so 
often posed by Americans: "Why do they hate us?" In more precise terms they 
call it the problem of 'knowledgeable ignorance' - Americans maintain a 
particular view of other cultures and belief systems even though the means 
exist to know differently. Knowledgeable ignorance is a term that is more than 
just general negative attitudes and ideas (Sardar & Davies, 2000:51;11-12). 
Rather, it defines the ways in which certain attitudes (in this case the way the 
West views Islam and Muslims in particular) are built into an approach to 
knowledge, a body of study and expertise called Orientalism. The problem of 
knowledge is not exclusive to the United States alone but also to the Western 
civilization in general. Europeans, for example, often see Africa and Africans as 
inferior. They use their history and their civilization as a yardstick for what is 
acceptable and reasonable. Anything that slightly deviates from that norm is 
seen as 'abnormal' or 'backward.' 
Recently Italy's Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was metaphorically 
carpeted for blurting out that he considered the Western civilization superior to 
the Islamic civilization: 
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We must be aware of the superiorihj of our civilization, a 
system that has guaranteed well -being, respect for human 
rights and - in contrast with Islamic countries - respect 
for religious and political rights. 
- Berlusconi, cited in Internet 5 
Berlusconi was attacked from all sides after that statement and was even 
forced to apologise to the Arab ambassador to Rome, because it was feared that 
his statement might damage the dramatic efforts of allies. Suspicion and 
apprehension in America and Europe towards Islam is further heightened by 
the existence of the large Muslim communities in major cities. Take my country 
of origin, for example, the Netherlands, where this phenomenon sustains 
feelings of apprehension toward the Turkish and Moroccan immigrants. They 
are perceived as a threat to their own life style - leading to the rise of 
xenophobia and the boost in the popularity of the extreme right, which blames 
the rise in unemployment and crime on immigrants. Muslims, like Jews in the 
past, find themselves in Western cultural contexts where they are often 
regarded as completely 'Other.' This approach risks painting all Muslims, and 
indeed Islam itself, as violent, rather than carefully distinguishing between a 
radical fringe and the mainstream, those who manipulate and distort the 
religion to justify their actions and the Islamic tradition itself. 
Once again, we could say that we have come full circle. It is like we are 
back in 1492 when the Crusaders induced anti-Muslim sentiments which 
resulted in the final expulsion of the Moors from Spain. In orchestrating the 
genealogy of resistance, it is central to refer back to this historical connection. The 
significance of Orientalism as a discourse should not be underestimated as the 
stereotypes which became established as 'facts' have had a significant influence 
on both the 'Western' and 'Eastern' side of the divide. The realities of 
colonialism and imperialism, forgotten or conveniently overlooked by many in 
the West, are part of the living legacy, firmly implanted in the memory of 
many. 
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If there is an 'Islamic threat', many Arabs and Muslims also believe that 
there has also been a 'Western threat' - of political, economic, and cultural 
imperialism. Just how Western politicians used 'Islamophobia' and their anti -
Muslim brigade as a weapon to make sure that 'the (Islamic) threat' is kept 
before OUf eyes - "assuring profitable consultancies, frequent TV appearances 
and book sales" (Internet 25) - so too is anti-American propaganda used as a 
means to embrace the present-day Jihad against the United States and its allies. 
The established doctrine of Jihad (in the sense of the 'Holy War', lit. 'exerting 
oneself to the utmost') has for all time been measured as a salient feature of 
Islam by Western observers (Peters, 1979:6). Anti-colonial struggle, above all 
during the first stages of the European expansion into the Islamic world, was 
often enthused by religion and armed struggle was waged under the banner of 
Jihad. Later, however, when secular ideologies began to dictate the anti-colonial 
struggle, proclamations of Jihad have turned out to be more part of the common 
war propaganda directed at the U.s. and its Western allies. 
The doctrine of Jihad is still a hotly debated issue in the Islamic as well as 
the Western world, especially in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. As 
the doctrine is concerned with the relationship between Muslims and non-
Muslims, the modern writings of Jihad reflect the attitude of the modern 
Muslims towards the Western powers (Peters, 1979:2). Fundamentalists such as 
Osama bin Laden have, therefore, formed the impression that the purpose of 
Jihad is to corroborate the complete superiority of Islam. 
Thus, by using Jihad as an anti-American propaganda slogan it is hoped 
that the Muslim population can rebel against Western domination as long as 
these struggles can be ideologically professed by those people that take part in 
them. Because of their preoccupation with political activism, leaders of 
contemporary Islamism have been more concerned with emphasizing segments 
of the Qur' an that serve their purposes (as illustrated in the above - extensive 
reduced quoting of verses) than with interpreting the texts itself. Consequently, 
by using the Jihad doctrine, Islamic fundamentalists use this movement as a 
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validation for using terror as a means to fight the United States and its Western 
allies. 
Extreme dislike for America has a deeper root; it is to be found in the 
imposed inability of other societies and cultures to live as they would wish to 
live. Whether it is because of America's support of the state of Israel (seen by 
many in the Arab world as a u.s. armed and funded colony) or because of 
Washington's support for authoritarian regimes such as those in Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and many others; or alternatively, because of the United States to 
intervene militarily in the developing world (Sardar & Davies, 2000:67). The 
Arab world sees America as the main culprit and the continuing source of their 
predicaments, and which accounts for their hostility towards it. They feel that, 
even though the U.s. may be an open society, the government operates in such 
a way that outside concerns and voices cannot penetrate its self-interests. 
Indeed, the Jihad doctrine could be said to have come about as a result of 
many obvious reasons to hate America. In the preliminary stages of European 
colonialism in the Islamic world, Muslims in many places vigorously resisted 
the new situation and appealed to the doctrine of Jihad in order to activate the 
population, to rationalize the struggle and to identify the enemy (Peters, 
1979:2). During the 1980's, for example, when the Palestinians called for an 
Intifada against Western powers, as their political concessions were not met, 
Jihad had two main goals: self-determination and liberation from Israeli 
occupation, and secondly, democracy, accountability and good governance 
(Klein, 2002:2). 
History, may well have taken a different course if the year of the Soviet 
invasion into Afghanistan would not have taken place. From the day the 
Soviets invaded Afghanistan, American diplomatic strategy was to mobilise 
world opinion against the Soviets. Afghanistan was doomed to be a pawn and 
given the highly conservative nature of the Afghan society and the 
spontaneous resistance to the Afghan communist regime, it did not take a 
genius to suggest that Islamic international solidarity could be used as a 
powerful weapon. Given the fact that the super powers were non-Muslims, the 
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doctrine of Jihad was well suited for these purposes (Peters, 1979:2). The result 
of the contradictions that were presented during the Afghan war, has led 
Muslim thinkers to reinterpret the doctrine of Jihad which was done in the 
general framework of modernity. To the best of my knowledge, chapter two 
offers a deeper analysis of the role of Jihad within the framework of the 
doctrine's new interpretations which paradoxically turned al-Qaeda into a 
modern phenomenon. 
As the American goverrunent both exemplifies the distinction between 
'us' and 'them', professors and foreign policy experts still weigh in about 
Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' model for viewing the future of 
international relations. Huntington's thesis supplied Americans with "a new 
phase" in world politics after the Cold War and his terms of arguments seem, 
large, bold and visionary even today (Internet 20). Does a genealogtJ of the 
conflict between the East and the West which resulted in September 11, such as 
this, buy into or confirm the fundamental binary as propagated by 
Huntington? Is there an essential, perhaps even metaphysical difference 
between Islam and the West that bears testimony to a history of conflict and 
which casts its shadow over the future? 
*** 
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4. Exploring the Scholarly Debate about the ~Clash 
of Civilizations' 
According to many Western commentators, since the late 1970's, and 
more particularly, since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Islam and the West, are 
on a collision course. Despite attempts to evade it, it appears to Westerners that 
the ultimate aim of fundamentalist terrorism is to muster the Muslim masses 
against the United States and Europe. In initiating the campaign against Osama 
bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization, Western leaders repeatedly stated 
that it was not a war against Islam nor a "clash of cultures", but only the need 
to eradicate a group of dangerous fanatics that signify a threat for the world as 
a whole (Internet 21). This 'truth' is embodied in a historic statement of the U.s. 
State Department in June 1992: " ... the United States Government does not view 
Islam as the next 'ism' confronting the West or threatening world peace" (ibid) . 
Huntington (1996:20) posited that the basis of friendships between 
nation states would be civilizational affinity and the world may be seen as 
being composed of civilizations that overlay nation states. He identifies several 
civilizations including Western-Christian, Eastern-Christian, Islamic, Hindu 
and others. In the case of nation states like Germany and France belonging to 
the same civilizations, there is little likelihood of conflict. On the other hand, 
when two or more civilizations meet on the ground, as in former Yugoslavia, it 
can give rise to conflict. The boundary where two or more civilizations meet, is 
to be seen as a 'civilizational fault line' (Huntington, 1996:22). Yugoslavia 
furnishes a particularly good example as it is the meeting ground of three 
civilisations (as conceived by Huntington) - Western (Croatia), Eastern (Serbia) 
and Islamic (Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
The challenge for Western policy makers, says Huntington, is to make 
sure that the West gets stronger and fends off all the others, Islam in particular. 
Said (Internet 20) describes Huntington as an 'ideologist', someone who wants 
to make 'civilizations' and 'identities' into what they are not. Huntington 
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divides the globe into nine occasionally awkward tectonic plates: Western (led 
by the U.S), Orthodox, Islamic, Hindu, Confucian and Japanese, with Latin 
America and Africa more doubtfully classified as 'candidates' for civilizational 
status (Huntington, 1996:45-46). He envisages friction in all directions along the 
borders between these civilizational plates, and also within civilizations. At 
various times, the vast and increasing global reach of Western power and 
influence will bring civilizational groups into conflict with each other (the West 
against the Rest) (Huntington, 1996:43). In particular, there will be two major 
clashes: one in the short term with a resurgent Islam, and perhaps more 
portentously, a long-term clash with the emergent China. 
Following the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama, an old student of 
Huntington, also wrote a book in which he proclaimed that it was the "End of 
History." The idea was that in a unipolar world, with no superpower rivalry to 
fuel them, economic activity would be everyone's prime anxiety and that any 
conflicts would be contained (Internet 18). This utopian visualization was 
reconfirmed by Western powers, because of the outbreak of religious and 
ethnic conflicts, in many parts of the world (ibid). Faced with this reality, some 
political scientists in the West tried to explain them in terms of civilizations 
rather than economic and political terms or ideologies that dominated the Cold 
War era. Thus, in the post Cold-War period there is a salient tendency to define 
Islam as a new threat or as the enemy of the West following the collapse of 
Soviet Communism. The discourse of 'the Clash of Civilizations' certainly 
gained a new momentum in the Western media and literature after the US. 
Vice-President, Dan Quale, and the Secretary-General of NATO, Willy Claes, 
publicly identified Islam as succeeding communism as the greatest threat to 
Western security (Internet 21). 
This also explains why there is a pronounced tendency to find the roots 
of terror in Islam and not in any other religion. As a matter of a fact, the 
discourse on the 'Clash of Civilizations' happened for reasons that not many 
people have spoken of. There has been for centuries, a conflict between Islam 
and Christendom. Now, Christianity knew how to corne to terms with Islam .0',' 
.-
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per se. But it did not know how to come to terms with political Islam. Political 
Islam, in any situation, is linked with territorial expansion of the Muslim 
community. In the first half of the 20th century, the Western hemisphere did all 
that it could to ruin socialist and communist ideas and with the self-destruction 
of communism and socialism in the 1990's, the spectre of the 'Other Enemy' 
had to be found. 
Gopal (2001) maintains that the United States has marshalled all her 
resources and rhetoric to the destruction of the 'Other.' Even if there were no 
Osama bin Laden, he would have been invented and nurtured by the United 
States. This is dangerous as the annihilation of Osama and the Taliban will only 
produce more bin Ladens. 
No one can justifij terrorism. What is happening in Kashmir, the 
kind of terrorism aided and abetted by Pakistan, is not acceptable. 
Nobody is going to support it. But then when do you find a 
solution? The solution does not lie in just targeting one individual 
or aile community or one counln;. Earlier it was Saddam Hussein 
and Iraq. Before it was (Yasser) Aratat and the Palestinians. And 
now it is bin Laden and the Ta libnn . 
- Hasan, cited in Gopal, 2001:2 
Similarly, in their well-structured study, Andrea Lueg and Jochen 
Hippler (Internet 21) point out the hypothesis in which they assess the real 
impulses behind the Western perceptions of Islam: 
We no longer have the Soviet Union or Communism to 
serve as the enemies justifijing expensive and extensive 
militanj apparatus. It was in tire mid 1980's at tire venJ 
latest that the search began for new enemies to justifij arms 
budgets and offensive militanj policies, at first part of the 
Communist threat and then in its place. 
*** 
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5. Culture Clash or Clash of Ignorance? 
After September 11 and with the growth of terrorism, many people in 
the West (and elsewhere) thought that the carefully planned suicide attacks by 
a small group of militants have been turned into proof of Huntington's thesis. 
President Bush in a few words in the post-September 11 address, to the joint 
House of Congress stated: "This is the world's fight. This is a civilization's 
fight" (Bush, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:295). Clearly underpinning the 
speeches of Western leaders such as Bush and Blair is the conviction that they 
represent the modern world while al-Qaeda are, in some sense, a throwback to 
an earlier time, with "a medieval theology and atavistic notions of society" 
(Brown, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:296). 
The assumption in all this, though generally unstated, is that terrorism is 
to be equated with the Islamic civilization (Huntington himself rejected it, but it 
was too late to have much effect). However, Western leaders, including 
President George W. Bush clarified that the extremists' elements within the 
Muslim world did not represent Muslims as such, but themselves only. A 
preponderant majority of Muslims worldwide have always been of the opinion 
that the idea of a monumental clash between Islam and the West is highly 
dangerous and must be discouraged at any cost. The boldness of people like 
Osama can be highly destructive. Muslim critics of Huntington furthermore see 
his theory as an exercise to defend Western interests. They point out that he is 
too ready to portray the non-Western nations as belligerent while ignoring the 
West's record of aggression and domination (Internet 25). Huntington's thesis 
is seen as a product or function of the historical conflict between Islam and the 
West and not, as he himself presents it, as a natural, historical account of it. 
Huntington's 'Clash of Civilization' thesis is therefore part of a perpetuation of 
the myth that drives the conflict, rather than a description of it. 
Another criticism directed against Huntington's thesis, IS that it is 
difficult to identify Islam as a monolithic civilization, as there have been, and 
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continue to be, conflicts within Islam (Internet 19). Geopolitical theories like the 
'Clash of Civilizations' make the facile assumption that human beings 
everywhere think and behave the same way and have similar priorities 
dominated by economic interests. To scholars in the secularized humanist 
West, it is inconceivable that people would lay down their lives for religious or 
cultural beliefs. Also, with terrorism striking in places, as far apart as, New 
York, Kenya, Moscow, Afghanistan, Kashmir and Bali, there is no distinct 'fault 
line' (ibid). In reality, terrorism represents no civilization and follows no 
boundaries. 
In addition, the reactions against September 11, were not along 
civilizational lines, as evidence from the Asian nations suggests, since states 
such as Muslim Indonesia, Buddhist Thailand, and Hindu India, acted more as 
states than as civilizations (Acharya, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:195). 
Religion and civilization do not replace pragmatism, interest and principle as 
the guiding motives of international relations. When asked to pick sides 
between the terrorists and Washington, these Asian countries overwhelmingly 
sided with the United States, despite the support given by the US to Israel. 
Why governments acted this way speaks more to 
pragmatism and principle than to their cultural 
disposition and civilizational affinihj. National interest, 
regime securihj and modern principles of international 
conduct were placed ahead of primordial sentiment and 
religious identihj. 
- Acharya, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:195 
The afore-mentioned quote furthermore exemplifies that Huntington's 
thesis is naIve because it assumes that countries will act in accordance with 
their civilizational identity. On the contrary, if the Asian countries reacted to 
Bush's plea to join the global 'war on terror', it is not because they had a 
civilizational affiliation with the United States, but rather political-economic 
agendas that needed to be met. 
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The most effective critique of Huntington's theory, however, has come 
from Esposito (1992) who warns against the risk of theories like that of 
Huntington as they de-emphasize the commonly shared ground between 
civilizations and emphasize distinctions alone. Esposito rejects the notion of a 
'Clash of Civilizations' between the West and Islam as a rehash of old 
imperialist theories. As mentioned earlier, Esposito is saying here about 
Huntington what was said previously, namely that this thesis is part of a 
genealogy and not a neutral description of it. "There is no one West, no one 
Islam: and to speak of civilizations in isolated entities defies the very logic and 
nature of what civilization is all about" (Internet 1). The question, explains 
Esposito, is whether the United States truly believes in the promotion of self-
determination for everyone, or is selective when it comes to the Middle East 
and the Muslim world. "If the U.S. and Europe are really concerned about the 
promotion of democratization and human rights, then they have to be 
consistent with regard to that policy" (ibid). Otherwise, says Esposito, "they 
will be vulnerable to anger that contributes to the conditions that allow Islam to 
be hijacked and used to legitimate the kind of terrorist actions that we have 
seen on September 11" (Esposito, cited in Abdel-Latif, 2001:5). 
*** 
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6. Conclusion 
A crucial aspect of this chapter was with regards to the distinctive 
Foucaultian approach to history. With reference to Said's (1978) Orientalism, it 
has been seen that subjectivity is critical to Foucault's account of power and 
hence his account of power-knowledge. In being productive, power produces 
subjects. While subjects are products, this does not mean that they are not 
active; they are active in producing themselves as subjects in the sense of those 
subjected to power. For Foucault and Said alike, the subject is produced 
through discourse. Subjects are therefore, the punctuation of discourse, and 
provide the bodies on and through which discourse may act. The disciplines of 
knowledge, such as anthropology, development studies and political science, 
interpret the rest of the world, not only for use in shaping politics and policy of 
the West, but also in explaining the rest of the world to itself. In the light of all 
of this, texts can create not only knowledge but also the very reality that they 
appear to describe. In time such knowledge produces a tradition, or what 
Michael Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence is responsible for 
the texts that are produced out of it. The contemporary intellectual can learn 
from Orientalism and apply it to the discourse of the 'Clash of Civilizations' 
and that of 'Islamophobia' in order to distinguish the human ground in which 
texts, visions, methods, and disciplines begin to grow, thrive and eventually 
degenerate. 
When looking at the background noise of cultural cliches that both Arabs 
and Westerners have about each other, it becomes apparent that both 
Christians and Muslims prevent themselves from learning more about other 
people and their way of being. With the most highly developed education 
system and institutions of scholarship, it is not difficult to notice how badly 
informed Americans are of world affairs. They are not aware of the leaders of 
other countries or where these countries are situated. Americans are ignorant of 
their own history, let alone the history of the world (Sardar & Davies, 
2000:200). America's uniquely and self-interested way in defining and 
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redefining herself, and most chillingly, the way in which she defines the way in 
which others people have to be seen and characterized, puts her in a position to 
have the power to define the welfare and well-being of others which often 
leads to the misrepresentation of entire groups of people. Because stereotypes 
are so widespread and so deeply interwoven into the fabric of American and 
Muslim societies, it will be difficult for genealogists to unpick them. 
By looking at the events leading up to September 11,2001, one finds that 
at the heart of it all are misinterpretations and a clash of viewpoints as opposed 
to a 'Clash of Civilizations.' While a 'Clash of Civilizations' can become the 
clarion call that justifies aggression and warfare, future global threats and wars 
will be due less to a 'Clash of Civilizations' than a clash of interests, economic 
and otherwise. 
A civilizational clash is not so much over Jesus Christ, 
Confucius, or the Prophet Mohammad as it is over 
unequal distribution oJ world power and those who do not, 
those who control the world's destiny and those who are 
the subjects oJ control. 
Fuller, cited in Sezgin, 2000:4 
*** 
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Chapter Two 
Globalization and Resistance From 
Within 
Jihad is a rapid response to colonialism and imperialism and their 
economic children, capitalism and modemih;; its diversihJ run 
amok, multiculturalism turned cancerous so that cells keep dividing 
long after their division has ceased to serve the healthy corpus 
- Barber, 1996:11 
1. Introduction 
After September 11, America's 'war on terror' soon saturated the media 
with one or another cultural theory of politics 1 (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg 
& Moore, 2002:44). From a simple Huntingtonian version of a 'Clash of 
Civilizations', we now read more refined notions of a clash within civilizations: 
specifically, we are told that 'bad Muslims' have hijacked Islam, which' good 
Muslims' must now be ready to define. In other words, what we seem to be 
experiencing is a struggle in which each culture grapples with the ambivalence 
of modernity. We live in a world so integrated, where everyday operations are 
geared at each other, that there are instant global consequences to any 
interruption. The disruption of the world transport system, international 
meetings and institutions, global markets, and even whole economies, can 
happen with a speed unthinkable in any previous period. The implication is 
1 "This is a theory to define cultures according to their presumed' essential' characteristics, 
especially as regards politics" (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:44). 
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that the only way forward is a civil war inside a quarantined culture 
(Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:44). 
In his powerful book, Jihad VS. McWorld (1996), Benjamin Barber 
illustrates how "the collision between the forces of integrative modernization 
and aggressive economic cultural globalization (McWorld) and disintegral 
tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism (Jihad)" have been exacerbated by 
the dialectical interdependence that these seemingly oppositional forces exert 
(Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:245). Barber's use of the term Jihad is 
understood as "the struggle of local peoples to sustain solidarity and tradition 
against the nation-state's legalistic and pluralistic abstractions as well as 
against the new commercial imperialism of McWorld" (Barber, 1996:232). 
"McWorld is a kind of virtual reality, created by invisible, but omnipotent 
high-tech information networks and fluid transnational economic markets" 
(Barber, 1996:26). It is merely a natural culmination of the modernization 
process that has gone on since the end of the Renaissance birth of modern 
science and its accompanying paradigm of knowledge constructed as power. 
The purpose of this chapter is to refer to Barber's explanations of Jihad 
and McWorld's dialectical interdependence in order to exemplify how 
September 11 was as much the challenger of modernity as its child. The two are 
locked together in such a way that neither is able to coexist with the other, nor 
is complete without the other. I want to suggest here, as Mamdani does, (in 
Hershberg & Moore, 2002:44) that one needs to go beyond an earlier round of 
discussions associated with Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis 
(which demonized Islam in its entirety). As will become clear, the problem is 
larger than claiming that all suicide bombers are Muslim. It lies with an 
undisguised argument in which tribalists and fundamentalists have recognized 
modernity as their adversary (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:44). 
Central to the post-September analytical predicament should be a line of 
reasoning that traces the political histories of the modern roots of the Jihad 
movement. In other words, the political tendencies of indirect rule as exercised 
by the colonial powers have mistreated and avoided the history of the 
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emergence of the Jihad movement. Rather than dismissing history altogether, 
the Jihad movement, as promoted by al-Qaeda, is "a modern ensemble at the 
service of a modern project" (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:46). 
*** 
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2. World Politics in a Globalized Era 
Globalization is not an entirely new phenomenon in world history; 
indeed, many argue that it is a new name for a long-term feature. Dani 
Nabudere, in his article, Globalization, The Post Colonial African State, Post-
Traditionalism, and the New World Order, suggests as Tandon does, (cited in 
Nabudere, 2000:11) that one could perceive globalization as either a completely 
new phenomenon or "an old enemy in a new guise." In many respects 
globalization has countless qualities in common with modernization theory 
(Baylis & Smith, 1997:7). It seems that modernization is a component of the 
globalization process, in that industrialization brings into existence a whole 
new set of contacts between societies, and changes the political, and economic 
processes that characterized the pre-modern world (ibid). The importance of 
economic interrelations and modern technology has been influential in 
establishing what Marshall McLuhan (1964) calls the 'global village' in which 
people, nations and economies, are intertwined closer than ever before (Bayliss 
& Smith, 1997:8). 
Globalization could be described as a fast train: "either you jump in 
from the start, or you are out forever" (Amalric, 2002:100). Claude Ake (cited in 
Nabudere, 2000:11) defines globalization as the "march of capital all over the 
world in search of profits." The marginalized in society are indispensable for 
the capitalist system as they allow capitalism to continue its enhancement of 
"capital accumulation" (Nabudere, 2000:12). So, while globalization brings the 
world closer together, the global divide between developed and developing or 
underdeveloped states is widening at an extraordinary rate. The 'weaker' 
societies become marginalized, swept to the periphery of the world economic 
forum. In this regard, globalization is a very uneven process, where serious 
inequalities exist with regards to the distribution of benefits and losses. 
The consequence of the imposition of the Western values and beliefs 
which accompany globalization, therefore, do not take into account many of 
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the inherent cultural differences that countries experience when they are 
'forced' to take part in the global process. It ignores the devastating impact that 
it has on the developing states. The result, as we have witnessed over the years, 
is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. It is just the beginning of culture playing 
an increasingly substantial role as a way to resist and oppose globalization 
(Nabudere, 2000:50; emphasis mine). Globalization should not just be studied 
with an emphasis on the rising global village, but more attention should be 
paid to counter-movements that are resisting this process and that this view 
would be particularly important with relation to Africa and other Third World 
States (ibid). It cannot be a globalization where one part of the world is 
exploited so that the other part can retain a privileged position. Globalization 
can only be talked of, only if all cultures and traditions are taken into 
consideration and not just those advocated by the West (Nabudere, 2000:50). 
Indeed, a few years earlier, Huntington's former student, Francis 
Fukuyama, had come up with his own theory of the end of history, in which he 
anticipated the onset of globalization by arguing that with Western democratic 
liberalism and market capitalism, the rest of history would become a kind of 
American mopping-up operation. Fukuyama's theory is not even that far-
fetched when referring to the predicament Third World countries find 
themselves in. They live in an environment of despairing rage, as American 
unilateralism is really a form of arrogant imperialism and a betrayal of 
democratic principles. Because of its competitive nature, globalization has led 
to conflicts, tiffs, and annoyances - between governments and between people. 
More importantly, these jealousies by chance erupt into a struggle for 
dominance, an attempt of people to ensure that their communities are free from 
elimination, butchery, enslavement, absorption, exploitation, or domination by 
others. As Hobbes once said: 
In all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authorin), 
because of their IndependenCl), are in continual jealousies, 
and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their 
weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that 
is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of 
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their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their 
neighbours ... 
- Hobbes, cited in Nossal, 1998:484 
From the earliest civilizations to the modern nation-state, these sources 
of division can be variable, and deeply dependent on context. Language, race, 
class, tribe, religion, nationality, ideology, wealth - are but a few of the facets of 
the human condition that may well be "the hinge on which division is hung" 
(Nossal, 1998:483). It is true that there are those who see new enmities lurking 
in the shadows. Indeed, the 'Clash of Civilizations' argument examined in the 
last chapter encourages this tendency in which the enemy's 'Otherness' is 
reasserted. 
A good example of this dynamic at work at present is the demonization 
of Islam, particularly in the United States. Now more than ever, the term 'green 
peril' (after the colour usually associated with Islam), is replacing the 'red peril' 
(used by the Americans to describe Communism) and the 'yellow peril' (to 
describe China). Indeed, Samuel P. Huntington even feels comfortable writing 
that "Islam has bloody borders", as though the interethnic conflict between 
Muslims and others in different countries can somehow be attributed to 
religion and as if only Islam is guilty of this (Huntington, cited in Nossal, 
1998:486). The 'Clash of Civilization' thesis assumes a degree of homogeneity 
among Islamic rebellions, which they evidently do not possess. It is a serious 
mistake to treat all Muslims as belonging to a single homogenous whole. Some 
may point to the statements made by the Bush administration that attempt to 
distinguish between 'good Muslims' and 'bad Muslims' with the implication 
that Islam must be quarantined so that the devil can be exorcised from it by 
means of a civil war (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:44). The 
Secretary of State's call may be seen as unbiased and appropriate in the wake of 
the September 11 attacks, but the real profound biases of culture are revealed in 
the simple fact that the same biases are not applied to all . Christian leaders are 
not exhorted to reign in 'bad Christians' after abortion clinics are bombed by 
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Christian fundamentalists, or when African-American immigrants are 
victimized by the burning crosses and hate crimes of the KKK. 
Mamdani's (2003:45) argument goes beyond the point that if there are 
'good' Muslims and 'bad' Muslims, there ought to also be 'good' Westerners 
and 'bad' Westerners. The politics and power that have come about as a result 
of reading Islamist and Western politics as an effect of Islamic and Western 
civilization, then can be understood as a result of an encounter which will 
neither be understood in isolation, nor external to the history of that encounter 
(ibid). Aside from the feelings of anti-Westernism - common to most - and over 
the Palestinian question - common to all - deep schisms divide Muslims 
(Legum, 1991:3). Thus, the Muslim world is deeply divided within itself. Many 
of the extremist groups now being branded as Islamic or terrorist (or both), are 
combating their own governments, whether, or not, these governments are 
associated with the United States or not (Acharya, cited in Booth & Dunne, 
2002:197). It is, therefore, very much so a clash within civilizations rather than 
between civilizations. 
The impact of globalization, and in particular the emergence of global 
financial markets, poses an even greater challenge to the autonomy of different 
peoples and their communities. Now, more than ever, the modern world is a 
complex jumble. The truth is that the neo-liberal utopians live by the myth that 
globalization will fill the world with liberal republics, linked together in peace 
and trade (Gray, 2003:118). Yet this newfound ability of capital, corporations 
and technology to move around the planet almost instantly, did nothing 
Western, or modern to allow different communities to coexist peacefully. In 
fact, as societies throughout the world became more modern they often grew 
further apart in a world which has encouraged a move of governance away 
from a distinct focus of the state-system to a multi-layered complex of rule 
making and order creation where rule is sovereign (Bayliss & Smith, 1997:26). 
Now that politics lacks a clear centre of command and control of the kind 
previously provided by the Westphalian state has been taken away, one cannot 
but wonder what the implications are for the developments of democracy. The 
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following section poses a critical normative question, namely, what is 
happening to democracy in the contemporary globalizing world? 
*** 
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3. Democratization in the Context of Globalization 
Economic globalization has entered a critical phase. A mounting 
backlash against its effects, especially, in the industrial democracies, is 
threatening a venj disruptive impact on economic activity and social 
stabilihj in many countries. The mood in these democracies is one of 
helplessness and anxiehj, which helps explain the rise of a new brand 
of populist politicians. This can easily be turned into a revolt 
- Barber, 1996:298 
True champions of laissez-Jaire have argued that globalization and 
democratization would be two sides of the same coin, yet even those states who 
receive top rating from Amnesty International hardly ever specially consult 
their populations on global policies (Bayliss & Smith, 1997:27). So the real 
enthusiasts claim that the market enlarges the scope for popular participation 
and contro!. However, this vision has proven to be contrary to 'popular' belief, 
since in the present-day globalizing world, the construction of rules takes place 
mainly through elite opposition rather than through representative, let alone 
participatory democracy (Bayliss & Smith, 1997:26). 
Barber's analysis in Jihad VS. McWorld articulates the latter point 
considerably as he places emphasis on democratization in the context of 
globalization. Barber's main concern is with something that he refers to as 
' participatory democracy' or 'civil society', a kind of political system in which 
each individual takes an active role in nearly every decision in government. 
The cutting line that Barber would like to pencil in is between good, democratic 
civil society and a dire, vulgar McWorid (Internet 8) . He sees both Jihad and 
McWorld as threats to the system, Jihad, because it represents a cultural 
sectarianism rooted in race which: 
., ,holds out the grim prospect of a retnbalization of large swaths of 
humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened balkanization of 
66 
nation-states in which culture is pitted against culture, people against 
people, tribe against tribe, a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly 
conceived faiths against even) kind of interdependence, even) kind of 
artificial social cooperation and mu tuality: against technologt), against 
pop culture, and against integrated markets; against moderniti) itself 
as well as the future in which moderniti) issues. 
- Barber, 1996:4 
McWorld, because it represents: 
... onrushing economic, tecJmological, and ecological forces that demand 
integration and uniformih) and that mesmerizes peoples even)where 
with fast music, fas t computers, and fast food - MTV, Macintosh, and 
McDonald's - pressing nations into one homogenous global theme park, 
one world tied together by communications, information, entertainment, 
and commerce. The planet is falling precipitously apart and reluctantly 
together at the very same moment. 
- Barber, 1996:4 
According to Barber, the nation-state, the institutional cradle of 
democracy and citizenship, is being threatened by McWorld for the simple 
reason that it takes away from people their conventional political communities 
- subverting these communities' power to regulate their own forms of 
behaviour (Internet 8). Barber gives a provocative insight that the world is 
becoming simultaneously more homogenous and diverse which subsequently 
questions the validity of the frame as "markets are not designed to do the 
things .. .invent the common language of 'we' (Barber, 1996:242). Naomi Klein 
(2002:283) adds to Barber's point when she refers to 'free' speech and how 
meaningless it is as the voice of the commercial mainstream is everywhere. To 
subdue the inherent tension in the frame is to substitute and humanize it in 
order for individuals "to adapt to their own interests and their own rules" 
(Praeg, 2003:72). The frame could be described as the capitalist, consumer 
society that constructs the identities of people through public spaces (these are 
"spaces in which the contemporary subject has to find a voice and speak out 
against a variety of forms of domination that are at once political, economic 
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and cultural" (Praeg, 2003:28). Benjamin Barber (1996:220) offers an eloquent 
description of this process in Jihad vs. McWorld when he writes: 
The apparent widening of consumer choices actually shrinks the field 
of social choices and forces infrastmctural changes no public 
communihj ever consciously either selects or rejects. For example, 
the American's freedom to choose among scores of automobile brands 
was secured by sacrificing the liberhj to choose between private and 
public transportation, and mandated a world in which strip malls, 
suburbs, high gas consumption, and traffic jams became inventible 
and omnipresent without ever having been the willed choice of some 
democratic decision-making body or that matter of individuals who 
like driving automobiles and chose to buy one. This politics of 
commodity offers a superficial expansion of options within a 
determined frame in return for surrendering the right to determine 
the frame. 
The McLibel 13 trial of the mid 80's was a project that typified the kinds 
of resistance aimed at democratizing our civil spaces (Praeg, 2003:66). By 
meeting the multinational face to face in the witness stand McWorld began to 
acknowledge the force of the' ordinary' - that they too have the power to make 
a difference and to: 
encourage and empower ordinanj people to articulate their 
OlVn needs and rights, to understand how sociehj is really 
functioning and in whose vested interests, and to be able to 
take partial stapes to fight for their own interests 
individually and collectively with others. 
- Morris, cited in Praeg, 2003:71 
13 In 1985 two ordinary people, a gardener and a bartender, confronted one of the largest 
transnationals, McDonald's, by taking them to court. According to Morris and Steele, 
McDonald's symbolized everything that they considered wrong with the prevailing corporate 
mentality. Although they were both well - aware of the fact that as ordinary people the odds 
were stacked up against them, they wanted to ensure that McDonald's would not succeed in 
silencing them. What the McLibel trial brought to our attention is that within the frames there 
are alternative frames - we have more choices than we are led to believe (Praeg, 2003:69). 
McWorld started to become a form of oppression and "transnational corporations often became 
more powerful and even less accountable than local and national governments - hence they 
should also have no right to suppress free public debate over their activities" (Morris, cited in 
Praeg, 2003:69). 
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Consumerism sells itself as the grand democratizing strength, but in 
reality mass culture exists to reinstate and reiterate the cultural inequalities and 
class distinctions in society. This could be referred to as the ambiguity of 
consumption, as consumption seems to operate as an explanation of 
democratization in a stratified society, while at the same time operating to 
reinforce this very stratification. This paradox, epitomized by the McLibel trial 
and typical of the globalization discourse, has very effectively revealed the 
contortions of the system. These contortions are notably the assumed affinity 
between capitalism and democracy. 
3.1 The Antidemocratic Animus of Jihad 
Historian John Pocock asks 'whether the subordination of 
the sovereign communihj of citizens to the international 
operation of post-industrial market forces' is a good or bad 
step in the architecture of a post-modern politics'. My 
answer here is: bad. No, not bad, disastrous. 
- Barber, 1996:236 
Democrats once dreamed of a society where the common language of 
the market with its accompanying currency would produce common 
behaviours that would flower out any inequalities in the world. It was believed 
that by shrinking the world and by diminishing the salience of national 
borders, the prevailing market imperative would push against national 
boundaries in search of an international economic emporium (Internet 2). By 
introdUCing the Enlightenment dream of a universal rational society that has 
been homogenized through technological innovations, it seemed as if the quest 
for universal solutions was complete (ibid). 
As individuals we have always have the desire for the most attractive 
democratic ideal - the yearning for self-government, some expression of 
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partaking, liability, and most of all, to be represented (Internet 2). It would be 
expected that living in a democratic society would allow for self-determining 
communities to open up to others as well as respecting their values and idea of 
community (Barber, 1996:279). While the majority of us seem to think that 
democracy is a "universal prescription for some singularly remarkable form of 
government", it really is a certain fashion how to live our lives (ibid). The way 
that democratic life presents itself makes one believe that it lays the 
foundations for self-determining communities. Yet, these communities are 
constantly open to outside influences which impose a firm sense of their own 
values (Barber, 1996:279). 
Tragically, 'democratic capitalism' does not do what 'strong democracy' 
should represent. 14 The reality is that it does not engage citizens in civic 
activity or civic judgement. Increasingly, we are finding ourselves in an era in 
which nation-states are stranded as the rights of their citizens are eclipsed. This 
contradiction is precisely what al-Qaeda is fighting against; their first priority is 
with the reinvention of democratic citizenship (Barber, 1996:275;284). To be 
sure, global government, above all democratic global government, does not 
nurture a democratic civil society. McWorld's market imperative has done 
nothing to live up to its democratic claim of creating freer societies. The pursuit 
for science and technology compels 'open' societies yet in this high-tech 
commercial world there is nothing that looks particularly democratic. 
Governments of today, especially those of developing countries, have allowed 
markets to push them around by allowing international banks into thinking 
that laissez-faire capitalist economics is a self-contained collective system 
(Barber, 1996:238). As will be seen below, Alexsandr Solzhenitsyn refers to this 
system as 'savage capitalism' - "fraught with unproductive, savage and 
repulsive forms of behaviour, the plunder of the nation's wealth" (ibid). A 
powerful irony is at work here in which: 
14 'Strong democracy' is a term that Barber (1992:7) describes as "a system that suits the political 
needs of decentralized communities as well as theocratic and national party dictatorships ," 
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Capitalism and democraClj have a relationship, but it is 
something less than a marriage. An efficient free market 
after all requires that consumers be free to vote their dollars 
on competing goods, not that citizens be free to vote their 
values and beliefs of competing political candidates and 
programs. 
- Barber, 1992:4 
As a result of the emergence of the 'relationship' that capitalism and 
democracy exert has led to an ever-greater degree of rebellious fractions, that 
not only claim to be at war with modernity, but also with the traditional nation-
state (Internet 2). Increasingly, these forces that Barber calls Jihad are working 
in the opposite direction of McWorld's movement towards homogenization. 
The mood expressed by Jihad is thus to go to war with McWorld as an 
expression of community, in order to resecure their parochial identities and to 
redraw their boundaries. Culture has, therefore, been implicated at the 
forefront of superstructure as the real players are no longer nations, but tribes 
that use identity politics and multicultural diversity to represent strategies for a 
free society (Barber, 1996:8-9). The first priority of the angry brothers of Jihad is 
thus with the reconstruction of civil society by giving it a voice with which to 
speak which has been left stranded within nation-states devoted to democratic 
citizenship (Barber, 1996:284). 
On that token, Jean Jacques Rousseau once wrote that freedom is: "a 
food easy to eat but hard to digest" (Rousseau, cited in Barber, 1992:8). Yet 
freedom, if ever achieved by McWorld's prisoners of cultural monism, comes at 
a price. If the United States is undeniably interested in constructing a 
democratic architecture for the world, it needs to operate on the premise that 
the world does not have to join McWorld in order to "suffer the consequences" 
(Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:253). Rather, it is essential that as citizens 
of the global village, we remove ourselves from the realities of interdependence 
so that we can negotiate on an equal footing. On the global plane today, the 
freedom of the market has helped to sustain the freedom of politics which in 
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turn has led to the globalization of democracy. Precisely because democracy is 
political and is defined by sovereignty, globalization has left this political 
institution ' trapped' in the nation-state box (Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 
2002:258). In fact, the paradoxical interdependence between Jihad and McWorld 
has given democracy little chance to embark on creating a civil society that 
reflects a democratic way of life. Wrestling with the terrors of Jihad, and the 
insufficiencies of McWorld, have appeared to leave little or no opportunity for a 
dialectical interplay between these two forces in which global democracy is 
supposedly to prosper. 
Furthermore, apart from the democratic option being importable to 
rescue democratic citizenship, a pattern also begins to persist which presents an 
image of McWorld in which the contrary is taking place - the world is 
concurrently more united and interdependent than before as well (Barber, 
1996:12). Take, for example, the economic and commercial forces, the latest 
round in capitalism's time-honoured hunt for world markets and global 
consumers, which have constituted a scheme of power and control that 
generates prosperity and development with unparalleled effectiveness. 
Together with the influence of the media and advertising, these developments 
have become dominant forces in the rationalizing process of the consumer 
mentality. 
Before long, by observing the patterns of consumption in a systematic 
way, our need for particular objects has become more alienating as we choose 
objects, not to satisfy needs but to differentiate ourselves from others 
(Baudrillard). McWorld has transformed capitalism into a system where 'needs' 
are manipulated and created to create and recreate social stratification along 
class and gender lines (Barber, 1996:268). While we are under the impression 
that the control given to us by science and technology appears to be gratifying, 
what we are in fact experiencing is the contrary. The more influential 
technology becomes and the more gratifying durable goods become in 
replacing our sense of identity, the more we will long for an unsatisfied or 
longing for community that has been lost (Barber, 1996:243) . This is the hard 
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lesson of interdependence in which consumption plays an active role in 
creating our identities. The following section discusses at length the 
interdependence between consumers and consumption as presented by the 
frame and Jihad's perpetual yearning to re-create our sense of community 
which has been lost as a result of McWorld's consumer culture. 
*** 
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4. The Hard Lesson of Interdependence 
Economic globalization has entered a critical phnse. A 
mounting backlash against its effects, especially in the 
industrial democracies, is threatening a venj disruptive 
impact on economic activihj and social stabilihj in many 
countries. The mood in these democracies is one of 
helplessness and anxiehj., which helps explain the rise of a 
new brand of populist politicians. This can easily tum into 
revolt. 
- Schwab, cited in Barber, 1996:294 
Alfred M. Zeien, Gillette's chairman, once said "I do not find foreign 
countries foreign" (Zeien, cited in Barber, 1996:23). In the world before 
McWorld, there was a genuine independence for democratic sovereign nations, 
and sovereignty offered peoples of different nations autonomous control of 
their lives. Today, by many measures, however, multinational corporations, or 
rather' anti-national' corporations, are much more central players in global 
affairs than nations (Barber, 1996:23). Their customers are no longer citizens, 
but consumers who belong to a universal tribe of needs and wants. "A 
consumer is a consumer is a consumer" (ibid). As far as production and 
consumption are concerned, there is only one world and that is the world of 
McWorld. Hence, what we are faced with today is a world in which there are no 
walls high enough to defend us against a corrupt ideology. While democracy 
allows markets to operate through offering consumers consumer choices, there 
are no alternative non-market forces in place to counteract their accompanying 
vices (Barber, 1996:244). 
By globalizing the market place and constraining the logic of 
sovereignty, international organizations such as the GATT and the WTO 
undermine civic power and public spaces. These institutions lack distinctive 
national identities and do not reflect nor respect the nation qua imagined 
community as an organizing regulative principle. The latter is also labelled as 
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market fundamentalism 15 which softens citizens up to believe that they will be 
a lot 'freer' when they think of themselves not as public citizens, but as private 
consumers (Barber, in Booth & Dunne, 2002:260). As Felix Rohatyn has bluntly 
confessed, 
... there is a brutal Danvinian logic to these markets. They 
are nervous and greedy. They look for stabilihj and 
transparenClj, but what they reward is not always our 
preferred form of democracy. 
- Rohatyn, cited in Barber, 1996:7 
Markets simply are not designed to do the things that democratic 
polities do. They enjoy contractual rather than communitarian modes of 
discourse and allow us to stroke our solitary egos but leave unsatisfied our 
longing for community. They offer us durable goods and short-lived dreams 
but not a common identity or a collective membership. In a democratic society 
the opposite happens, as we are citizens as opposed to just consumers. 
Democratic governance does not just concern choosing, it is about public 
choosing. This is important with regards to the global sector, as only public and 
democratic decisions will be able to set up social justice and equity on earth. 
Put plainly, 
... the st111ggle against Jihad (which is in itself a holy 
'sh'uggle' against us) can succeed only if it is also a struggle 
on behalf of the genuine transnational public good against 
the private interests in McWorld. 
- Barber, cited in Booth & Dunne, 2002:261 
15 'Market fundamentalism' is also known to the Europeans as neo-Iiberalism. It "is an ideology 
that saps democracy by attacking government and its culture of public power" (Barber, cited 
in Booth & Dunne, 2002:260). 
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Certainly the hurried pursuit of free markets gives us the impression 
that we have the right to choose between dozens of automobile models or the 
many different brands of designer labels. The disillusion behind that, is that 
those who do not have the monthly salary to keep up with the rising price of 
bread, let alone the men and women who do not have jobs at all, do not have 
that 'freedom' to choose as advocated by the free market. 
The politics of commodity offers a superficial expansion of options - a 
feeling of freedom while diminishing the range of options and the power to 
affect the larger world. Capitalists might be democrats, but that does not 
necessarily mean that they practise democracy or that capitalism produces 
democracy. Contrary to this, the widespread postulation has always been that 
the power at the top knows best and that people are no good - they have to be 
controlled (Mailer, 2003:16). 
We don't can trol our countn;. Corporate power is running 
this countnj now. The notion that we have an active 
demoCraClj that controls our faith is not true. Was I ever able 
to vo te on how high buildings could or should be? Nobody's 
ever been able to vote on many an item that truly matters in 
terms of how our lives are led ... We're on a power trip in 
which only a small fraction of America manages to 
participate. 
- Mailer, 2002:104 
The unequal distribution of resources and unbalanced affairs have 
turned McWorld into a playground for some, but a cemetery for those who 
cannot play along. Not only do the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, but 
the rich get freer while the poor get enslaved. It's worth, while then, to 
understand terrorism in the context that terrorists see it. "Terrorists feel that 
they are gouging out an octopus that's looking to destroy their world" (Mailer, 
2002:22). You go into a McDonald's in Panama and there are marble floors. 
Corporate capitalism does have this tendency to take over large parts of the 
economies of other countries. McWorld does not always pay attention to what it 
tramples. To some degree there is a lot of envy towards the United States. But 
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on the other hand, the hatred expressed is rightly so for various intrusive 
reasons. As seen in the previous chapter, the core of the hatred of Muslims 
towards the United States is the fear that they are going to lose their own 
people to Western values. 
These manifold ironies, while contributing powerfully to the story of 
growing global injustice and shrinking the prospects of global democracy, are 
important footnotes to the primary focus here: the fundamental analysis of the 
dialectics that bind Islamic Jihad and McWorld together. 
*** 
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5. The Paradoxical Interdependence of Jihad and 
McWorld 
It is not Jihad or McWorld that Barber (1996:5) is interested in, but the 
relationship between them. Squeezed between their opposing forces, the 
world has been sent spinning out of control. 
Progress moves in steps that sometimes lurch backwards; in 
histon/s twisting maze, Jihad not only revolts against but 
abets McWorld, while McWorld not only imperils but re-
creates and reinforces Jihad. They produce their contraries 
and need one another. 
- Barber, 1996:5 
While Jihad is driven by parochial hatreds - re-creating ancient 
subnational and national borders from within, McWorld is driven by 
universalizing markets, making national borders porous from without. Both 
these forces have something in common as they make war on the sovereignty 
of the nation-state by belittling its democratic institutions (Barber, 1996:6). Yet 
neither can do without the other: McWorld needs Jihad's religion and culture to 
feed its endless appetites for differences that can be branded, while Jihad needs 
McWorld's communications systems and markets to sell culture (Barber, 
1996:155-156). Telecommunications technology has therefore the capability of 
strengthening civil society, but it also has a capability for unparalleled 
surveillance and can be used to encumber and manipulate as well as to access 
information. "Left to the market, which is where McWorld leaves technology, 
monsters may end up with a free and mighty profitable reign" (Barber, 
1996:270). Technology can as easily become an instrument of repression, as it 
can be one of liberation. In many ways, the modern terrorist is the creation of 
the modern media. Acts of terrorism command wide attention in the media, 
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and terrorist demands routinely are accorded extensive publicity, permitting 
the terrorists to advertise their causes to the world. At this point doubts begin 
to arise, as there is something suspiciously modern about the sense of public 
relations that terrorists use. The very extensive use of video technology, the 
Internet, and the urbane administration of dealings with the Arab-language TV 
station, al-Jazeera, suggests a distinctive sense of modern approach which 
coincides with the modern narrative (Brown, cited in Booth & Dunne, 
2002:298). If al-Qaeda were truly in opposition to Western ideals, we would not 
even have heard of them, or certainly not in the way in which they have made 
themselves known to the world at large (ibid). 
5.1 Terror Networking in the Information Age 
The information revolution has led to the fastest-growing economic 
expansion in U.s. history, and led to unusual productivity gains in recent years 
(Zanini & Edwards, cited in Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001:29). Alongside these 
benefits, however, has come the ominous side of the information technology, 
namely cyberterrorism (ibid). Middle-East Arab terrorists are on the cutting 
edge of organizational networking and stand to gain extensively from the 
information revolution. Today, in the business world, virtual or networked 
organizations are heralded as effectual alternatives to traditional bureaucracies 
because of their innate elasticity, adaptiveness, and capability to get the most 
out of the talents of all their members (Zanini & Edwards, cited in Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, 2001:31). 
It appears that conflicts are increasingly being fought through 
'networks' in which the power is migrating to non-state actors. The result is 
that the old power-politics model of international relations becomes less stable 
as states have to negotiate with other actors to achieve their goals - which in 
turn question the very identity of a state. The information revolution is altering 
the nature of conflict across the spectrum. It affects not only the types of targets 
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and weapons terrorists choose, but also the ways in which such groups manage 
and comprise their organizations (Zanini & Edwards, cited in Arquilla & 
Ronfeldt, 2001:30). A few of the most dangerous terrorist organizations are 
using information technology (IT) to achieve a better control and management 
of dispersed actions. Just as companies in the private sector are forming 
alliance networks to provide complex services to customers, so too are terrorist 
groups relying less on the bureaucratic fiat and more on shared values to 
achieve their aims (ibid). 
Perchance the most appealing example of a terrorist network actor is 
Osama bin Laden's compound network of rather autonomous groups that are 
financed from confidential sources (Zanini & Edwards, cited in Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, 2001:34). Bin Laden uses his wealth and his organizational skills to 
support and direct al-Qaeda, a multinational alliance of Islamic extremists 
(Corbin, 2002:xviii) . Although bin Laden finances al-Qaeda and directs some 
operations he apparently does not playa direct command-and-control role 
over operatives. Rather, he is a key figure in the coordination and support of 
several dispersed nodes. Thus the latest communications technologies are 
enabling terrorists to operate from almost any country in the world, provided 
they have access to the necessary IT infrastructure; this affects the ways in 
which groups rely on different forms of sponsorships. IT can be used to chart, 
direct, and carry out operations. Using the Internet for communication can 
increase speed of mobilization to permit more discussion between members, 
which enhances the organization's plasticity (Zanini & Edwards, cited in 
Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001:36). 
To be sure, there are also limits to how much reliance terrorist networks 
will place on information technology. While IT-enabled communication flows 
can greatly help a network coordinate dispersed activities, they also present 
security risks. Communication over Internet sources can also become a liability 
as it leaves digital 'traces.' For example, FBI officials have of late recognized 
that they used an Internet wiretap program called "Carnivore" to follow 
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terrorist email correspondence at least 25 times (Zanini & Edwards, cited in 
Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001:39). 
The case of Ramzi Yousef, the World Trade Center bomber, also 
provides a helpful example of how information-technology can stand for a 
double- edge sword for terrorists. Yousef's numerous calls to fellow terrorists 
during the preparations of his strike were registered in phone companies' 
computer databases, providing law enforcement officials with a significant set 
of leads for investigating terrorists in the Middle East and beyond (Reeve, 
1999:39). Prior to his arrest, Yousef unintentionally lost control of his portable 
computer in the Philippines. In that laptop, U.s. officials found incriminating 
data, including plans for future attacks, flight schedules, projected detonation 
times, and chemical formulae (ibid). 
5.2 Terrorism and the Media: Violence {or Effect 
The television camera is like a weapon lying in the street. 
Either side can pick it up and use it. 
- Clutterbuk, cited in Livingstone, 1982:1 
Many of today's terrorists have learnt a significant lesson about the 
technological age that McWorld has introduced: that television and news 
organizations can establish the link between the terrorists and their audience. 
In order to ensure public preoccupation with terrorism, terrorists resort to 
'violence for effect' to make propaganda by the deed. They choose to stage 
spectacular and violent displays (Morris & Hoe, 1987:20). Kidnappings are 
internationally organized, reaching out across continents. Assassinations of the 
important and random slaying of the innocent capture the headlines or are set 
for prime-time coverage, seen in living rooms, during breakfast, or on TV in 
colour. The kaleidoscope of violence is beamed by satellite across the world 
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and seen by millions. "Terrorism ... may be seen as a violent act that is 
conceived specifically to attract attention and then, through the publicity it 
generates, to communicate a message" (Hoffman, cited in Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 
2001:42). 
Getting the message out and receIVIng extensive news media 
propaganda are therefore important components of terrorist strategy, which 
ultimately seeks to undermine the will of the opponent. In addition to such 
traditional media as television or print, the Internet now offers terrorist groups 
an alternative way to reach out to the public, often with much more direct 
control over their message. The news media therefore play an integral part in 
the terrorist act because they are the conduits for news of the violence of the 
general population (Internet 22). Some terrorist groups such as Hizbollah, 
through its own television station, has included special cameramen to record 
dramatic film footage of Israeli casualties so that they can re-broadcast it on 
Israeli television stations. The fact that many terrorists now have direct control 
over the content of their messages offers further opportunities for perception 
management, as well as for image manipulation, special effects, and deception. 
The fight for the future is making daily headlines. Its battles are not 
between the armies of leading states, nor are its weapons the hefty, expensive 
tanks, planes, and fleets recurrently used in armed forces. Rather the 
combatants come from bomb-making terrorist groups that operate in small, 
dispersed units that can deploy nimbly - anywhere, anytime. They know how 
to penetrate and disrupt, to elude and evade. All feature network forms of 
organization, doctrine; strategy, and technology are attuned to the information 
age. 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, I felt I was being bombarded 
already by the enormous quantity of images, information, opinions, and 
political rhetoric, that was conveyed to me by the mass media. Moreover, I had 
the feeling that I was strongly sucked into the continuous discussions and 
debates that were humming around me - on the television, in the streets, 
everywhere. I also felt that the images, opinions and attitudes that the mass 
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media were bringing before me were often irresponsible and unthinking. 
Indeed, I felt that the very surfeit of what the mass media presented to me, and 
to everyone around me, was both a manifestation of this unthinkingness as 
well as a manipulation of it. 
A brief look at the skilful use of the media of the world's best - known 
terrorists, Osama bin Laden, raises interesting questions about the impact of 
the media on events during a terrorist crisis. As Judith Miller (2003) so aptly 
put it, "With his turban and camouflage jacket, his ornate Arabic and harsh 
vows of continued terror against America, Osama bin Laden revealed in his 
speech the instinctive cunning that has made him such a formidable foe" 
(Miller, cited in Combs, 2003:153). Although this was not the first call by bin 
Laden for a Jihad against America, the video shown around the world in early 
October 2001 was by far the most effective. He used the media to secure a 
platform with a worldwide audience, to explain emotionally the cause for his 
anger and his anguish, and to paint the enemies of his Jihad in ways that shook 
the alliance that President Bush was trying to form. 
Society has therefore become vulnerable to a new kind of terrorism in 
which destructive power of both the individual terrorist and terrorism tactic 
are infinitely greater. The advanced societies of today are more reliant on 
electronic storage, retrieval, analysis, and transmission of information, which 
expose enormous fundamental areas of national life to mischief and sabotage 
by any computer hacker, and concerted sabotage which could render a country 
unable to function. Hence, the growing speculation about info terrorism and 
cyber warfare. An anonymous U.s. intelligence official even has gone so far as 
to boast that with one billion dollars and twenty capable hackers, he too could 
shut down America. What he could accomplish, a terrorist could too (Laqueur, 
1996:35). There is little concealment in the wired society, and defensive 
measures have proved of limited value: teenage hackers have penetrated 
highly secret systems in every field. The potentials for creating chaos are 
almost boundless even now, and susceptibility will most definitely increase. 
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Experts in the field of media and terrorist studies alike have also noticed 
this coming together of interests between the media and terrorism: 
• Frederick Hacker, a Californian psychiatrist who has served as negotiator in terrorist 
incidents, notes that "if the mass media did not exist, terrorists would have to invent tlrem. 
In turn, the mass media hanker after terrorists' acts because they fit into their 
programming needs: namely, sudden acts of great excitement that are susceptible, 
presumably, of quick solution. So there is a mutual dependency. 
• Walter Laquer, a chairman of tire International Research Council of the national Research 
Council of the International Studies, stated that: "TIle media are a terrOlist's best friend ... 
[TJerrorists are tIre super-entertainers of our time. 
• Raymond Tanter, political scientist at tIre Universihj of Michigan, makes tIre relationship 
dilemma a bit clearer in his statement: "Since the terror is aimed at the media and not at 
the victim, success is defined in terms of media coverage. And there is no way in tire West 
that you could not have media coverage because you're dealing in a free socieh;. 
- Hacker et aI., cited in Combs, 2003:138 
As the experts above have suggested, the media are increasingly acting 
like a weapon that terrorists are learning to use with rapidly improved 
sophistication. It is moreover, a gun that democratic governments have 
provided, and continue to provide, essentially without controls, against itself. It 
appears more and more so that the irony of it all is that the fundamental 
freedoms of the 'world-free-press' - is becoming instrumental in its own 
destruction. 
What I am suggesting, then, is that this offers quite an extreme 
perspective on globalization and resistance. In the structural world, where Jihad 
and McWorld are functions of one another, the original role of the media is such 
that the difference between globalization and Jihad collapses - creating a 
simulation of terror. The extreme implication of such a structural analysis is 
that, given the role of the media, the fundamental opposition between Jihad and 
McWorld is necessary to understand September 11. The conflict between the 
United States and bin Laden then becomes a kind of professional wrestling 
match: everybody may be watching it, but nobody believes that it is any longer 
a real conflict. One does not necessarily have to agree with renowned authors 
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such as Baudrillard on this, whether it is true or not. That is not the point. 
Rather, it is my belief that this kind of analysis charts the far extreme of the 
media-led structural conflict. 
For analytical purposes, the following section pulls up by the roots the 
myth that, as we become modern, we are also becoming more alike. On the 
contrary, nothing could be further from the truth. While M cWorld might want 
to attempt to point out that the real source of world conflict lies with those 
cultures that try and resist the reshaping that it might wish upon them, the true 
foundation of difference between civilizations rests with McWorld's dire ways 
of imposing its cultural monism upon civil societies. 
*** 
85 
6. McWorld's Cultural Monism: Modern and Alike? 
A hundred years ago, European civilization considered itself the model for 
world civilizations to look up to. Because of the backing of its overpowering 
economic and military strength, Europeans had no hesitation that this century 
would be one in which their values would be recognized everywhere (Gray, 
2003:5). The central concern of Chapter Three of Thompson's The Emergence of 
the Global Political Economy (2000), is to deconstruct the conventional reading of 
the 1490's - a decade which in Western historical mythology has acquired the 
status of radical epistemic shift, the birth of a new age and the origin of a 
Europe conquered world system (Praeg, 2003:11). His more immediate concern 
with deconstructing the 1490's is to answer two closely related questions: 
1. How do we account for tire rise of tlte European world Sl)stem? Are we in error to 
pay so muclt attention to the 1490's? 
2. Why did tire shifting centralih) of the global political economy shift from China in 
tlte East to Europe in the West? 
To be very clear about what he does, one could say that Thompson has 
two separate, but closely related interests, history, and historiography (Praeg, 
2003:12). Thompson gives us a very fine and detailed deconstruction of the 
historical meaning of the 1490's, but he never elaborates a great deal on his 
philosophy of history. This is where he informs his analysis with plentiful 
references to his collaborations with Modelski. Embedded in his 
historiographical model of continuous structural change is the central historical 
question of Chapter Three: why did leadership in economic growth pass from one 
end of Eurasia to the other? As is pointed out much more extensively in Chapter 
Three of this thesis, one of Thompson's aims is to decentre the discontinuous -
structural reading of the 1400's - by pointing out the historical roots of the 
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change during this period and the continuities that made it possible (Praeg, 
2003:12). 
Modernization can be described as a process in which social and cultural 
changes converge to become more systematically organized (Gray, 2003:27-28). 
Modernization theory furthermore emphasizes normative forms of behaviour, 
belief systems and modern values (Gray, 2003:1). As a result, theorists of this 
persuasion argue that terrorism and criminal activities are caused by the 
breakdown of norms and values. Thus, when a particular nation-state is not 
developing contemporaneously with the rate of rapid modernization, or when 
relative deprivation is experienced, group behaviour such as crime and terror is 
more than likely to result. 
The structural analysis above suggests that, rather than seeing the 
contemporary supra-national fundamentalism as the residue of a pre-modern 
culture in modern politics, terrorism is a modern project, a product of 
contemporary globalization (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:46). 
Contrary to the great deal of thinking in this area - this is an important point 
being raised, as there are potentially a number of ways of being modern. Not, 
for example, just one way espoused by the liberal, largely post-Christian 
humanist West - best represented in the teleological thinking of modernization 
theory. Islamic fundamentalists want a world in which individuals do not 
distance themselves from their own beliefs, but at the same time they see no 
reason why such a world cannot encompass the creature comforts of 
modernity. Borrowing the more advanced technologies of the West when it 
suited them - witness the network's ability to mount an audacious attack by 
turning Western technology to itself, with "knives acting as the force multiplier 
at the critical moment as aircraft were hijacked" (Freedman, cited in Booth & 
Dunne, 2003:45). 
Modernization theory, in its classical and contemporary 
manifestations, is governed by the idea that the more modern people become, 
the more alike they grow to be. The truth is that, as societies throughout the 
world become more modern, they do not necessarily become alike (Gray, 
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2003:113). The Taliban and the al-Qaeda network are the result of an encounter 
with modern imperial powers which make these movements 
neofundamentalist products of the Cold War (Mamdani, cited in Hershberg & 
Moore, 2002:56). The flaw in the modern myth is that there is the hope of unity, 
when in fact the contrary is at work (Gray, 2003:112). J.G. Herder discards the 
Enlightenment ideal of universal civilization, believing that, as there are 
countless cultures, they are unique in their own ways (Gray, 2003:25). He adds 
to this by saying that what we have to accept, is that we all have divergent and 
incompatible values that need to be appreciated and valued (ibid). In the 
globalizing world of McWorld's cultural monism, however, this seems to be 
exactly the opposite. Zbigniew Brzezinski is spot on in asserting that we could 
describe the modern post-industrial world as a 'technotronic' society, "shaped 
culturally, psychologically, socially, and economically by the impact of 
electronics" (Brzezinski, cited in Livingstone, 1982:58). The American way of 
life is often advocated as the reality in which we should dwell. Information has 
been digitalised and accelerated to such an extent that knowledge gets 
communicated to people around the world via sound and pictures. Indeed, we 
live in a visual age that is highly powerful in shaping and influencing our 
political and cultural attitudes. Hollywood's images have taken the place of 
numbers and words, which traditionally were the ways in which humans 
communicated. Unfortunately, television has succeeded beyond the wildest 
dreams of the pioneers in the field. Although the print medium is still in 
power, it is from television that most people get their information. "Television 
is a world stage and everyone wants to be on it: I am on television therefore I 
am" (LiVingstone, 1982:58). 
Also referred to as McWorld's front parlour, Disney World is a good 
example of the latter, as it is America's promotional piece - illustrating illusion, 
manipulated desire, and vicarious satisfaction; it is an unreal place that wants 
to redefine our reality. Through this highly effective medium, "image-
mongering" makes life over into consumption, consumption into meaning, 
meaning into fantasy, fantasy into reality, reality into virtual reality, and 
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completing the circle, virtual reality back into actual life again so that the 
distinction between reality and virtual reality vanishes. No one knows how to 
stop the American tidal wave, as nothing is quite what it seems. The time is not 
so far off that there will be one single image of America. Indeed, in McWorld's 
terms American popular culture is everywhere visible, whether it be through 
cinema, television, books, or theme parks (Barber, 1990:84). 
Recognizing the power inherent in the force of McWorld's cultural 
monism, Walter Russell Mead is under the impression that nationalism is "the 
most powerful political force on earth today" (Mead, cited in Barber, 1996:158). 
As a moment of anti-cultural life of Jihad, what nationalism is interested in 
promoting, is narrowness, ethnic and cultural particularism as opposed to 
McWorld's monocultural whole. Rather than spending an extensive amount on 
Jihad's combat against McWorld's cultural monism, it would be more useful to 
move on to a further discussion on the structural dimension of September 11 -
how the event should be interpreted as a clash within civilizations as opposed 
to between civilizations. 
6.1 The Reinvention of Tihad: Clash Within Civilizations 
... histon) is the raw material for nationalists or ethnic or 
fundamentalist ideologies, as poppies are the raw material 
for heroin-addiction", and since "in the nature of things 
there is usually no entirely suitable past", where necessan) 
"it can always be invented. 
- Hobsbawn, cited in Barber, 1996:162 
Perhaps no other society has paid a higher price for Jihad's reinvention 
and the defeat of the Soviet Union than has Afghanistan. Out of a population of 
rough! y fifteen million, a million lost their lives, another million and a half 
were maimed, and a further five million became refugees. There are two 
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countries that destroyed Afghanistan in the last twenty years and devastated it: 
the former Soviet Union and the United States. 
It has been speculated by political analysts, that during the Afghan war 
of the 1980's, the CIA searched for a Saudi prince to lead the modern crusade in 
Afghanistan in the war against the Russian occupation. But when this prince 
was not to be found, the United States settled for the next best thing, the son of 
a well-known family closely related to the Saudi family (Mamdani, cited in 
Hershberg & Moore, 2002:53). The CIA created the Mujaheddin and bin Laden 
as alternatives to secular nationalism. 
With reference to the past, old models have frequently been used by the 
United States for purposes that make the assumption that those rituals and 
practices change the function in a newer context (Hobsbawn, cited in 
Hobsbawn & Ranger, 1983:5). Inventing traditions, it is assumed here, is 
essentially a process that has a well-known weakness insofar as it functions as a 
justification for invariant performances of countries that calculatingly involve 
themselves in the affairs of other nation-states. The following chapter 
specifically focuses on this issue - how historical traditions such as Jihad which 
appear to be old in origin, but are in point of fact recent in foundation and 
sometimes even an attempt to establish continuity with the past through 
repetition (Hobsbawn, cited in Hobsbawn & Ranger, 1983:1). 
*** 
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7. Conclusion 
To recapitulate, this chapter has suggested that contemporary history is 
witnessing a significant shift in the spatial character of world politics. In 
addition to the old geography of places, distances, and borders, we now have 
an extensive global dimension in which certain circumstances are effectively 
placeless, 'distanceless', and borderless. The romantic belief that the world can 
be reshaped by universal ideas is extremely precarious. "Yet modernity in 
politics is about moving from exclusion to inclusion, from repressions to 
integration" (Mamdani, 2000:27). By doing so, we broaden the bounds of lived 
community, and lived humanity. That is perhaps the real confrontation of 
today. It is the recognition that life cannot be lived in isolation. As Karl Kraus 
once said, "radical Islam is a symptom of the disease of which it pretends to be 
the cure" (Klaus, cited in Gray, 2003:26). 
With respect to McWorld, the clearest conclusion that can 
be drawn from this review is that the integrating forces of 
interdependence associated with globalism actually reinforce 
the fragmenting tendencies of Jihad tlrey seem to combat. 
- Barber, 1996:43 
The elimination of global forms of inequality that would end terrorism is 
a tall order. And many will view this idea as an ideal - a fanciful utopian 
international society - that cannot be accomplished. The history of the world is 
essentially, the history of nations imposing their wills on another in an effort to 
dominate and take advantage from scheming relationships. It must be 
comprehended that terrorist actions will continue to occur as long as the 
nations of the world continue to live in an international web of 
interdependency which is characterized by inequality and oppression (Lynch, 
cited in Onwudiwe, 2001:xii). 
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The struggle between Jihad and McWorld is not so much a 'Clash of 
Civilizations' as it is a dialectical expression of tensions built into a single 
global civilization, as it emerges against a backdrop of traditional ethnic and 
religious divisions. Many of these divisions are actually created by McWorld 
and its 'infotainment' industries and technological innovations (Barber, cited in 
Calhoun et aI., 2002:249: emphasis mine). This is precisely McWorld's paradox; 
it cannot survive the world it inevitably tends to create if not countered by civic 
and democratic forces it inevitably tends to undermine. The dynamics of the 
Jihad-McWorld linkage are, therefore, deeply dialectical. Until democracy 
becomes the aim and the end of those wrestling with the terrors of Jihad and the 
insufficiencies of McWorld, there is little chance that we can even embark on the 
long journey of imagination of the probability of a peaceful option. In the end, 
"Jihad will not succeed unless McWorld is also addressed" (Barber, 1997:247). 
*** 
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Chapter Three 
Contextual Synthesis: Structural-
Genealogical Narrative of 
Se~tember 11 
The Islamic world has not yet seen an armed Jihad for centuries, 
but now the CIA was determined to create one, to put a version 
of tradition at the service of politics. Thus was the tradition of 
Jihad - of a just war with a religious sanction - nonexistent in 
the last 400 years, revived with American help in the 1980's. 
- Mamdani, cited in Calhoun et al., 2003:52 
1. Introduction 
Following the alarming events of September 11 in New York and 
Washington, it seems as if terrorism has become the leading concern of 
politicians, police chiefs, journalists, and writers alike. The growing stream of 
books and articles published on this subject bears witness to the continuing 
concern, their contents reflecting the fact that terrorism is seen as a major threat 
to human rights and political and economic stability in many countries. 
September 11 and its aftermath has certainly created a frightening 
beginning of the new millennium (Kellner, 2003:27). In the first traumatic days 
after the attacks, open criticism of America's greatest intelligence malfunction 
since Pearl Harbour (a failure which gave birth to the CIAl), was still muted 
I CIA is the abbreviation for Central Intelligence Agency 
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(Corbin, 2003:49). The Directors of the CIA and the FBI came under fire for 
failing to ensure the country was as prepared as it should have been. The most 
catastrophic realization by far, was not only the failure of the United States to 
have detected the terrorist assaults on New York and Washington, but the 
realization that the United States had covertly contributed to producing the 
groups who were implicated in the heinous September 11 atrocities (Kellner, 
2004:30). What September 11 has done is to leave Americans unsure and 
fearful of their future. As the National Security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, 
(cited in Johnson, 2004:229), said to the National Security Council, "I really 
think this period is analogous to 1945 to 1947", referring to the years when 
panic and mistrust led the United States into its Cold War with the former 
Soviet Union. In retrospect, the attacks are essentially the first massive violence 
that continental America had suffered since the American Civil War (Carroll, 
cited in Johnson, 2004:78). Elsewhere in the world the realities are all too 
common. In fact, the devastation of war has been a familiar sight to those 
living in Africa, Latin America, or the Middle East. What September 11 has in 
actuality done is to underscore the fact that Americans have never been 
touched by modern warfare (ibid). As a result, the implementing of America's 
'War on Terror' has showed signs of militarism and the creation of a national 
security state around the world. "We wage war without knowing war" 
comments Johnson (2004:78). As long as the rhetoric of 'preventive war' gains 
an immediate reality from the Bush administration, it seems as if the Americans 
will literally do anything in their power to further their quest for global empire. 
The analysis in this chapter is concerned with mapping a structural-
genealogical narrative of September 11. So far, both genealogical and structural 
theories have been used to contextualize the world-shaking events of 
September 11. In chapter one, I argued that there is a need for a historical 
understanding to grasp the origins and nature of the terrorist attacks. In that 
analysis it is suggested that September 11 does not represent a catalyst, but 
rather a ferocious culmination of a historical conflict between the West and 
Islam. 
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Chapter two, on the other hand, argued that the events of September 11 
reveal contradictions typical of the process associated with globalization. Far 
from being simply a culmination of a historical conflict, 9/11 qua Jihad is a 
structural component of a greater Jihad directed against the forces of 
globalization and modernity. In this chapter, it is suggested that neither the 
genealogical nor the structural narrative is acceptable as an explanation of 9/11 
and that choosing one narrative over the other will not do justice to the 
question at hand. 
Having read this far into the thesis, it should be apparent that chapter 
one depended on a different methodological alternative, one that looks at 
historical generalizations as opposed to an exhaustive catalogue of texts 
dealing with September 11. Foucault's 'history of the present' was extensively 
used to uncover the layers of meanings that make September 11 what it is. 
History for Foucault is not seen as a reality, but rather as a construction shaped 
by the dominant discourses and their interaction with social practices. 
Identities are, therefore, constructed discursively through the use of 
stereotypes. Hobsbawn was mentioned briefly in this regard as he deals 
specifically with the 'invention of traditions' and how formalizations and 
rituals gain character through reference to the past (Hobsbawn, cited in 
Hobsbawn & Ranger, 1983:4). This kind of generalizing paves the way for the 
weaker 'Other' (in the case of this study 'Islam') to be contained and 
represented by dominating frameworks which eventually produce 'truths' and 
'facts' about the other - leading to a historical confrontation between 'East' and 
'West.' Chapter one has thus provided the tools to make out how Edward Said's 
notion of Orientalism is not a binary variable by which we can test for presence 
or absence; it refers to the process by which value-laden descriptions are 
bought, or sold as objective truths, and become implicated in prejudices and 
biases which inform scholarship and public policy. The point of chapter one 
was to illuminate how history has been used to create enemies by making sure 
that unwanted facts remain unacknowledged. I argued that this discourse took 
shape through and beyond the end of the Cold War, during which the 
95 
American administration started to 'invent' new enemies. As we have seen 
with Bush's 'war on terror', 'Islamism' is currently at the top of the new list of 
enemies. The 'green threat', which is represented by Middle Eastern Islamic 
fundamentalism, has been perceived as something inherently rooted in the 
religion of Islam. 
The arguments presented in chapter two elucidate Barber's point that 
both Jihad and McWorld are "locked in a Freudian moment of the ongoing 
struggle, neither willing to coexist with the other, neither complete without the 
other (Barer, cited in Le Pere, 2001:2). While the rapidly globalizing world of 
the past decade brought many people the benefit of open borders, the speed-of-
light communication of the Internet, freer markets and cheap travel it was 
precisely in this new environment that the al-Qaeda network and other 
terrorist organizations flourished (Bergen, 2002:29). The extent of al-Qaeda's 
dependence on the Internet was revealed when U.S. officials ultimately found 
over 2,000 encrypted messages and data files in a password-protected sector of 
an Islamic website which had been downloaded on the computer to correspond 
with Mohammad Atta and the hijackers (Corbin, 2003:353). What this suggests 
is that al-Qaeda's Jihad, which supposedly is against the United States and the 
infidels, is actually working against modernity in a very modern way, that is, 
from the inside. This raises an interesting question: should we reduce this 
paradox to just another moment, albeit a very complex and paradoxical 
moment, in the long genealogy of the conflict between Islam and the West? Or 
are the dynamics of the contemporary conflict surrounding globalization so 
particular and Islamic Jihad and other forms of anti-globalization Jihad so 
similar in their objectives that to talk of September 11 in terms of the historical 
conflict between Islam and the West makes very little sense? What weighs 
heavier, the history of Jihad qua anti-Western resistance or the similarity 
between Islamic Jihad and other forms of anti-globalization Jihad? To suggest 
that history weighs heavier (that September 11 was a product of history) is to 
prioritize the genealogical narrative of chapter one. To suggest, on the other 
hand, that Jihad is only one extreme example of anti-globalization is to prioritise 
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the structural meaning outlined in chapter two. In this chapter I shall argue 
that this is an impossible choice and that we cannot choose between these two 
narratives - what is really needed is a synthesis of their meanings. Fundamental 
to such synthesis is the fact that, after 400 years, the very notion of a military 
Jihad was reinvented by the CIA in the 1980's as an instrument in contemporary 
politics. Here, the very notion of Jihad becomes an invented tradition, sourced 
from history and applied in contemporary politics, refiguring the entire 
September 11 and not just those responsible for it, essentially as ideological 
'blowback.' At this interface we find the genealogical at the heart of the structural 
and the structural at the heart of the genealogical; less interdependent than 
conceptually inseparable from one another. 
It should therefore be acknowledged that neither the genealogical nor 
structural narrative is more acceptable and that by choosing one narrative over 
the other will not do justice to the question at hand. Accordingly, in order to 
make sense of the meaning of September 11 we have to acknowledge that a 
combination of both narratives is necessary. It has been suggested that we have 
to understand the role of the United States in two different perspectives. First, 
as historical, Western antagonist (genealogical) and secondly, as contemporary 
superpower that represents the forces of globalization (structural). These two 
narratives are only analytically distinct because much of the hatred for the 
United States as contemporary superpower taps into the historical conflict and 
finds in it a historical justification for a contemporary conflict. 
The central point in chapter three is to acknowledge that there are two 
binaries (East/West), but that there is a need to transcend them by criticising 
the genealogtj of September 11. Building a grand-narrative surrounding the 
September 11 attacks means steering away from looking exclusively at long-
term causes or textual interpretations. Rather, a structural-genealogical grand 
narrative will provide the tools to put together two halves of a rather intricate 
argument. Given this general strategy, September 11 will serve as a catalyst in 
enabling both the genealogical and structural narratives to interface. It is at this 
juncture that September 11 gains relevance as a catalyst for a structural-historical 
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narrative of a new world order, as historical and structural conflicts are no 
longer analytically distinguishable. 
What needs to be kept in mind, however, is that caution is needed in 
putting together this structural-genealogical grand narrative. The process does 
not amount to cutting and pasting elements of both historical and structural 
narratives to produce a third narrative. Rather, it requires a synthesis or fusion 
of the relevant elements of each narrative. 
Kellner's book, From 9/11 to Terror War: The Dangers of the Bush Legacy 
(2003), will be used to flesh out the contextual synthesis in theorizing 
September 11 as he suggests that Chalmer Johnson's (2003) concept of 
'blowback' provides a useful way of mapping the meaning of September 11. 
Kellner (2003) furthermore provides a more probable account of the attacks 
because rather than "dualizing civilizational discourses of the September 11 
terrorist attacks" or by solely accepting Barber's (1996) model of a dialectical 
interpenetrating of both the forces of Jihad and McWorld (demonstrating 
contradictions and tensions between capitalism and democracy in the new 
world (dis)order), the useful concept of 'blowback' can be said to contain both 
historical and structural elements (Kellner, 2003:29) necessary for a third, 
synthetic narrative. This is the theoretical argument as discussed in the 
following section. 
*** 
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2. 9/11: iBlowback' of an Invented Tradition of 
Jihad 
World politics in the hventy-first centun) will in all likelihood be 
driven primarily by blowback from the second half of the 
hventieth century - that is, from the unintended consequences of 
the Cold War and the crucial American decision to maintain a 
Cold War posture in a post-Cold War World. 
- Johnson, 2003:vii 
The term 'blowback: which was first used in March, 1954 by the Central 
Intelligence Agency, in a recently declassified report on the 1953 operation on 
how to overthrow the government of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran, is 
increasingly beginning to circulate among international relations students 
(Johnson, 2003:8). In straightforward terms, 'blowback' is another way of 
saying "that a nation reaps what it sows" (Johnson, 2003:231). Although people 
generally do not fully know or understand what they sow (or claim not to 
know), the managers of the American empire make sure that what should not 
be known will be kept under its watchful eye. 
In retrospect, the attacks of September 11 are a textbook example of a 
'blowback' of the consequences of the previous imperial policies of the United 
States in Afghanistan and elsewhere (Kellner, 2003:30). Indeed, the United 
States has turned out to be the world's most prominent target for 'blowback' as 
it is the world's lone imperial power that shores up repressive regimes and 
sells weapons to the 'rogue' states of the world. It is common for imperial 
people to deny their imperial acts, but even an empire cannot control the long-
term effects of its policies (Johnson, 2003:12-13). This is the essence of Blowback 
that Chalmers Johnson (2003) writes about following the months of September 
11. Blowback was no longer read "like a comic book" by the Council of the 
United States Foreign Relations (Zelikow, cited in Johnson, 2003:viii). It 
suddenly became a bestseller sensitizing the American people to some of the 
99 
self-proclaimed roles of the United States as the last remaining superpower at 
the end of the Cold War in 1991. On the day of the September 11 calamity, 
President George W. Bush told Americans that they were attacked because the 
United States represented "a beacon of freedom" and because the terrorists 
were "evil-doers" (Johnson, 2003:xi). By attempting to define the attacks, the 
'Clash of Civilizations' thesis has been used in Bush's address to the United 
States Congress on September 20, to evade the accountability that America's 
imperial projects have generated. Culture and politics thus became 
interchangeable as the attacks paved the way for the media, in particular the 
U.s. media, to saturate our television screens with a rather dubious theory that 
justified a link between Islam and terrorism (Mamdani, cited in Calhoun et aI., 
2001:45). As a modified line of argument, the Bush administration presented a 
distinction between' good' and 'bad' Muslims to define a global civilization, 
such as Islam, with 'inherent' characteristics. The very premise on which this 
suggestion is based is addressed by Mahmood Mamdani, in his article entitled, 
Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: a Political Perspective on Culture and Terrorism (2002). 
Mamdani's purpose is to throw light on the public's general perception that 
people's behaviour is determined by their culture. In order to demystify this 
radical assumption, Mamdani recognizes the importance of both historical and 
contemporary conditions. Events such as September 11 are not entirely the result 
of 'evil Muslims' but need to be understood as a modern construction which is 
at the service of modernity itself (Mamdani, cited in Calhoun et al., 2002:45; 
emphasis mine). This kind of conviction might seem suspicious at first, but on 
closer inspection it makes absolute sense. By offering a narrative of September 
11 where both the political history of America and the world is presented 
(genealogical narrative), and by giving us a synopsis of current global affairs 
(structural narrative), we are laying the foundation for a narrative in which the 
structural and genealogical can no longer be separated from one another. As 
Benjamin Barber (1996:157) states, "Jihad does not stand and is in itself a 
dialectical response to modernity whose features both reflect and reinforce the 
modern world's virtues and vices." 
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Take the civil war in Afghanistan in the 1980's, in which the United 
States rediscovered Jihad on behalf of Muslims in the fight against the former 
Soviet Union. Over the years, the fighting in Khabul, which was once an 
Islamic centre of culture, was curved into a facsimile of Hiroshima once the 
bomb had been dropped (Johnson, 2003;13). The Afghan war was in all 
probability the most obvious form of 'blowback' that the United States has yet 
encountered. It is in fact not generally known that the United States, with the 
covert assistance of CIA operatives, aided the Mujahiddin guerrillas, beginning 
shortly after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. The 
invasion of Afghanistan, can therefore, be seen as one of the direct causes of the 
attacks of September 11. Camp Bush and previous U.s. administrations, for that 
matter, will never hold politicians or high-ranking officers responsible for the 
September 11 attacks. It gradually begins to make sense that the current post-
Cold War American jargon of the 'Clash of Civilizations' is used by the United 
States government to make sense of September 11; for, if it is acknowledged 
that 'blowback' played a part in the events, then some high-elected officials in 
the Bush administration would have to take responsibility for the death of 
several thousand fellow citizens (Johnson, 2003:xi; emphasis mine). 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was certainly an opportunity for the 
Americans to get even with the Russians (Bergen, 2001:66). Just as the Soviets 
had supported the Northern Vietnamese in their war against the United States, 
so too were the Americans determined to finance the Afghan struggle against 
the Soviets (ibid). American policies ensured that the former Soviet Union 
would endure a similar kind of devastating defeat in Afghanistan as the United 
States had experienced during the Vietnam War. In fact, the damage done to 
the Soviet Union was so severe during the Afghan invasion, that at the end of 
the 1980's the former Soviet Union officially collapsed (Johnson, 2003:13). In an 
interview with the French weekly magazine, Nouvel Observateur, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, confirms this thought when he says that, 
"TIre day that tlte Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to 
President Carier, saying: 'We now have tire opportunihj of 
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giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.' What is more important 
in world histonj? The Taliban or the col/apse of the Soviet 
Empire?" 
- Brzezinksi, cited in Johnson, 2003:xii 
The CIA made several tactical errors during the Afghan war. It allowed 
all decisions about the funding and prosecution of the conflict to be made by 
Pakistan under the lSI (Inter-Services Intelligence Agency). It handed Pakistan 
absolute control of how the funds would be disseminated which turned out to 
be a costly mistake (Bergen, 2001:71). Letting Pakistan run the show made 
sense during the early years of the war - first of all to preserve the United 
States' ability to deny its role in the conflict, and also because Pakistan 
understood the facts on the ground better than anyone else. There was a lack of 
direction in Washington on United States' policy towards Afghanistan and in 
the early days of Taliban rule, the American administration was prone to grant 
the new regime the benefit of the doubt (Corbin, 2002:65). The United States 
ended up playing a double game which would eventually result in a 
catastrophic 'blowback' (Bergen, 2001:70). 
By continuously funnelling hundreds of millions of dollars to, what was 
essentially, anti-Western Afghan factions, America was effectively pushing bin 
Laden into the arms of the Taliban. As the alleged mastermind of September 11 
and the embassy bombing in Kenya, bin Laden is seen by many political 
analysts to be a former protege of the United States in driving the Soviets out of 
Afghanistan (Johnson, 2003:11). It was only when Afghanistan suffered a 
Vietnam-like defeat, and the United States turned its back on the destruction 
that the CIA had helped cause, that Osama bin Laden took his anti-American 
stance (Johnson, 2003:iv) . Bin Laden furthermore regarded the stationing of 
American troops in the 'holy land' of Saudi Arabia during and after the Persian 
Gulf War, as a violation of his religious beliefs. When the House of Saud 
refused to remove the troops after the Gulf War, bin Laden broke the ties with 
his country and was seen as a persona non grata by the Saudis who felt that his 
behaviour was provocative (Kellner, 2003:33). "Ever since, bin Laden has been 
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attempting to bring the things the CIA taught him home to his teachers" 
(Internet 10). 
In as much as the United States anticipated reinventing the Muslim 
tradition of military Jihad for its own ideological purpose, it was the world's 
super-power that on September 11 had to bear the consequences for doing so. 
Instead of attacking the embassies in Africa, the bombings of the 
pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (which was suspected of harbouring nerve gas), 
or the attacks of September 11, the United States could have avoided all the 
unnecessary bloodshed by removing the large-scale and provocative military 
presence in Saudi Arabia. Needless to say, the 'victory' of the Afghan war was 
an important lesson for the Afghan Arabs, but it Similarly was influential in 
orchestrating the modus operandi for al-Qaeda which applied it to the next holy 
war against the United States (Bergen, 2001:78). 
The following section will look more closely at a critique offered by 
Noam Chomsky (2003) and other critics of American foreign policy, who direct 
their condescension towards America's single-minded focus on securing a 
global 'Pax-Americana' - justified through its 'imperial grand strategy' 2 of 
'preventive war.'3 For Chomsky, there is only continuity - not the kind of 
continuity identified in chapter one but the continuity of an 'imperial grand 
strategy.' While some speak of Foucaultian epistemic shifts that signal the 
transition from one order of things to another and while it is suggested that 
September 11 signals the dawn of such a new (dis)order, Chomsky argues that 
there is nothing exceptional or unusual about the series of events that have 
defined the role the United States exerts in the contemporary world (dis)order. 
Contrary to prevailing opinion, then, the operating philosophy of American 
foreign policy has been going its way for decades. Chomsky's analysis is very 
2 The aim of the 'imperial grand strategy' is committed to maintaining and containing "a 
unipolar world in which the United States has no peer competitor," a condition that is to be 
"permanent [so] that no state or coalition could ever challenge [the U.s] as global leader, 
protector and enforcer" (Chomsky, 2003:11). 
3 This is a term coined by the imperial grand strategy which asserts that the United States has 
the right to undertake 'preventive war' at will. Whatever the justifications are for 'preemtive 
war: the U.s. military forces use this concept as an interpretation to use armed force to 
eliminate an imagined or invented threat (Chomsky, 2003:12). 
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plausible and does not necessarily clash with what is being suggested here. 
After all, such an 'imperial grand strategy' needs to legitimate itself through 
concepts, tools and strategies in order to pass itself as the crude kind of 
Huntingtonian war of the 'West' against the 'Rest.' Firstly, it can be argued that 
these concepts and strategies are characterized by the expedient use of history; 
secondly, that in the contemporary context of globalization, the simulated Jihad 
aligns itself with other Jihads. 
By all means, Chomsky'S kind of continuity of an 'imperial grand 
strategy' is necessary, but what needs to be taken into consideration is how this 
simple grand strategy narrative interfaces with some of the complications that 
have been spelt out until now. 
*** 
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3. America's Quest for Global Empire 
Whether or not the United States today should be called an 
empire is a semantic game. The important point is that is 
resembles previous empires enough to make the search for 
lessons of histOl1j worthwhile. Overwhelming dominance 
lUIS always invited 11Ostilih;. U.S. leaders thus must learn 
the arts of imperial management and diplomaClj, exercising 
power with a bland smile rather than with boastful words. 
- Cohen, 2004:1 
3.1 The American Imperial Grand Strategy 
The underlying thesis of Noam Chomsky's, Hegemony or Survival: 
America's Quest For Global Dominance (2003), dissects America's quest for global 
hegemony - presenting a scrupulously researched critique of America's 
'imperial grand strategy.' In international politics it is only self-explanatory 
that state policy seeks to construct systems that are open to economic 
penetration and political control. The goal of any hegemonic power is to 
recognize whichever challenge is presented to its power, position, and prestige. 
With the end of the Cold War, the United States did precisely this by 
rashly committing itself to maintaining a global empire. It decided to "convert 
its slipping preeminence into an exploitative hegemony," to try and coerce the 
much weaker and smaller economies according to the American model of 
'democratic freedom' Gohnson, 2003: 28; 233). As has been demonstrated over 
the years in international relations, whoever occupies a territory will also 
impose its social system on the people that live there. It cannot be any different 
Gohnson, 2003:20). The effects or by-products of the 'imperial grand strategy' 
are likely to build up reservoirs of resentment against the United States and 
other Western powers as a result Gohnson, 2003:5). "Yet American foreign 
policy remains on autopilot, instead of withdrawing from a place where a U.s. 
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presence is only making a dangerous situation worse" (Pfaff, cited in Johnson, 
2003:xv). American installations and embassies are still to be found in every 
part of the globe where they use American capital and markets to force upon 
others a global economic integration that is not necessarily beneficial to them. 
Without good explanations, Washington projects its military power on its 
terms just so that it can exercise its global hegemony. 
By fall 2002, high on the global agenda of the most powerful state in 
history, was the ambition to do exactly this; to maintain its hegemonic position 
in world politics (Chomsky, 2003:2-3). In the televised state of the Union 
address on January 29, Bush promised to wage a 'War on Terror' not only on 
those countries who harbour terrorist groups, but also on countries that possess 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Bush junior furthermore claimed with 
confidence that he was ready to wage a war on countries that formed an "axis 
of evil," as they posed a threat to world peace. As an 'empty vessel' (totally 
bereft of ideas and insight himself), Bush mentioned his programmed speech in 
a desperate attempt to assert U.S. power and to justify U.s. aggression in the 
coming years (Kellner, 2003:211). All that Bush junior really wants is to ensure 
that the United States can be the policeman of the world and go after whoever 
it likes in the project of creating a 'new world order' (Kellner, 2003:211). As we 
should be aware by now, such a discourse serves as a cloak for United States 
world dominance. 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq could be seen as a stunning example of how 
America's 'grand imperial strategy' has represented the United States desire for 
hegemony. Beyond doubt, far from eliminating the terrorist threat, Bush's 
administrative policy of 'preventive war' against Saddam Hussein has 
enhanced terrorist activity against U.S. targets in Iraq. As a consequence of 
America's involvement with 'rogue'4 states in international relations, such as 
Iraq and Afghanistan, one could unquestionably assert that 'Camp Bush' has 
invoked the 'War on Terror' to lay the foundation for the 'civilization' 
4 Johnson (2003:224) notes that official America might be talking a great deal about 'rogue' 
states like Iraq, North Korea or Iran, but what we must really ask ourselves is whether the 
United States has itself not become a 'rogue' superpower in international relations . 
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discourse. Huntington's well-known thesis, whose political commentaries 
claim that a major war between Islam and Christianity, somewhat affirms the 
assertion that the United States is determined to fight a battle with Islam - any 
Islam (Moussalli, 1998:7). As to be predicted, Saddam Hussein would be 
depicted as the first one responsible for the September 11 atrocities. The 
invasion of Iraq drew worldwide criticism, in part because it seemed to present 
a new philosophy of 'preventive warfare' and an appearance of global empire 
building. Yet, despite popular opposition that was without precedent, U.S. 
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, addressed the United Nations Security Council 
on February 2003, informing its members that the United States would go to 
war with Iraq with or without U.N. authorization. Echoing Powell, White 
House Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, explained that "the U.N. can meet and 
discuss, but we do not need their permission" (Card, cited in Chomsky, 
2003:32). There is no place more appropriate to begin a reconsideration of 
America's imperial policies than with American behaviour in the Iraq war of 
2003. While, at first glance, the suicidal attacks of September 11 appear to have 
been a catastrophic event on a grand scale, in retrospect, it only puts into place 
America's 'imperial grand strategy' - giving the United States a 'legitimate' 
reason to beat its war drums on Afghanistan and Iraq (Chomsky, 2003:17). So 
while going to war with Iraq was an unpleasant truth for some, it is sometimes 
overlooked that the great evil of war certainly can have a great virtue for 
building empire, in particular an American Empire. 
3.2 War on Iraq and the Useful 'Tragedy' o(September 11 
"After all, this is the guy [Saddam Hussein] who tried to kill my dad." 
- President Bush, cited in Johnson, 2004:217 
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September 11 was just what the American administration needed to 
wage war on Iraq. Within days after the events, Condoleezza Rice approached 
members of the National Security Council and asked them "to think about 
'how to capitalize on these opportunities' to fundamentally change the 
American doctrine, and to shape the world, in the wake of September 11 th" 
(Rice, cited in Johnson, 2004:229). Nevertheless, in order for the Bush 
administration to go to war with Saddam, there needed to be some way to tie 
Hussein's regime to the terror attacks of September 11 (Ibid). This is where the 
small group of ideologues that work for Bush come into play. Deputy Defence 
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, vigorously sold to the Secretary of Defence stories 
based on reports from Iraqi exiles (who had been discredited by the CIA), that 
Iraq was in the possession of nuclear weapons (Johnson, 2004:305). It is 
therefore quite simple really, if the American government does not like the 
information that they are receiving from the CIA, they will bring in people that 
shall write manufactured intelligence information that justifies the American 
machine to act. In other words, "If it does not fit their theory, they won't accept 
it. Simple!" (Johnson, 2004:231). 
On October 7, 2002, President Bush (Johnson, 2004:231) did exactly that; 
to bring in people to write the stuff that would provide for a war with Iraq. In a 
speech delivered in Cincinnati he stated: 
Saddam Hussein is a homicidal dictator who is addicted to 
weapons of mass destruction .. .Iraq has a growing fleet of 
manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be used 
to disperse chemical and biological weapons across broad 
seas. We're concerned that Iraq is exploring ways of using 
these unmanned aerial vehicles for missions targeting the 
United States. 
The initial U.s.-British invasion of Iraq was therefore justified by the two 
Enlightenment leaders, Bush and Blair, as they were 'absolutely certain' that 
Saddam was "assembling the world's most dangerous weapons [in order to] 
dominate, intimidate, or attack" (Chomsky, 2003:17). In the words of President 
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Bush, "[Saddam] possesses the most deadly arms of our age" (Johnson, 
2004:229). Hans Blix (cited in Johnson, 2004:302), the chief United Nations 
weapons inspector, directly countered this testimony on February 14, 2003, by 
commenting that 
Since we have arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more 
than 400 inspections covering more than 300 sites. All 
inspections were performed without notice, and access was 
almost always provided promptly. In no case have we seen 
convincing evidence tlmt the Iraqi side knew in advance 
that the inspectors were coming. 
When no so-called unconventional weapons of any kind were found 
(which would be used to justify the invasion under the 'imperial grand strategy 
of 'preventive war'), yet another pretext was manufactured to go to war with 
Iraq. Bush and his Bushites now began an eloquent denunciation of the 
dictator's use of dangerous weapons on his own citizens - leaving "thousands 
dead, blind, or transfigured ... if this is not evil then evil has no meaning" 
(Chomsky, 2003:17). It is impressive to note that the administration was 
harping that Sad dam might have given some unconventional weapons to 
"evildoers" and that his monstrous offences in the gassing of the Kurds are 
recounted at a convention when Bush's midterm election campaign opened. 
This kind of propaganda rings a familiar bell during the first Gulf War, in 
which Bush senior also had the habit of mobilizing the administration by 
referring to Iraqi soldiers that had pulled babies from Kuwait's hospital 
incubators Gohnson, 2004:230). And in the words of Bush senior, the Iraqi 
soldiers" scattered them across the floor like firewood" (ibid). 
As the opponents of the Bush administration's tactics consistently point 
out, there is a dangerous paradox at work here. While the American 
government supported Saddam Hussein for many years prior to the 1990 
invasion of Kuwait (which demonstrates how the United States is happy to 
fund despots when it is in American interests), as it "would improve human 
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rights, regional stability, and peace," Bush junior turned on Saddam only last 
year, when the Iraqi dictator lost his 'usefulness' to the Bushites (Chomsky, 
2003:111). He consequently was abruptly transferred to the category of 'evil' 
and became the target of invasion and was placed on the United States' 'most 
wanted list' together with Osama bin Laden. Even though there has never been 
an actual link between bin Laden and Hussein, there now was suddenly strong 
'evidence' that Saddam's ruthless secular regime must have been staunch to 
bin Laden's religious commitments in bombing the World Trade Centre and 
the Pentagon. Washington subsequently justified its launch of attack on Iraq, a 
country known to be devastated and defenceless. Overwhelming victory was 
likely to be guaranteed before going to war in any event. What Washington is 
doing is sending out a disturbing message to the world: enthusiastically march 
upon the weak but leave out vastly more dangerous tyrannies such as North 
Korea which has openly threatened to put its nuclear weapons to use 
(Chomsky, 2003:38). The point that needs to be made very clear is that 
America's 'imperial grand strategy' effectively dispenses with international 
rule of law when it so pleases. "Our invasion is legitimate," Bush declared, 
because "the United States of America has the sovereign authority to use force 
in assuring its own national security" (Chomsky, 2003:33). The U.s. 
government has adopted a standard practice in which it regularly chooses force 
over law, no matter how" grievous" the effect might be on others (Chomsky, 
2003:29). With the fall of Baghdad on April 11, 2003, America's dutiful aim in 
inching toward imperialism and militarism gives way to the assertion of the 
coming of the second Roman Empire. "American imperialism used to be a 
fiction of the far-left imagination... now it is an uncomfortable fact of life" 
(Bunting, cited in Johnson, 2004:284). 
*** 
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3.3 Towards an American Emporium 
"Far be it from the American President to get to decide who leads what countnf 
- George W. Bush, 
April S, 2002 
Interview with ITN in Crawford, 
Texas. 
American self-glorifying triumphalists, such as the likes of the Bush-
Cheney gang, compare themselves to the imperial Romans that once acquired 
an empire through their military monopoly Gohnson, 2004:15). But the irony in 
America's case is that the majority of Americans are not even clued up about 
Roman history. To the uninformed civilian, Bush's foreign policy towards Iraq 
or any other defenceless country might be terrifying, but in fact there is nothing 
new to U.s. foreign policy since the 1950's. The innumerable misdeeds of the 
United States Empire have been documented not only by Chomsky, but also by 
other critics of United States foreign policy, such as Herman and Johnson 
(Kellner, 2004:38). 
There is far more symmetry between the post-war policies of WW II and 
the actions of the United States today. The agenda of problems that the United 
States faces at present would simply not have arisen if it were not for the 
imperial commitments and activities that the United States was involved in 
after/ during World War II and the Cold War. While the United States 
government fattens itself on the notion that the United States 'won' the Cold 
War, today's imperialists give us clues how the United States, like the Roman 
Empire before it, embarked on the path towards militarism and empire 
Gohnson, 2004:16). In the first place, within a decade of the Cold War in 
Europe, the position of the United States in world politics underwent a 
111 
fundamental change. As Galston (cited in Johnson, 2004:22), deputy assistant to 
President Bill Clinton for domestic policy from 1993 to 1995 stated: 
Rather than continuing to seroe as first among equals in 
the poshvar international system, the United States would 
act as a law onto itself, creating new rules of international 
engagement without agreement by other nations 
By citing examples from Similarly aggressive policies from previous 
administrations, Chomsky (2003) points out that, as the world's lone 
superpower, the United States, accelerated the country's sense of its role in 
world history and its noble ideals - not to mention its military might at home 
and abroad. As a means to fill the void left by the Cold War, Walter Russell 
Mead of the Council of Foreign Relations, advocates open imperialism 
(Johnson, 2004:68). To keep states loyal and docile, client states were paid off or 
went through "regime changes" (ibid). In Latin America, for example, 
"Operation Just Cause," removed a former CIA "asset," Miguel Noriega, from 
power. When the former commander of the Panama Defence Force refused to 
follow Washington's orders, George H.W. Bush sent 26,000 troops into Panama 
City with the intent of decimating the Panamanian army, which was Noriega's 
main defence (Johnson, 2004:69). Inevitably, the cover story surrounding 
"Operation Just Cause," was that Noriega was involved in the selling of 
recreational drugs that were on their way to the U.S. market (ibid). With 
Noriega out of the way, the invasion of Panama by the Americans was once 
again a successful example of intrinsic imperialist behaviour. It ensured that, 
after Panama was once again declared a 'sovereign' nation, that the United 
States would remain with some sort of influence of the Panama Canal. 
"rn all of American public life there is [now] hardly a single 
prominent figure who finds fault with the notion of the United 
States remaining tlte world's sole military superpower until tlte 
end of tinte." 
- Bacevich, cited in Johnson, 2004:67 
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What imperialists like to assert, is that they are there to bring' stability' 
to the world through' democratic' means. They believe in making the world 
safe for democracy. Yet, these imperialists also tend to 'forget' that imperialism 
is the base of the most unpleasant maladies inflicted by Western civilization on 
the rest of the world (a good example is racism). According to the long 
tradition of imperialism, it is not really seen as a form of domination but rather 
expansionism. Theodore Roosevelt, for example, perceived himself to be an 
"expansionist" as opposed to an imperialist (ibid). Arguing for the annexation 
of the Philippines, he said, 
"There is not an imperialist in this countnj. .. 
Expansionism? Yes ... Expansion has been the law of our 
national growth. " 
- Roosevelt, cited in Johnson, 2004:29 
While Roman imperial sorrows of 'expansionism' took place over a 
hundred of years, it appears that if the present trend continues, the United 
States seems determined to bring about precisely the threats that it says it is 
trying to prevent. Its apparent acceptance of a 'Clash of Civilizations' and of 
wars to establish a moral truth that is the same in every culture sounds part of 
politically expedient theatre. The great alarm that we are faced with today, as a 
result of terror collapsing into simulated resistance, is that the United States uses 
this constructivist logic to legitimate its 'imperial grand strategy' of' preventive 
war' on countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The fact that contemporary Islamic Jihad is to a great extent the product 
of an America-driven imperial strategy lends the discourse on Jihad a certain 
'unreality.' Not quite the historical continuation of a tradition of military 
resistance but not quite an arbitrary invention either, Jihad now perhaps 
presents the logic of what French Jean Baudrillard (1988) theorized in terms of 
simulation to produce the notion of terror as simulated resistance. 
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According to Baudrillard (1988), with the distinction between terror and 
media theatre collapsing - terror becomes theatre and theatre becomes terror. 
Baudrillard's concept of simulation (cited in Poster, 1988:166-167) can be seen as 
the use of "models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal." Simulation 
threatens the difference between 'true' and 'false,' between 'real' and 
' imaginary' (Poster, 1988:168). It is a reproduction of something that is real, an 
exact image of the real image and obscures the reality. What is of extreme 
importance is the fact that it is not an imitation or a duplication of reality but 
instead a substitute for reality. The result is one of confusion, of trying to 
distinguish between what is real and what is in fact simulated, presented as 
being real. Simulacra have become equivalent to reality and the consequence of 
this is that there is no way of distinguishing between the real and the imagined. 
When an event or object is simulated, it "takes on a life of its own" 
(Kellner, 1989:76). It loses its status as an object or a representation of 
something else and becomes 'real.' To Baudrillard (cited in Kellner, 1989:78) the 
simulacra become a natural law or right and serve to control and dominate 
society. The goal is to reproduce a new system. Society is thus told how things 
are to be done and what are the correct codes by which society should behave. 
These precoded choices signify everyday life and' simulate' people into specific 
society that it has created (Kellner, 1989:80). The function of these codes is to 
preserve the system and to reproduce it. 
It is within this framework of reference that Baudrillard studies, among 
other things, the processes and effects of American monopolistic power. The 
Bush administration is trying to make the masses believe certain facts about the 
American 'imperial grand strategy' against the 'evil' forces of Jihad but at the 
same time the former is dependent on strategies and concepts borrowed from 
its enemies. The fact is, that the masses are at the mercy of the United States to 
create the reality they inhabit. Terrorism can therefore be interpreted as 
violence for effect as it choreographs dramatic incidents to achieve maximum 
publicity - the real is collapsed into simulacra and the encoded system of 
thought and behaviour substitute our 'reality' with a simulated reality. This 
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accounts for the somewhat strange epistemological status of concepts like 
'blowback' and 'useful tragedy' which function as the cornerstone of a 
narrative about 9/ 11 that goes beyond the limitation of historical and structural 
narratives. 
* * * 
8. Conclusion 
It almost seems as if history has come full circle. Communism is dead, 
and today its successors in Russia and elsewhere are helping the United States 
extirpate the dreaded terrorists. Yesterday's freedom fighters in Afghanistan, 
many of them Islamic fundamentalists from other countries, are today's 
terrorists . There is a very good chance that in the coming years we will see 
enemies and friends reshuffled again. It is a human tendency to look towards 
others in times of need. We seek out friends and allies in times of danger. But in 
times of richness, the shortsighted tend to walk away with others (Mamdani, 
2002:27). Nothing is certain anymore; our world has become inordinately 
complex - not just for onlookers but, above all, for those who seek to rule. 
Lack of knowledge about other peoples has made Americans oblivious 
to other cultures and peoples around the world. Ignorance and myth about 
Islam can breed self-righteousness - a dangerous base on which to engage with 
the world. Narratives are therefore Significant in understanding the roots of the 
conflict, the reactions of many of the protagonists, the United States and other 
responses to the attacks, and the upcoming actions that are, or are not, 
contemplated (Ross, cited in Calhoun et al., 2002:308). In the enterprise of 
constructing reality, both the historical and structural narratives have been used 
to frame the discourse around September 11. These narratives head off in 
different directions that evoke very different images of the September 11 
attacks. Whereas the historical narrative invokes images of justice and predicting 
115 
the controlled revenge that has characterized the relationship between the West 
and Islam, at least since the first Crusade, the structural narrative is connected to 
the anger and resentment towards the United States as expressed by many 
parts of the Muslim world. This narrative could be viewed as further evidence 
that rather than to neatly dichotomise (West/East or West vs. Rest) the world 
and deducing that we are experiencing a 'Clash of Civilizations,' it would be 
better to suggest that we are in fact witnessing a clash within civilization. 
Either way, the complexity and ambiguity of both the structural and 
historical narratives, as well as the experiences underlying them, has offered the 
opportunity to bridge these two completely incompatible worldviews into a 
structural-historical narrative, which is relevant to an understanding of the 
attacks of September 11. We can therefore not have a structural argument 
without a genealogical one - even, and perhaps especially, if in such a 
genealogical account of the notion of a religious Jihad (against the West, against 
Modernity, against secularism and so on) emerges as nothing more than a 
tradition that was recently invented by the secular in order to mobilize the 
religious to fight a secular war, a war that they had to pay a very high price for. 
Over time, the consequences of September 11 will be decided by the 
factor that itself caused this crisis. The outcome is, to say the least, quite 
uncertain but the 'blowback' could possibly lay the foundations for a crisis that 
could impair, or even end America's hegemonic influence (Johnson, 2003:232-
233). Many observers have argued that the war against terrorism will lack 
legitimacy, unless the powerful nations embark on reducing global inequalities 
and extreme poverty. Moreover, many have insisted, the global war against 
terrorism cannot succeed without bold initiatives to secure justice for the 
Palestinian people. What the United States needs is to seek desperately a new 
analysis for its role in the post-Cold War world and to implement policies that 
will prevent any other major war from taking place (Johnson, 2003:34). 
Although most Americans do not even have a hand in deciding how the 
foreign policy of the United States is governed, they are certainly going to pay a 
steep price for their imperialist escapades of the past decades (Johnson, 
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2003:34). David Castello, a professor in international relations (cited in Johnson, 
2003:232), has correctly observed, 
The international system breaks down not only because 
unbalanced and aggressive new powers seek to dominate 
their neighbours, but also because declining powers, 
rather than adjusting and accommodating, tn) to cement 
their slipping preeminence into an exploitative 
hegemony. 
*** 
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I Conclusion 
In the end we are all swimming in the same waters, Westerners 
and Muslims and others alike. And since the waters are part of 
the ocean of history, trying to plough or divide them with 
borders is futile. 
- Said, cited in Internet 19 
On September 11, the vulnerability of the United States and the rest of the 
world was revealed - in particular, the United States homeland was no longer 
resistant to the consequences of American foreign policy in international 
relations (Hershberg & Moore, 2003:3). Strong-minded enemies could show 
hostility and impose dire harm upon the ultimate symbols of American power, 
the Pentagon and Wall Street. The city of New York was just like any other city 
in the world, chaotic, crowded and in ruins: "Lower Manhattan was like a city 
after an earthquake ... Wall Street executives were wandering like the homeless. 
Streets like Kinshasa. Rubble like Beirut or the West Bank" (Gole, cited in 
Calhoun et al., 2002:343). The actions and the purposes of the terrorists are 
unspeakable and can neither be rationalized nor negotiated (Berber, cited in 
Booth & Dwme, 2002:246). When terrorists hijacked innocent people and turned 
civilian aircraft into fatal weapons, these self-proclaimed ' martyrs' of faith 
stbjected others to an inescapable martyrdom interchangeable from mass 
mlrder (ibid). 
Osama bin Laden is not just some Arab who woke up one morning in a 
bad frame of mind, his turban in a twist, only to decide that America was ' the 
enemy.' H e has reason for hating the United States, and by understanding those 
reasons; chapter one has given a glimmer of insight into what provoked the 
events of September 11 by substantiating the argument with a historical narrative. 
11 8 
I 
The mood of the crisis has its roots in a history that goes back as far as the 
Crusades. Given its causes, such a crisis was virtually inevitable. The Crusades 
and the Ottoman Empire have unmistakably shown that despite theological roots 
of affinities between Christianity and Islam, contra religious and political 
interests fashioned a history of difference and warfare. For centuries, Christian 
Europe often found itself in the position of defending itself against Muslim 
armies, which seemed at times to be fighting for its very existence (Esposito, 
1992:44). In fact the phrase guerra fria (Cold War) originated in the thirteenth 
century in order to describe the altercation between Islam and Christianity in 
Spain (Booth & Dunne, 2002:16). 
At the end of the Cold War, during the late 1980's, and the early nineties, 
(one with which we are more familiar) the United States did not only lose the 
Soviet Empire as the 'Other' or 'enemy' to justify its behavior in international 
affairs, but it was unable to find its role in the immediate aftermath of the 
conflict. It did, however, do so when it began to single out Islam as the 'dark 
force' in tomorrow's world. The project in chapter one, was therefore, to 
illuminate just how the struggle between the two 'forces' of Islamo-fascism and 
Western globalization, have been deliberately constructed by the United States 
and influential European powers such as Britain, in order to serve as a 'tool' to 
justify their imperial behaviors worldwide. For globalization to have worked 
and for superpowers to justify their imperialist aggression against sovereign 
nations, the 'Other' had to be created which gave the 'West' a free hand in 
fighting their battles against the so-called ' Islamic dictatorships. ' The 
confrontation between these new forms of culture-based political stereotypes 
about the 'Other' was effective because of the essential differences between the 
dissimilar ideologies to which the 'West' and 'East' adhered to. Some Westerners, 
including the former President of the United States, Bill Clinton, have argued 
that the West does not have problems with Islam but only with violent Islamic 
extremists. Fourteen hundred years of history demonstrate otherwise. 
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Narratives are therefore reflectors of deeper worldviews and assumptions that 
parties make about each other. By understanding these narratives as being 
motivating factors and reactions of the parties, it can also give one an indication 
how to interpret clashing actions that might otherwise be hard for the naive 
observer to notice (Ross, cited in Calhoun et a/., 2002:304). "As exacerbates, 
narratives provide in-group support and solidarity that promote negative images 
of the enemy, escalatory actions, and offer little room for accommodation" (ibid). 
Superficially, bin Laden seems to fit into the 'Clash of Civilizations' thesis. 
After all, he reveals the attacks on American targets. But a closer look shows how 
this rage is as much directed against one of the most conservative Muslim states 
in the world - Saudi Arabia - as against the United States. The 'Clash of 
Civilization' thesis, however, is a seductive theory to explain the post-Cold War 
world, and certainly Huntington (1996) can point to a wealth of examples: a 
bloody war in the Sudan between the Islamist regime and the animist and 
Christian rebels; continued wars between the Russians and the Chechens; the 
Muslim insurgency in the Philippines; Arabs versus Jews in Israel; and now, 
perhaps, the events of September 11. But age-old hatreds are not sufficient 
explanations for September 11. 
Edmund Burke (cited in Mossali, 1998:41) observes: "Scholarly concern 
with the Islamic roots of culture and politics is very recent." All knowledge as 
well as the criteria with which we identify knowledge, is a product of a 
particular historical moment. For centuries Islam was associated with the 
colonized peoples and the backwardness at the time when Western (scientific) 
knowledge was being constituted. This situation produces 'interests' on the part 
of those at the top of the hierarchies which became, at least in part, constitutive of 
'knowledge' because knowledge was defined by those who occupied dominant 
positions (Wolff, cited in Moussali, 1998:42). Moreover, what this illustrates is 
that, because the monopoly of technological and industrial power was 
maintained by those who claimed to 'know,' we in the 'West' have tllis habit of 
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looking for solutions. Part of the spirit of technology is to assume that there is 
always a solution to a problem, or something very close to one. "There may be no 
solution this time. This may be the beginning of an international cancer we 
cannot cure" (Mailer, 2002:29). 
The structural narrative in chapter two argues that neither side is fighting a 
civilizational war but that instead what we are experiencing in the post-Cold 
War period is in fact a clash within civilizations. Thus, on the contrary, the really 
decisive cultural conflict that is taking place is within the horizons of each 
civilization (Hefner, cited in Calhoun et a/., 2002:51) . The attack on the Twin 
Towers and the Pentagon was an attack from within and not beyond. 
Undoubtedly, the attacks provided shame among Muslims, but also a hidden 
feeling of pride and empowerment. Even if only for a day, the suicide bombers 
were able to reverse the roles - revealing the vulnerability of the Western 
powers. The central question addressed to Islamists in particular and the Muslim 
world in general, is to know the ways in which they can come to terms with their 
own experience of modernity. "The fear of sameness and modernity led them to 
search for purity througl, th e destructive performances and to exorcise the 
modern in themselves" (Gole, cited in Calhoun et a/., 2002:343). Contemporary 
Islam therefore challenges the 'West' to know and understand the diversity of 
the Muslim experience. 
To paint all Muslim students in Europe and the United 
States and all the Muslim diaspora in the West with the 
same brush as we pain t the Taliban is to endanger the 
forces of modernization and doom the catalysts of 
modernization of Islam in the cleft global modernization of 
modernity. Only then may the Islamic Jacobin dream of a 
clash of imagined and ossified dvilizations come true. 
- Arjomand, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:175 
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Movements are more often motivated by objection to specific Western 
policies than by civilizational hostility. U.s. Presence and policy, not a generic 
hatred for Americans, is often the primary motivating force behind acts against 
American government, business, and military interest. Islam was not just turning 
against some kind of external, colonial, or occupant force of modernity (Gole, 
cited in Calhoun et al., 2002:343). We "should not counter Occidentalism with a 
nasty form of Orientalism. Once we fall for temptation, the virus has infected us 
too" (Arjomand, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:175). 
The tragedy of September 11 provided, among many other things, an 
important reminder that the globalization so widespread in homogenizing the 
world's cultures has in fact done the contrary. The terrorists are thus, themselves 
a product of the modern world, using modern arms, and attacking modern 
targets. It is easy to see the cause of resentment towards the United States as 
expressed by Asians, Arabs, Africans, and Latin Americans. Anti-Americanism 
goes back a long way and for good or ill, American foreign policy has not done a 
good job in winning the hearts and minds of people. It has created humiliation, 
worthlessness, and hopelessness in many places, particularly in Islamic nations. 
The resentment of modernity and world integration therefore resonates widely 
in many societies - giving al-Qaeda no better prospect to target globalization 
than by attacking New York City - the hub of modernity's worldwide finance. 
The resistance to globalization has, therefore, itself been globalized. Jihad 
and McWorld could be described as a rather melodramatic tableau vivant who are 
attracted to one another yet neither promotes nor needs democracy (Barber, 
1992:6). Both Jihad and McWorld have their different sets of virtues to the extent 
that they have turned out to be more anti politics. 1 
1 Some of the virtues of McWorld are prosperity and relative unity, whereas Jihad has a different 
set of virtues such as a vibrant sense of identity and community (Barber, 1999:6). For McWorld, 
antipolitics furthermore includes that of globalism - bureaucratic and technocratic which is 
focused on the administration of things (Barber, 1996:6-7). Jihad has also been anti-political as 
trivialization has been explicitly undemocratic. With regards to theocratic fundamentalism, it is 
122 
The underlying philosophy of the democratic front that has as its aim to 
transform passive participants into engaged civilians has not been consistent in 
constructing autonomous individuals in the global economy (Barber, cited in 
Booth & Bunne, 2002;247). It was partly the cost of civilizational globalization 
that was emphasized in the structural chapter. Each individual is juggling with 
both these benefits and costs that modernity has to offer. What McWorld has 
created, is a milieu where needs are manipulated to such an extent that 'we' as 
global consumers find ourselves in a situation of profound civic alienation. The 
outcome between the cruel battle between Jihad and McWorld has led to a culture 
that is "unquestionably in the process of forging a global something: but whatever 
it is, that something is not democracy" (Barber, 1996:276). 
Stil/, democracy has always played itself out against the odds. 
And democraClj remains both a form of coherence as binding as 
McWorld and secular faith potentially as aspiring as Jihad. 
- Barber, cited in Internet 2 
Chapter two has furthermore also attempted to illustrate that there are a 
few things more interesting about anti-globalization resistance than that it draws 
whatever strength it has from itself to contribute to the process of globalization. 
The stereotype of al-Qaeda as a band of nomadic cave dwellers are in fact the 
members of a highly organized network that are so modern that communication 
technology is used to exchange their messages. It is precisely by transmitting 
these messages via video recordings as reported on the world's media, that 
Osama bin Laden directed the fate of the suicide bombers of September 11. Why 
has it been so important to note this? Because it has shown us that it is not 
globalization itself that is the problem but the way in which the world is being 
not uncommon to find an individual empowered who rules on behalf of the people (Barber, 
1992:7). 
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globalized through the blind dissemination and imposition of free-market 
principles and the power accumulated by the multi-nationals (Praeg, 2003:58). 
What we need to appreciate from the anti-globalization resistance is exactly the 
fact that it has contributed in a significant way to globalization. 
Thus, amid the enthusiasm for the spread of information technology, in 
which social processes have become more interconnected around the world, the 
issue of cyberterrorism moved to the forefront of attention - along with more 
straightforward ways in which the Internet and improved communications 
technology could actually aid in the communication of terrorists. "Few seemed to 
appreciate that one of the prime ironies of 9/11 has been the way in which 
advanced technology has been turned against its makers" (Calhoun et al., 2002:6). 
Globalization has in fact become the shorthand to create the conditions for the 
September 11 attacks. 
Perhaps the most essential conclusion to be drawn from chapter three, 
then, is that there is no end in competing narratives whether historical or 
structural. September 11 is the point where the structural and genealogical 
narratives overlap most forcefully. To illustrate tlle interface between these 
narratives, reference has been made to the United States (as contemporary power 
representative of McWorld) and how it has been able to exploit history by 
reinventing the tradition of Jihad to manipulate the politics of globalization in its 
own favor. In the end, there is no moment where we can say that September 11 
meant this or that of the same to anyone of us all the time (Cal11oun et al., 
2002:2). The way that one reads September 11 depends on the particular 
experiences that we have had at the end of the day and the broader contexts and 
ideas that we carry with us. By offering a contextual synthesis of both the 
historical and structural narratives, this study has attempted to come up with a 
structural-historical grand narrative. Through a contextual synthesis of tlle 
strengths and weaknesses of both these narratives and by taking into account the 
historical and contemporary elements of the conflict (i.e. globalization), it has 
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been made feasible to establish the parameters of the new world (dis) order. In 
the light of the September 11 attacks, then, either one accepts the 'Clash of 
Civilization' thesis as propagated by Samuel Huntington (1993) which leads one 
to predict an all-out assaults against ostensible culprits and the nations that 
shelters them (Rubio, cited in Hershberg & Moore, 2002:68); or, alternatively, 
someone who recognizes the intricacy of September 11, and its inherent shades 
of gray would take a far more parsimonious view of the future. 
Whatever one's interpretation of the meaning of September 11, what has 
been demonstrated to be certain, is that by reinventing the tradition of Jihad, the 
United States has given us clues in three central ways: one, the interface between 
structural and genealogical narratives; two, the complicity of the U.s. in the attacks 
in which the attacks qua Jihad appear full-scale 'blowback'; three, much as authors 
such as Baudrillard and Barber talk about the 'system' as if it were some 
anonymous menace, we are in fact dealing with imperial politics in which the 
United States has the power to dedicate, to a very large extent, the nature and 
rules of a game - taking out players along the way. 
Over the long term, the United States and other countries need to dedicate 
themselves to resolving, once and for all, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As long 
as this impasse remains, the United States campaign against al-Qaeda and the 
Islamic Jihad against the non-believers and the infidels will continue. There are no 
quick-fix solutions. It would be naIve to think that differences in culture, 
historical, historical experiences, and political disagreement could be bridged so 
easily (Sardar & Davies, 2000:209) . It is only appropriate that in the post-Cold 
War world, the United States puts the welfare of citizens ahead of its quest for 
global hegemony (Johnson, 2003:237). More generally, the United States should 
comply with an agenda where it seeks to lead through diplomacy as opposed to 
imposing military force and presenting itself as an economic persecutor (ibid). It 
is not a matter of simply altering a small number of policies in a few places. In 30 
or 50 years to come bin Laden will soon be forgotten, but the kind of political 
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violence and destruction that has been left behind will remain very much with 
us. 
To be sure, the September 11 attacks have demonstrated that we have 
sadly entered an era where we have become accustomed to conflicts that we once 
would have found difficult to imagine. In retrospect, leaders of the United States 
seem to have become used to the habit of using 'unfortunate' events such as 
September 11, as tactical strategies to legitimize their 'imperial grand strategy.' 
The latter will inevitably generate multiple forms of 'blowback,' as has been 
demonstrated with the terror attacks of September 11. 
As a student in international relations, one is prone to think that the 
United States 'won' the battle against the former Soviet Union during the Cold 
War. However, this conclusion might appear to be a little too far-fetched. In all 
probability, those who will look at this study in years to come, will find that 
while the United States might appear to have won the battle, it is in fact losing by 
maintaining its present imperialist stance in global affairs (Johnson, 2003:238). 
While the war on Afghanistan and Iraq might have satisfied the popular 
American demand for now, in the long run, things will only turn out for the 
worse because of the American threats at home and abroad. It is important to 
keep in mind that it is nowhere written that by operating in its guise by building 
an empire to dominate the world that the United States' global quest for imperial 
extension must go on forever (Johnson, 2003:xvii). Empires do not last forever 
and their endings are not of the pleasant sort (Johnson, 2004:310). Much like the 
Roman senate in its time, the American Emporium cannot be cleansed from its 
widespread corruption. And failing to implement reform through letting people 
take active control over Congress, gives Nemesis, u the goddess of re tribution and 
vengeance, the punisher of pride and hubris," the power to wait impatiently for 
her meeting with the United States (Johnson, 2004:312). 
Fin© 
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